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Separation of Powers Doctrine on
the Modern Supreme Court and
Four Doctrinal Approaches to
Judicial Decision-Making
R. Randall Kelso*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past decade, the Supreme Court has decided six major
separation of powers cases: INS v. Chadha,' Bowsher v. Synar,'
Morrison v. Olson;' Mistretta v. United States," Public Citizen v.
United States Department of Justice,' and Metropolitan Washington
Airports Authority v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc."
Commentators have referred to these cases as "an incoherent muddle,"'
* Professor, South Texas College of Law. B.A., University of Chicago, 1976; J.D.,
University of Wisconsin, 1979.
1. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
2. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
3. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
4. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
5. 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
6. 111 S. Ct. 2298 (1991). This listing includes the past decade's major separation
of powers cases involving legislative versus executive power. In-depth discussion of
cases dealing with aspects of separation of powers directly involving the judiciary,
such as Congress' ability to create non-Il courts, see, e.g., Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986), constitutional requirements for standing,
see, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct 2130 (1992), or legislative or
executive immunity from judicial processes, see, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S.
606 (1972) (legislative immunity); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.' 800 (1982) (executive
immunity), is beyond the scope of this Article. However, the author comments on
these cases at the end of this Article. See infra note 479. The comments suggest a
consistency in the Supreme Court's approach in judicial separation of powers cases
and the legislative versus executive power cases discussed in the text.
7. Rebecca L Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L REv.
1513, 1517 (1991).
"a paradox without a principle,"' and "evinc[ing] something of a split
personality."9
Despite these characterizations, careful examination of the six cases
reveals an underlying order. The apparent confusion results from the
fact that four different approaches to the separation of powers doctrine
can be observed among the Justices of the Court. These four approach-
es track the four major approaches to judicial decision-making adopted
by judges at various points in our legal history. A close examination
reveals that the approach adopted by each Justice towards the separa-
tion of powers doctrine in each case is remarkably consistent. The
cases only appear to be confused because different combinations of
four decision-making approaches appear in the majority and the
dissenting opinions in each case.
Part I of this Article describes these four major approaches to
judicial decision-making. Part II discusses the separation of powers
doctrine from the perspective of these four styles. Part III relates these
approaches to the modem Supreme Court and suggests which Justices
appear to follow which decision-making style. Part IV then discusses
the six recent separation of powers cases in light of the four styles.
Part V provides a brief conclusion. It is hoped that this discussion will
not only illuminate recent separation of powers doctrine, but also help
provide a framework within which to consider other aspects of
Supreme Court decision-making.'0
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN LAW: FOUR STYLES OF
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
In 1977, Professor Grant Gilmore published his classic statement of
the development of American law, The Ages of American Law."
8. Erwin Chemerinsky, A Paradox Without a Principle: A Comment on the Bur-
ger Court's Jurisprudence in Separation of Powers Cases, 60 S. CAL L RE v. 1083,
1083 (1987).
9. Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "f Angels Were to Govern". The Need
for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE LJ. 449, 450
(1991).
'10. A companion piece to this Article dealing with modem Supreme Court deci-
sion-making and statutory interpretation is in the process of being written. See R.
Randall Kelso, Statutory Interpretation, the Modem Supreme Court, and the Four
Judicial Decision-making Styles (1993) [hereinafter Kelso, Interpretation]. A related
piece providing a framework for considering constitutional review of legislation under
the Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause, First Amendment, and other provi-
sions of the Constitution, appears in R. Randall Kelso, Filling Gaps i-p the Supreme
Court's Approach to Constitutional Review of Legislation: Standards, Ends, and
Bdrens Reconsidered, 33 S. TEx. L REV. 493 (1992).
11. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw (1977).
532
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Professor Gilmore, building on earlier writings by Karl Llewellyn,
divided American legal history into three distinct stages: a pre-Civil War
Golden Age, a post-Civil War to World War I formalist or conceptualist
age, and a modem period which harkens back to the Golden Age of the
pre-Civil War period."2 Commentators have called this modem period
or approach to law "instrumentalism."3
As described by. Gilmore and Liewellyn, the formalist or conceptualist
style of decision-making is based upon the assumption that law is
composed of a system of rationally related rules and that the judge's
sole function is to apply those rules mechanically to the case at hand. It
is a system of pure logical categorization and deduction. Judges need
not inquire into the particular consequences of applying the rule to the
case before them. The judge's sole duty is to apply the rule (or rules)
applicable to the case at hand. The premise of this system is that
change should come, if at all, from the legislative or executive branch.
Judges should not make new rules; rather, they should merely apply
existing law. 4
12. Id. at 11-13.
13. See, e.g., Robert S. Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth-Century
American Legal Thought-A Synthesis and Critique of our Dominant General Theo-
ry About Law and Its Use, 66 CORNELL L REv. 861 (1981) [hereinafter Summers,
Pragmatic Instrumentalism]; David Lyons, Legal Formalism and Instrumentalism-A
Pathological Study, 66 CORNELL L REv. 949 (1981); Michael S. Moore, The Need for a
Theory of Legal Theories: Assessing Pragmatic Instrumentalism, 69 CORNELL L REV.
988 (1984); Robert S. Summers, On Identifying and Reconstructing a General Legal
Theory-Same Thoughts Prompted by Professor Moore's Critique, 69 CORNELL L REv.
1014 (1984) [hereinafter Summers, Reconstructing].
14. See GILMORE, supra note 11, at 60-64; KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION-DECIDING APPEALS 38-45 (1960). As Gilmore states:
The post-Civil War Judicial product seems to start from the assumption that
the law is a closed, logical system. Judges do not make law. they merely de-
clare the law which, in some Platonic sense, already exists. The judicial
function has nothing to do with the adaptation of rules of law to changing
conditions; it is restricted to the discovery of what the true rules of law are
and indeed always have been .... Change can only be legislative and even
legislative change will be treated with a wary and hostile distrust.
GILMORE, supra note 11, at 62. For the classic account of formalism, see Roscoe
Pound, Mechanical 'Jurisprudence, 8 COLum. L REV. 605 (1908). For more modem
discussions, see Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalists, supra note 13, at 866-69; Robert
Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise, 1870-
1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA, 1780-1940 (L Stone &
G. Geison eds., 1983); Thomas C. Grey, Langde/ls Orthodoxy, 45 U. PrT. L REv. 1, 6-
15 (1983). Se also R. RANDALL KELSO & CHARLES D. KELSO, STUDYING LAW: AN INTRO-
The instrumentalist approach, according to Gilmore and Ulewellyn,
casts the judge in quite a different role. Under this approach, the judge
must test the formulation and application of each rule by its purpose or
policy. Where the reason for the rule stops, there stops the rule. Rules
are not tested merely by internal logical symmetry, as they might be by
a formalist. Rather, they should be tested by the social ends to which
they are the means. Because the consequences of a rule are critical in
making this determination, an instrumentalist judge tends to be
result-oriented. Of course, judges must follow the law and cannot make
law whimsically. But, for an instrumentalist judge, the act of interpret-
ing a constitution, statute, or prior common law decision will often
require consideration of sound social policy to resolve leeways in the
law. Furthermore, there may be cases where the law does not com-
mand a particular result because no law exactly covers the situation or
two conflicting rules arguably apply. In each such case, a judge can and
must make law to help achieve sound social policy."
DUCTION 113-23, 278-82, 388-405 (1984) (discussing formalism as a judicial decision-mak-
ing style in common law, statutory interpretation, and constitutional law cases).
15. See GILMORE, supra note 11, at 91-98; LLEWELLYN, supra note 14, at 213-35. See
also KARL LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 217 (1962).
Llewellyn states:
I call it our Grand Style ... [A]s overt marks of the Grand Style: 'precedent'
is carefully regarded, but' if it does not make sense it is ordinarily re-ex-
plored; 'policy' is explicitly inquired into; alleged 'principle' must make for
wisdom as well as for order if it is to qualify as such, but when so qualified
it acquires peculiar status. On the side both of case-law and of statutes,
where the reason stops there stops the rule; and in working with statutes it
is the normal business of the court not only to read the statute but also to
implement that statute in accordance with purpose and reason.
Id,
For an in-depth discussion of instrumentalism, see Summers, Pragmatic Instrumental-
ism, supra note 13, at 863-96, 908-23. As Summers states,
The theory is instrumentalist in four related yet distinguishable ways. First, it
views law not as a set of general axioms or conceptions from which legal
personnel may formally derive particular decisions, but as a body of practical
tools for serving specific substantive goals. Second, it conceives law not as
an autonomous and self-sufficient system, but as merely a means to achieve
external goals that are derived from sources outside the law, including the
dictates of democratic processes and the "policy sciences." Third, it assumes
that a particular use of law cannot be a self-justifying "end in itself." Uses of
law can be justified only by reference to whatever values they fulfill. Finally,
the law is considered to serve generally instrumental values rather than in-
trinsic ones. That is, law's function is to satisfy democratically expressed
wants and interests, whatever they may be (within constitutional limits) ....
Furthermore, the theory treats the law "in action." It is concerned not only
with the general nature of law as social means but also with law as it is
actually used, and with the practical differences that law's uses make. This
(Vol. 20 531, 19931 Separation of Powers Jurisprudence
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The differences between formalism and instrumentalism can be better
understood by noting that formalism and instrumentalism disagree on
two basic propositions about law. The first concerns whether legal deci-
sion-making is separable from moral or social value considerations (in
the sense of law being solely a body of principles about which predic-
tions can be made-the positivist assumption, or law as science),"6 or
focus extends beyond law's external effects to the workings of its internal
processes---the operation of its complex implementive technology. Thus, the
theory necessarily addresses official legal personnel, their roles as "social
engineers," and the technical skill they must deploy in those roles. More than
any other theory of law, pragmatic instrumentalism is concerned with the
effectiveness of legal action.
Id. at 863-64. See also KELSO & KELSO, supra note 14, at 113-23, 191-95, 286-91, 388-405
(discussing instrumentalism -as a judicial decision-making style in common law, statuto-
ry interpretation, and constitutional law cases).
For a classic account of an instrumental judicial decision-making style, see BENjA-
Mm N. CARDoZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). As Cardozo stated there-
in:
What i it that I do when I decide a case? To what sources of information
do I appeal for guidance .... If a precedent is applicable, when do I refuse
to follow it? If no precedent is applicable, how do I reach the rule that will
make a precedent for the future? If I am seeking logical consistency, the
symmetry of the legal structure, how far shall I seek it? At what point shall
the quest be halted by some discrepant custom, by some consideration of the
social welfare, by my own or the common standards of justice and morals?
Into that strange compound which is brewed daily in the caldron of the
courts, all these ingredients enter in varying proportions. I am not concerned
to inquire whether judges ought to be allowed to brew such a compound at
allI take judge-made law as one of the existing realities of life .... The
final cause of law is the welfare of society. The rule that misses its aim
cannot permanently justify its existence .... Logic and history and custom
have their place. We will shape the law to conform to them when we may,
but only within bounds. The end which the law serves will dominate them
alL
Id. at 10, 66. For a general discussion of Cardozo's decision-making style as it relates
to instrumentalism, see KELSO & KELSO, supra note 14, at 145-61.
16. On positivism generally in legal philosophy and its relation to "law as science"
and the separation of law and morals, see EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE: THE
PHILOSOPHY AND METHOD OF THE LAW 91-109 (rev. ed. 1974); LORD LLOYD OF
HAMPSTEAD, INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 170-343 (4th ed. 1979). See also WILLIAM
TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALST MOVEMENT 10-25 (1973) (discussing
Langdell's View of law as science and Holmes' prediction theory of law). For a
classic statement on positivism and the separation of law and morals, see H.L.A.
Hart, Positivism and the Sepanztion of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L REV. 593
(1958).
whether law is a body of rules testable by reference to some external
standard of rightness (some social or moral value-law as normative or
prescriptive, not descriptive).' The second disagreement concerns
whether law is to be represented as a set of logically consistent
universal rules (what can be called the analytic, or conceptualist,
assumption),' or whether rules are ultimately to be judged as a means
to some social end (a functional, or pragmatic, approach)."
With respect to these two propositions, formalists believe that legal
decision-making and morals are separable (that is, law is a science),
and that laws are ideally formulated as logically consistent universal
rules.' Based on this reasoning, formalists view law as a closed system
17. On rejecting positivism as a jurisprudential approach to law and Instead em-
bracing a normative, or prescriptive, legal philosophy, see BODENHEIMER, SUp7G note
16, at 134-68 (discussing natural law); LLOYD, supra note 16, at 79-169 (same); Sum-
mers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism, supra note 13, at 874-81 (discussing "value theory"
and instrumentalism). For Professor Fuller's classic rebuttal to HL.A. Hart's article,
see Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV.
L REV. 630 (1958).
18. Sm BODENHEIMER, supra note 16, at 95-99 (discussing analytic positivism);
LLOYD, supra note 16, at 170-98 (same); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the
Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE U. 949, 950-66, 1000-16 (1988). As Weinrib
notes:
The second consequence of the connection between law and the immanent
intelligibility of form is that legal form is inherently non-instrumental ....
For formalism, legal ordering is not the collective pursuit of a desirable pur-
pose. Instead, it is the specification of the norms and principles immanent to
juridically intelligible relationships. Formalism repudiates analysis that con-
ceives of legal justification in terms of some goal that is independent of the
conceptual structure of the legal arrangement in question.
Id. at 964-65.
19. See BODENHEIMER, supra note 16, at 111-33 (discussing sociological jurispru-
dence and legal realism); LLOYD, supra note 16, at 344-564 (sociological jurisprudence
and American legal realism discussed); Weinrib, supra note 18, at 955. As Weinrib
notes:
The dominant tendency today is to look upon the content of law from the
standpoint of some external ideal that the law is to enforce or make authori-
tative. Implicit in contemporary scholarship is the idea that the law embodies
or should embody some goal (e.g., wealth maximization, market deterrence,
liberty, utility, solidarity) that can be specified apart from law and can serve
as the standard by which law is to be assessed. Thus law is regarded as an
instrument for forwarding some independently desirable purpose given to it
from the outside.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
For a classic statement of the functional approach to law, see Felix S. Cohen, Tran-
scendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L REV. 809, 821-49
(1935). See also Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism, supra note 13, at 882-89 (dis-
cussing means-end reasoning and instrumentalism).
20. See generally supra note 14 and accompanying text. See also Grey, supra note
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of related rules to be logically or mechanically applied."' In contrast,
instrumentalists think that law is always testable by reference to some
external stmdard,' and they view law in functional terms as a means
14, at 11-12. Grey states-
In the terms of the analytic scheme just sketched, the'heart of classic theory
was its aspiration that the legal system be made complete through universal
formality, and universally formal through conceptual order. A few basic top-
level categories and principles formed a conceptually ordered system above a
large number of bottom-level rules. The rules themselves were, ideally, the
holdings of established precedents, which upon analysis could be seen to be
derivable from the principles. When a new case arose to which no existing
rule applied, it could be categorized and the correct rule for it could be
inferred by use of the general concepts and principles; the rule could then
be applied to the facts to dictate the unique correct decision in the case.
The system was doubly formal. First the specific rules were framed in
such terms that decisions followed from them uncontroversially when they
were applied to readily ascertainable facts. Thus, the classic orthodoxy sought
objective tests, and avoided vague standards, or rules that required determina-
tions of state of mind. Second, at the next level up one could derive the
rules themselves analytically from the principles.
Id. See also TWINING, supra note 16, at 10-11. Twining notes:
In so far as legal realism was in the first instance a reaction against an ap-
proach to law that was characterized as 'formalism,' Langdell can be treated
as a leading representative of this approach ....
[Langdell] explained the basis of his approach as follows: (It] was indis-
pensable to establish at least two things; first that law is a science; secondly,
that all the available materials of that science are contained in printed
books.'
Id. (citations omitted); see also Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentali.sm, supra note 13,
at 867-68 n.4 (listing 12 differences between a formalist and a non-formalist approach
to law).
21. See Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism, supra note 13, at 889-90
("Formalists generally viewed the law as a relatively closed system of conceptions
and axionts from which judges and others could deduce resolutions of almost any
issue."); Uoyd, supra note 16, at 344 "([Under sociological jurisprudence, there is] a
rejection of a 'jurisprudence of concepts,' the view of law as a closed logical order.
The shortcomings of formal, logical analysis were noticed as the twentieth century
produced new problems for which existing law did not provide solutions."). See
generally supra notes 14, 20 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism, supra note 13, at 875. Sum-
mers states:
A general theory of law that does not address issues of value is, in my opin-
ion, fundamentally incomplete. The law is not merely a formal receptacle. It
includes substantive content ....
[Miost of the leading instrumentalists ... followed... the American
pragmatist philosophers in subscribing to a theory of value that may be char-
to the end of that standard.'
The existence of two relevant dimensions, however, means that there
must be at least four possible modes of legal analysis, not merely the
two on which Llewellyn and Gilmore focus the brunt of their attention.
These two additional modes of legal analysis are included in the Table
below.
TABLE 1
Styles of Judicial Decision-Making
Positivism: Prescriptivism:
Judges as Judges as
Scientists Normative Actors
Law as Logical, Formalism Natural Law
Analytic, or
Conceptualist
Attitude
Law as Means to Holmesian Instrumentalism
Ends, Functional, or
Pragmatic Approach
As this table suggests,' one of the two additional modes of legal
acterized as utilitarian, quantitative, conventionalist, and majoritarian ....
Most pragmatic instrumentalists believed that values in general and the
goals of rules and other legal precepts in particular must derive from prevail-
ing wants and interests.
Id See generaUy Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism, supra note 13, at 874-81
(discussing instrumentalism and value theory); see also supra note 15and accompany-
ing text.
23. See Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism, supra note 13, at 882 ("That law is,
in essence, a means, and only a means, to goals derived from sources outside the
law, was perhaps the most characteristic tenet of pragmatic instrumentalism."); see
genera/Uy id. at 882-89 (discussing means and goals in an instrumentalist approach to
law); see also supra note 19 and accompanying text.
24. It should be noted that this taxonomy of four decision-making styles is not in-
tended to represent an exhaustive list of possible jurisprudential approaches to de-
ciding cases. Such a complete taxonomy of judicial decision-making styles is beyond
the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, a few words are appropriate concerning how
such a taxonomy would be developed consistent with the two basic questions con-
cerning decision-making styles (positivist versus normative, and analytic versus func-
tional) which frame Table 1.
First, one can imagine jurisprudential approaches which can be represented as a
compromise between two of these four basic judicial decision-making styles. For
[Vol. 20. 531, 19931 Separation of Powers Jurisprudence
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example, one way to view the American legal realist movement of the 1920s and
1930s is that it represents a transition between the Holmeslan and Instnmentalist
Judicial declsion-making styles, with the more moderate American legal realists being
closer to Holmes and the more radical legal realists being closer to modem
Instrumentalism. See KELso & KELso, supra note 14, at 191-95; KERMrr L HALL, THE
MAGIC MIROmR LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 269-71 (1989). On the legal realist move-
ment generally, see Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1222 (1930); John H. Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical
Social Science: Fmn the Yale Experience, 28 BUFF. L REV. 459 (1979); John H.
Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular
Case of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFF. L REV. 195 (1980). Similarly, the sociological juris-
prudence movement of Roscoe Pound can be viewed as a transition between Holmes
and the moderate American legal realists. See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 14, at 191-
95; BODENHEIMER, supra note 16, at 124-28 ("The realist movement in American
jurisprudence may be characterized as a radical wing of the sociological school of
law."); HALL, supra, at 269-71. On Pound's sociological juriprudence approach gener-
ally, see Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARv. L REV. 1 (1943);
Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARv. L REV. 697 (1930);
BODENHEIMER, supra note 16, at 118-20. On Holmes, Pound, and American legal
realism generally, see Martin P. Golding, Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy in
Twentieth-Century America-Major Themes and Developments, 36 J. LEGAL ED. 441
(1988).
Second, even within a particular judicial decision-maldng tradition, a complete
taxonomy of decision-making styles reveals the existence of subdivisions. For exam-
ple, there are a number of versions of natural law theory which a complete taxono-
my would have to address. See infra note 42.
Third, there are a number of approaches to judicial decision-making which
require three-dimensional treatment that are not within Table l's two-dimensional
approach. This three-dimensional treatment asks whether the theory is utopian or
non-utopian. For discussion of some of these alternatives to non-utopian natural law,
formalism, Holmeslanism, and instrumentalism, see KELSO & KELSO, supra, note 14, at
523-30 (dicussing Plato, Hegelanism, Marxism, and nihilism).
Fourth, It is possible to adopt an approach towards deciding cases that follows
one decision-making approach in some circumstances, and another approach in other
circumstances. For example, the jurisprudential approach represented by H.L.A. Hart
appears to be poised between formalism and instnunentalism. Where the law is clear,
Hart pushes for a formalist approach to law; where leeways exist in the law, Hart
pushes for an instrumentalist response. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAw Ch. VII (1961).
Finally, it must be noted that Professor Summers identifies, as does this Article,
four main jurisprudential decision-making styles. Summers, Pragmatic Instrumental-
ism, supra note 13, at 862-63. See also ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND
AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 19 (1982). These styles track, but are not perfectly consis-
tent with, the styles identified in this article. Professor Summers' four styles are
.analytic positivism, natural law, historical jurisprudence, and pragmatic
instrumentalism. Analytic positivism is synonymous with the formalist theory of law,
as reflected in Table 1. This theory adopts analytic and positivist premises; natural
analysis agrees with the instrumental premise that one should conceive
law as a means to the end of some social standard, and not analytically
as a system of logically related rules. However, this mode also agrees
with the formalist view that judicial decision-making ideally should be
separated from moral discourse. Because of Oliver Wendell Holmes'
great influence in advocating this theory of law, this theory is denomi-
nated in Table 1 and in this article as the Holmesian approach to legal
decision-maldng.
law is obviously synonymous with natural law. On the other hand, pragmatic
instrumentalism, as used by Professor Summers, combines both the positivist prag-
matism of Holmes and the instrumental pragmatism of modem-day instrumentalism.
See id at 22-34, 116-35 (listing Holmes and Pound as instrumentalists and stating that
the positivist "prediction theory of law" forms part of the pragmatic instrumentalist
approach, while at the same time critiquing the positivist prediction theory as failing
to take into account the normative/prescriptive, instrumentalist dimensions of the
law). It seems better to separate Holmes' pragmatic positivist jurisprudence from
modem-day instrumentalism, thereby separating a positivist prediction theory of law
from the more normative, or prescriptive, instrumental account of judicial decision-
making. See iqfra text accompanying notes 25-41. Given this separation, the four
major American judicial decision-making styles then become analytic positivism or
formalism; natural law; and the two kinds of pragmatism, Holmesian jurisprudence
and instrumentalism. Summers' final style of jurisprudence, the historical
school, is best characterized as a transition from analytic positivism to Holmes'
pragmatic focus on a rule's history. It has been noted that the historical school
represented a break from analytic positivism in its recognition that "law is not an
abstract set of rules simply imposed on society, but is an integral part of that soci-
ety, having deep roots in the social and economic habits and attitudes of its past and
present members." LLOYD, supra note 16, at 634. This follows Holmes' insight that the
life of the law has not been logic, but experience. See infra text accompanying notes
25-26, 35-36. However, Holmes did not fully embrace a historicist approach, but rather
used history in the context of determining the "de facto supreme power in the com-
munity" to whom the judge is to defer. Robert W. Gordon, Holmes' Common Law as
Legal and Social Science, 10 HOFSTRA L REV. 719, 734-37 (1982). See infra text
accompanying notes 31-33 (discussing Holmesian deference to the dominant forces in
society). This transition in Anglo-American jurisprudence from Austin's analytic posi-
tivism through Maine and Maitland's historicism to Holmes is not included in Table 1
and is not discussed any further in this Article, because the historical school was
mostly a European phenomenon which was never adopted as a main judicial deci-
sion-maing style in the United States. See BODENHEIMER, supra note 16, at ch. 5. But
see Stephen A. Siegel, Historism in Late Nineteenth-Century Constitutional Thought,
1990 Wts. L REV. 1431 (arguing that the judicial decision-making style in post-Civil
War America is better described as "historism," which is a variation of the historical
school, and not "formalism," as it has been typically described; Professor Siegel thus
proposes that the ages of American law involved a transition from the pre-Civil War
natural law style, to post-Civil war historism, to early 20th-century Homesian jurispru-
dence). A more thorough discussion of Professor Siegel's thesis is beyond the scope
of this Article, except to note that as described by Professor Siegel, historism and
formalism are closely related to one another, see id. at 1450 n.81; both are related to
Hegellanism, see i. at 1443 n.49; and, in another context, I have described Hegelism
as a utopian version of formalism. See KELSo & KELso, supra note 14, at 525-27.
(VoL 20. 531, 1993) Separation of Powers Jurisprudence
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As his famous aphorism states, Holmes thought that the life of the
law was not the logic of the formalists, but rather experience.'
Therefore, he concluded, law must be responsive to social conditions as
a pragmatic means to that end.' However, Holmes also believed that
judicial decision-making was separate from moral discourse and that
certainty and predictability were important virtues of law.' Holmes'
25. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW I (Belknap/Harvard Univ. Press ed.,
1963, orig. ed. 1881). Holmes stated
It is something to show that the consistency of a system requires a particular
result, but it is not all. The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the preju-
dices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a god deal more
to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be
governed.
26. Id& Holmes stated:
The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centu-
ries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and cor-
ollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to know what it is, we must
know what it has been, and what it tends to become.
Id. See aso JAMES WILLARD HURST, JUSTICE HOLMES ON LEGAL HISTORY 3-8 (1964). Hurst
notes:
What is "the law," the life of which we would study?.... For a man steeped
in history there exists no timeless, placeless, essential legal order, on the
record, law has been man-made, or at least grown out of men's social experi-
ence, and hence is found always bearing the stamp of particular situa-
tions .... Moreover, men use law to help order their relationships; by rea-
son of Its functions, therefore, law is found enmeshed in particular contexts
of circumstance, purpose, and attitude.
Id. See also KELSO & KELSO, supra note 14, at 114 ("Holmes, as we have noted,
thought that the life of the law was not logic, but experience, and that law therefore
must be responsive to social conditions, as a means to that end."). See generaUlly
Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L REV. 787 (1989); Patrick
J. Kelley, Was Holmes a Pragmatist? Reflections on a New Twist to an Old Argument,
14 S. ILL. U.LJ. 427 (1990).
27. See Kelley, supra note 26, at 456. Kelley notes:
Holmes believed a judge could do a number of things to improve the law
within the limits imposed by his society's prevailing beliefs. First, a judge can
increase the effectiveness of current law in achieving its socially desirable
consequences by making it more fixed, definite, and certain .... So, too,
the positivist judge ought to adhere strenuously to the doctrine of stare deci-
sis, as that makes the law more reliable, certain, and knowable, and hence
more effective in achieving its socially beneficial consequences, whatever they
maybe.
concern with certainty and predictability led him to postulate that law
should be guided by external and objective standards, as opposed to
,internal and subjective standards. Holmes believed that if the law were
based on internal or subjective standards, disagreement would be more
likely, thereby leading to uncertainty and unpredictability in the ap-
plication of the law.'
Later instrumentalists, wishing to view Holmes as a forerunner of
instrumentalism, sometimes discount Holmes' belief that law and
morals should be separable." This view attempts to collapse Holmes'
views into instrumentalism by implanting into Holmes a particular
social value science.~' Holmes, however, was ultimately skeptical of
the validity of any moral system.3 In Holmes' view, the role of the law
Id See also MARK D. HowE, JuSTICE OUVER WENDELL HoLmEs: THE PROVING YEARS
196-97 (196) (the acceptance of the objective standard for liability in tort and crime
would, in his eyes, accelerate certainty, for it would permit and encourage judges to
apply a lown standard with foreseeable regularity .... '[T]he tendency of the law
must always be to narrow the field of uncertainty.'").
28. Oliver Wendell Holmes, A Theory of Interpretation, 12 HARv. L REv. 417,
417-18 (1899) ("[Wie ask not what this man meant, but what those words would
mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in the circumstances
in which they were used."). See also Kelley, supra note 26, at 461 ("[Holmes'] analy-
sis in The Common Law, for example, called for the adoption of wholly external
standards of liability in tort and criminal law .... Holmes as a judge never
hesistated to adopt external or objective liability standards in tort and criminal law.");
KELSO & KELSO, supra note 14, at 291, 323 ('Holmes, consistent with his emphasis on
objective, external standards, and his denigration of subjective, internal standards,
always spoke of searching for the objective meaning of words used in a statute, and
not for the legislature's subjective judgment.").
29. See, e.g., Grey, supra note 26, at 847-48 ("Holmes believed that adjudication
should and must be result-oriented, fundamentally legislative .... Sound legislative
judgment was thus a primary judicial qualification.").
30. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., Holmes' Positivism-An Addendum, 64 HARV. L
REV. 929, 929 (1951). Hart states:
While Holmes speaks of existing law as "the witness and external deposit of
our moral life," he is careful when he comes to describe what lawyers
should be doing and hereafter to avoid any words as soft as "moral" or "eth-
ical." It is only by reading in our own utilitarian concept of these words that
we can understand him as Professor Howe does.
ld. See also Pairick J. Kelley, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Utilitarian Jurisprudence, and
the Positivism of John Stuart Mill, 30 AM. J. JURIS. 189, 189 (1985) ("Professor
Pohiman's thesis is that the central core of Holmes' substantive Jurisprudence and
philosophical methodology arose from the premises of utilitarian jurisprudence.").
31. See Mark D. Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64 HARv. L REV.
529, 537, 546 (1951). Howe states:
If this interpretation of Holmes' intellectual development is accepted, it means
that when he began the study of law in the fail of 1864 he had passed
through two decisive phases of his growth. First, he had shaken off the reli-
gious faith on which so many assumptions of the world around him were
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was to accommodate the desires of the dominant group in societY.3
Thus, Holmes believed that legislatures, as representatives of the
majority in our democratic society, are the proper balancers of public
policy.' In this sense, Holmes agreed with the formalist view that
judges should not test their decisions by an external standard of moral
rightness. As did the formalists, Holmes believed in the jurisprudential
tenets of positivism.'
based, and second, he had learned from the War that personal taste in mor-
als does not establish universal or objective truth in ethics. Skeptic in faith
and skeptic in morals .... We would do better to stand by Holmes' faith and
his skepticism than to repudiate both.
ld.
32. See HOLMES, supra note 25, at 36 ("The first requirement of a sound body of
law is, that it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the com-
munity, whether right or wrong."); see also GILMORE, supra note 11, at 49-50 (de-
scribing Holmes' philosophy as holding that "if the dominant majority desires to
persecute blacks or Jews or communists or atheists the law, if it is to be 'sound,'
must arrange for the persecution to be carried out with, as we might say, due pro-
cess"); G. Edward White, The Integrity of Holmes' Jurisprudence, 10 HOFSTRA L REV.
633, 667 (1982). White states:
During Holmes' tenure judicial deference resulted in legislation that helped al-
leviate some of the inequalities of rampant industrialization; in the 1950s and
1960s a similar version of deference would have perpetuated malapportioned
legislatures, racially segregated facilities, the absence of legal representation
for impoverished persons, and restrictions on the use and dispensation of
birth control devices.
Id.
33. See White, supra note 32, at 655. White notes:
Holmes' job at the Supreme Court consisted of, in many instances, reviewing
the constitutionality of actions of a legislature. In such cases Holmes forged
his famous attitude of deference, which was seen as humility and
"self-restraint" by admirers and has the added advantage of sustaining "pro-
gressive" legislation about which a number of early 20th-century intellectuals
were enthusiastic. Deference to legislative policymaking was consistent with
the view Holmes had developed on the Massachusetts [Supreme] court.
34. See Gordon, supra note 24, at 722-29. Gordon believes that
we have to start somewhere else-specifically with positivism-in order to
understand The Common Law. In particular, I am referring to the scientific
positivism of such authors as Clifford and Spencer, two of the most ag-
gressive supporters of the tendency "to treat the world as a hard object grad-
ually being discovered by means of the suppression of human subjectivity."
ld. See also Hart, supra note 30, at 932; FRANcIs BIDDLE, JUSTICE HOLMES, NATURAL
LAW, AND THE SUPREME COURT 40-41 (1960). Biddle wrote:
Holmes disagreed with the formalists, however, over whether ideally
legal rules should be organized into a system of logically consistent,
symmetrically related rules. In contrast to the formalist view, Holmes
felt that law should be more responsive to the "felt necessities of the
times" than to "logic" or "symmetry."' With respect to the common
law, Holmes noted that it is never purely logical because it is always in
a constant process of change, discarding rules at one end and adopting
new rules at the other end.' With respect to constitutional or statutory
interpretation, Holmes also criticized a purely formalist, or literal,
approach.' For Holmes, laws have underlying purposes; a statute or a
constitution is merely a vehicle for achieving those purposes.' Thus,
an enlightened judge in interpreting a statute or a constitution must
"There is a tendency to think of judges," Holmes wrote Laskd in 1926, "as if
they were independent mouthpieces of the infinite, and not simply directors
of a force that comes from the source that gives them their authority .... "
And that is precisely how [Holmes] thought of natural law-a mystic overlaw,
not law in any true sense, theology or morals if you like, but not law. The
demand for the superlative that we find in all men was at the bottom of the
philosopher's effort to prove that truth was absolute, and of the jurist's
search for criteria of universal -validity which he collects under the head of
natural law.' That is why the jurists who believed in natural law seemed to
[Holmes] to be "in that naive state of mind that accepts what has been fa-
miliar and accepted by them and their neighbors as something that must be
accepted by all men everywhere."
Id.
35. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
36. HOLMES, supra note 25, at 32.
37. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARv. L.
REv. 417, 417 (1899). He stated:
A word generally has several meanings, even in the dictionary. You have to
consider the sentence in which it stands to decide which of those meanings
it bears in the particular case, and very likely will see that it there has a
shade of significance more refined than any given in the wordbook.
Id. See generally Usattore v. The Victoria, 172 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1949). Holmesian
Judge Learned Hand's opinion for the court stated:
One school says that the judge must follow the letter of the law absolutely. I
call this the dictionary school. No matter what the result is, he must read
the words in their usual meaning and stop where they stop. No judges have
ever carried on literally in that spirit, and they would not be long tolerated if
they did.
Id. at 441-42 n.16.
38. See, eg., United States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143 (1905) (Holmes, J., for
the Court) ("[T]he general purpose is a more important aid to the meaning than any
rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down.") (citing Georgia Railroad v.
Smith, 128 U.S. 174, 181 (1888)). See also Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the
Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLum. I REV. 527, 538-44 (1947) (discussing statutory inter-
pretation theories of Holmes and Cardozo under the headings "Proliferation of Pur-
pose" and "Search for Purpose").
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focus on both clearly stated texte and on clear inferences drawn from
purpose.' In sum, Holmes' distinctive style was to combine positivism
with a pragmatic approach to the law, and thus, reject the pure logic or
symmetry of the formalist decision-making style."'
39. See Frankfurter, supra note 38, at 535-38 (discussing interpretation of the text
of statutes and constitutions under the heading "The Process of Construction" and the
subheadings "The Text" and "The Context"). Judge Friendly reports that Justice
Frankfurter, a devout follower of Holmes, as a Harvard professor often reminded his
students that there Is a threefold injunction in interpreting a statute: (1) read the
statute; (2) Read the Statute; (3) READ THE STATUTE. HENRY FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS
202 (1967).
40. Frankfurter, supra note 38, at 539. Frankfurter stated:
[Tihe purpose which a court must effectuate is not that which Congress
should have enacted, or would have. It is that which it did enact, however
inaptly, because it may fairly be said to be imbedded in the statute, even if
a specific manifestation was not thought of, as is often the very reason for
casting a statute in very general terms.
Id. Furthermore, he found that "[elveryone has his own way of phrasing the task con-
fronting judges when the meaning of a statute is in controversy. Judge Learned Hand
speaks of the art of interpretation as the proliferation of purpose.'" l. at 529.
Under the Holmesian approach to statutory interpretation, resort may be had to
legislative history materials to help determine the legislature's purpose in passing a
statute. See United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940)
("When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is avail-
able, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the
words may appear on 'superficial examination.'"). Thus, this approach rejects a plain
meaning rule limitation on resort to legislative history materials. See generally KEIso &
KELsO, supr note 14, at 282-86, 310-15. For a discussion of various versions of the
plain meaning rule, see infra notes 222-27, 241-44 and accompanying text.
Of course, under the Holmeslan approach judges must be careful to use legislative
history only to advance the intent of the legislature, not to enlarge or narrow it. As
Frankfurter stated
Spurious use of legislative history must not swallow the legislation so as to
give point to the quip that only when legislative history is doubtful do you
go to the statute. While courts are no longer confined to the language, they
are still confined by it .... In the end, language and external aids, each
accorded the authority deserved in the circumstances, must be weighed in
the balance of judicial judgment.
Frankfurter, supra note 38, at 543-44. For reference to the modem Supreme Court
debate over the use of legislative history, see infra notes 241-44 and accompanying
text. For an argument that Judge Learned Hand, a famous .Holmesian-style judge, would
no longer consult legislative history given its spurious use over the last generation, see
Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105 HARv.
L REv. 1005 (1992).
41. For an account of Holmes focusing on the pragmatic side of his judicial deci-
sion-malting philosophy, see Grey, supra note 26, at 789. For an account of Holmes
The fourth mode of legal analysis listed in Table 1 is natural law.'
Natural law theory agrees with the formalist proposition that law can
ultimately be expressed as a system of logically related, universally
focusing more on the positivist side, see Kelley, supra note 26, at 453-54.
Professor Grey properly notes that Holmes' judicial decision-making style was a
blend of positivism and pragmatism. As Grey states:
Holmes was certainly one of the important American exponents of English
analytical positivism, and his prediction theory [of law] is a significant elabo-
ration of that approach to law. But if this were all there were to Holmes, we
would add little by calling him a pragmatist. My suggestion is that we can
understand the distinctively pragmatist cast to Holmes' legal thought if we
take account of the recent revival and reinterpretation of pragmatism
Grey, supra note 26, at 789.
However, Professor Grey also attributes instrumental, result-oriented reasoning to
Holmes' pragmatism. See supra note 29. Professor Grey then criticizes Holmes for not
always following through on this mode of judicial decision-making. In response, Profes-
sor Kelley properly criticizes Grey for forgetting Holmes' positivism:
A pragmatic judge, Grey suggests, ought to embody in his opinions a syn-
thesis of the instrumental and the contextual. He ought to exercise sound
legislative judgment, based upon 'considerations of social advantage.' ...
Grey then judges Holmes's performance as a judge failed to live up to these
pragmatic guidelines ... But what was it, exactly, that Holmes preached ...
If we add back in what Grey leaves out-Holmes's progressive positivist
historicism and his thoroughly reductive theory of judicial decision-we can
understand Holmes's theory of judging, too, as a coherent positivist theory.
See Kelley, supra note 26, at 453-54.
In short, not every pragmatist is an instrumentalist, and, of course, not every
positivist is a formalist. As Table 1 indicates, the Holmesian judicial decision-making
style represents a pragmatic postivism, rejecting both formalism and instrumentalism.
42. As used in this Article, the term "natural law" includes both the religious or
theological natural law tradition and the more secular natural rights tradition. No
attempt is made in this article to discuss separately these two related approaches.
For a discussion of these two related traditions, see BODENHEIMER, supra note 16, at
21-35; LLOYD, supra note 16, it 79-81, 105-07. In addition, no attempt is made in this
Article to discuss separately the classical natural law tradition of Plato, Aristotle, and
the Stoics, including Cicero; the medieval natural law tradition of Thomas Aquinas
and others; the Renaissance natural law tradition of Grotius, Puffendorf, and Vattel;
the Enlightenment natural law tradition of the French, English, and Scottish Enlight-
enments; or various versions of modem twentieth century natural law. For a summa-
ry of these various natural law theories, see BODENHEIMER, supra note 16, at 3-59,
134-68; LLOYD, supra note 16, at 79-169. Such a complete taxonomy of natural law
theories is beyond the scope of this Article. Rather, the intent here is only (1) to
describe the general features which unite natural law theories and which distinguish
them from formalist, Holmesian, and instrumentalist theories, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 43-54; and (2) to discuss the separation of powers natural law theory
which was the foundation of the doctrine adopted by the framers of our Constitution.
See infra text accompanying notes 102-31. Despite this limited intent, a few com-
ments have been included concerning versions of natural law judicial decision-making
and their relation to the framing and ratification of our Constitution. See infra notes
49-50, 101.
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valid rules. Thus, law is not just a means to the end of some social
value, regardless of what that does to the symmetry of rules.' On the
other hand, natural law theorists disagree with the formalist conclusion
that law and morals are separable, believing instead that law can be
tested by an external standard of rightness, the standard of natural
law." This approach rejects positivism in favor of a natural law base to
judicial decision-making.'
Of course, the natural law approach does not mean that societies
should not have positive legal enactments-constitutions, statutes, or a
record of prior common law decisions-or that in deciding cases judges
may ignore them. Natural law is not a justification for unbridled judicial
activism.' It does mean, however, that natural law thinkers are likely
43. See Weinrib, supra note 18, at 951-57. Weinrib states:
Fornalism postulates that law is intelligible as an internally coherent
phenomenom .... Formalism can accordingly be summed up as proffering
the possibility of an "immanent moral rationality" . . . . The description re-
flects legal formalism both as it has been understood in the philosophic tradi-
tion of natural law and natural, right and as it is presupposed in the ideal of
coherence to which sophisticated legal systems aspire.
Ild. at 951, 953-54.
44. See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 18, at 954 n.14 (distinguishing the natural law
and natural rights- tradition "from the thinner formalism of positivism, which...
makes the notion of law as such indifferent to the law's content"). It must be noted
that in his article Professor Weinrib uses the term "formalism" to describe any analyt-
ic non-functional approach to law. Thus, for Professor Weinrib, there are two basic
kinds of formalist theories, the "thinner formalism" of analytic positivism and the
formalism of the natural law and natural rights tradition. Id. In contrast, and more in
keeping with common use, this Article uses "formalism" to describe only the analytic,
positivist approach to law, while the term "natural law" is used to describe the
separate normative, analytic jurisprudential approach of the natural law and natural
rights tradition.
45. See, e.g., BODENHEIMER, supra note 16, at 105-06. Bodenheimer states:
Behind all these attempts to find a place for a higher law may be discerned
a feeling of discontent with justice based on positive law alone, and a
strenuous desire to demonstrate that there are objective moral values which
can be given a positive content and expressed in normative form.
Id. See also Deryck Beyleveld & Roger Brownsword, Law as a Moral Judgment vs.
Law as the Rules of the Powerful, 28 AM. J. JURis. 79, 81 (1983) ("For Natural Law
Theory the idea of morally legitimate power constitutes a real definition of law;, for
Positivism the rival real definition is contained in a morally neutral concept of socially
organized power.").
46. Indeed, the basic premise of a natural law decision-making' style is that the
judge does not have unbridled discretion, but rather is disciplined by the natural law
theory. See, eg., Michael S. Moore, The Constitution as Hard Law, 6 CONST. COMM.
to include natural law principles in drafting a constitution" and would
likely take natural law principles into account in passing statutes.* It
also means that a judge following natural law presuppositions should
interpret the words which the society had used in its constitution and
statutes in light of natural law principles to the extent that the words
were chosen to incorporate a natural law philosophy. If the words were
not chosen to incorporate a natural law philosophy, then the judge
should give the words their ordinary, plain meaning."' Furthermore,
51 (1989). An additional aspect of the natural law decision-making style dominant at
the time of the framing of our Constitution is the traditional English common law
tradition, which emphasizes fidelity to precedent, deciding cases on narrower grounds
where possible, and reasoned elaboration of the law. This aspect of natural law also
limits judicial discretion. See generally infra note 50 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., RoscOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAw 17 (1938) ("In
studying the formative era of American law we are concerned immediately with the
eighteenth-century natural law which became embodied for us in the Declaration of
Independence and is behind our bill of rights."); HALL, supra note 24, at 58. Hall
states:
Beginning in the 1760s, Americans separated ideas about the principles of
government from the product of its actions; the law. They did so by tying
the idea of a written constitution to two related notions, natural law and
social contract .... Natural law theory and the social contract gave Ameri-
can public law Its emphasis on limited governmental power. If government
violated the social contract and If it denied natural rights and abused public
trust, the people retained a right to overthrow it.
Id. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 3-21, 219-21, 253-73 (1990); Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Back-
ground of American Constitutional Law I, III, 42 HARV. L REV. 149, 365 (1928-29).
48. See, e.g., POUND, supra note 47, at 27. Pound writes:
ITIhe believers in eighteenth-century natural law did great things in the de-
velopment of American law because the theory gave faith that they could do
them. Application of reason to the details of the received common law was
what made the work of the legislative reform movement of enduring worth.
Some of its best achievements were in formulating authoritatively what men
had reasoned out in the era of the school of the law of nature in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries.
Id.
49. This proposition is not as uncontroversial as it first appears. At least three
recent natural law approaches can be identified concerning the Constitution. One
approach takes the view that, whether or not the framers and ratifiers of the Consti-
tution intended each Clause to embody natural law principles, judges should take that
view today. In such a case, judges should always read the Constitution's words
against the backdrop of a natural law interpretation style. This would typically re-
quire that judges pay great respect to the ordinary meanings of words, but would
always permit judges to resort to natural law philosophy in the final instance. For a
description of such an approach to constitutional interpretation, see Michael S.
Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretawm, 58 S. CAL L. REv. 277 (1985) [here-
inafter Moore, Interpretation].
A second natural law approach holds that even if judges should not interpret
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consistent with the approach to judicial decision-making dominant
during the framing and ratifying of our Constitution, judges wishing to
follow the natural law judicial decision-making style of the framers and
ratifiers of our Constitution would need to pay great attention to the
grand traditions of the Anglo-American common law system, which in-
cludes such principles as fidelity to precedent, using reasoned elabora-
tion of the law, and deciding cases on narrower grounds where possible.'
each clause of the Constitution to embody natural law principles, nonetheless the
framers and ratifiers of the Constitution intended judges to resort to fundamental
natural law principles outside the written text of the Constitution to supplement it.
See Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127
(1987).
A third, and more modest, natural law approach would be to hold that judges
should resort to natural law in interpreting the Constitution only to the extent that
particular clauses were drafted with natural law principles in mind. Justice Thomas
stated this type of natural law approach during his conformation hearings in the fall
of 1991. See Jeff Rosen, Thomas's Promise, THE NEW REPUBLIC 18-21 (Sept 9, 1991);
infra text accompanying notes 248-49. Professor Michael Moore has also recently
defended his approach towards natural law interpretation on such original intent
grounds. See Michael S. Moore, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution, 63 S. CAL
L. REV. 107, 133-37 (1989) [hereinafter Moore, Unwritten Constitution).
For purposes of this Article, no choice has to be made among these three
natural law interpretation styles. In the separation of powers area, it is clear that the
framers and ratiflers of the Constitution believed in a natural law separation of
powers philosophy which they intended to, and did, insert into the text and structure
of the. Constitution itself. See infra text accompanying notes 102-31. Thus,
the separation of powers natural law philosophy inserted into the Constitution's text
and structure should guide judicial decision-making on separation of powers issues
under any of the three natural law decision-making styles described in this footnote.
50. For a general discussion of these and other aspects of traditional Anglo-Ameri-
can common law decision-making which formed part of the framers' and ratifiers'
understanding of the natural law decision-making style, see RUPERT CROSS, PRECEDENT
IN ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1977); see also LLEWELLYN, supra note 14, at 19-61, 178-235;
Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEx. L.
REV. 35, 38419 (1981); Harry W. Jones, Our Uncommon Common Law, 42 TENN. L
REv. 443, 450-63 (1975).
At least three major approaches in contemporary legal scholarship concern how
to relate a natural law decision-making style to constitutional interpretation. See
supra note 49. Detailed discussion of these approaches, or other ways to relate any
particular vision of natural law to the task of judicial decision-making, is beyond the
scope of this Article. For purposes of this Article, further discussion is not necessary
because the separation of powers natural law philosophy which the Constitution's
framers and ratifiers adopted and incorporated into the Constitution's text and struc-
ture should guide judicial decision-making on separation of powers issues under any
reasonable version of a natural law decision-making style. Nevertheless, a few obser-
vations are perhaps in order.
The first question a judge must ask himself or herself before deciding cases Is
metaethical. That is, the judge must decide whether the judge feels free to adopt his
or her own favored interpretive style (and then decide what that style is), or whether
the judge feels compelled to adopt the style of the framers and ratifiers of the docu-
ment in question (an original intent approach). At this metaethical level, an approach
where the judge feels free to adopt his or her own interpretative style would repre-
sent a normative approach and an original intent approach would reflect a positivist
approach to the judicial decision-making task.
Once this decision is made, the judge would then have to determine the implica-
tions of this metaethical choice for the actual deciding of cases. For example, a
normative judge at the metaethical level might decide to adopt a normative decision-
making style, like instrumentalism, as a way to resolve cases. That same judge,
however, who follows a normative approach at the metaethical level might decide to
adopt an analytic positivist (i.e., formalist) judicial decision-making style when ac-
tually resolving cases because the judge thinks, for whatever reasons, that such a
formalist style is normatively best.
Similarly, a positivist, or original intent, judge at the metaethical level might not
adopt an analytic positivist (i.e., formalist) or pragmatic positivist (i.e., Holmesian)
style of decision-making when actually resolving cases. Instead, such an original
intent positivist at the metaethlcal level might conclude that the framers and ratifiers
of our Constitution favored a natural law judicial decision-making style. Therefore, to
be faithful to the original intent of the framers and ratifiers, the judge would need to
adopt a natural law judicial decision-making style today.
Under such an approach, the judge would not have to decide which theory is
best among the various versions of natural law theory. See supra note 42. Nor would
the judge have to decide which theory of the three major contenders, see supra note
49, is the best way to relate natural law theory to the judicial decision-making task.
Instead, as a metaethical positivist, the judge would merely follow the natural law
theory, as well as the mode of natural law judicial decision-making, in which the
framers and ratifiers believed. See generally It Jefferson Powell, The Original Under-
standing of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L REV. 885, 894-924 (1985) (discussing early
approaches to constitutional interpretation). See also infra note 101.
Of course, determining the specific details of that theory may not be completely
uncontroversial. For example, in recent years there have been debates over whether
the framers and ratifters of our Constitution were influenced more by classic Lockean
or classic Republican natural law ideology. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Su-
preme Court 1985 Term. Foreword. Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARv. L REV. 4,
17-55 (1986); see also Symposium on Classical Philosophy and the American Consti-
tutional Order, 66 CHI.-KENT L REv. 3 (1990) (collection of articles); Stephen M.
Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn, 1992 Wis. L REV. 679. There have
also been debates over the influence on the framers and ratifiers of the Scottish ver-
sus the English Enlightenment traditions. See, e.g., GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA:
THE FEDERALIST (1981); GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE (1978). And no doubt there could be debates over the influence of
Adam Smith or Immanuel Kant during the pre-Civil War period leading up to the
framing and ratifying of the 13th and Fourteenth Amendments. On the influence of
Adam Smith during the first half of the nineteenth century, see generally iqfra note
59. On the influence of Kant, see Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law,
Address at Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARv. L REV. 457,
458 (1897) ("To an imagination of any scope the most far-reaching form of power is
not money, it is the command of ideas .... Read the works of great German
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Admittedly, argumentation under a natural law or a positivist regime
appear to be superficially similar. In both cases, the judge gives
consideration to the constitution, statutes, and prior judicial decisions
and gives great respect to their meanings. Indeed, where words used in
a constitution or statute do not reflect a sound natural law position, as
in the case of slavery under the United States Constitution before the
Thirteenth Amendment,"' even under a natural law approach to judicial
decision-making the judge's role, and at least under the natural law
theory, which served as the framework of our representative democra-
cy, is to follow a constitution or statute until the natural law position is
properly added to the document.' However, as discussed in Parts HI
jurists, and see how much more the world is governed today by Kant than by
Bonaparte.").
Nonetheless, some aspects of the framers' and ratifiers' natural law tradition, like
their views on separation of powers, are relatively clear. See infra text accompanying
notes 102-31. Similarly, it is clear that under our Constitution, the framers and rati-
fiers expected judges to remain faithful to the Anglo-American common law decision-
making tradition, including adherence to precedent, reasoned elaboration of the law,
and the determination of cases on narrower grounds where possible. See generally
Jones, supra, at 452-64 (describing how American lawyers remained faithful to "com-
mon-law modes of reasoning from precedent"). Thus, under a metaethical positivist
approach to .judicial decision-making, judges must pay great attention to these grand
traditions because that is what the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution expected
judges to do. For further reference in this Article to aspects of our natural law
decision-making tradition, see infra text accompanying notes 51-52, 101, 205-44. See
also Symposium: Perspectives on Natural Law, 61 U. CIN. L REv. 1 (1992).
51. See, e.g., Peter J. Riga, The American Crisis over Slavery: An Example of the
Relationship Between Legality and Morality, 26 AM. J. JURIS. 80 (1981).
52. See, e.g., Donald M. Roper, In Quest of Judicial Objectivity: The Marshall
Court and the Legitimation of Slavery, 21 STAN. L REV. 532 (1969) ("Judicial objec-
tivity was the approach evolved by the Marshall Court in slavery cases to resolve
this conflict between the Justices' individual opposition to slavery and their concern-
for ... the institutional position of the Court."); Kent Newmyer, On Assessing the
Court in History: Some Comments on the Roper and Burke Articles, 21 STAN. L
REV. 540, 544 (1969). Newmeyer states:
But there are occasions when the Court is limited in what it can do ....
[I]f the Marshall Court did not have substantial lawmaking discretion in the
slavery cases, it would be misleading to say that it "legitimated" -slavery. That
odious accomplishment was the work of colonial and state law (as Mr. Roper
himself noted) and, as the Abolitionists claimed, the Constitution of the Unit-
ed States.
Id.
Of course, to say that judges, as judges, are limited to following clear constitu-
tional commands under such an approach does not mean that citizens should not press
for constitutional reform consistent with a natural law vision. See, e.g., Riga, supra
and III below, interpreting words that carry a backdrop of natural
law meaning is a very different enterprise than interpreting words
which are thought only to have a literal, positivist meaning devoid of
any natural law roots. In addition, in deciding common law cases where
leeways exist in the common law, a natural law judge would decide the
case in a way to advance, rather than retard, natural law beliefs."
This addition, of Holmesian and natural law jurisprudence to
Gilmore's discussion of formalism and instrumentalism helps to clarify
the ages of American law that Gilmore discusses. Formalism is
unquestionably the post-Civil War style, and instrumentalism, at least
until quite recently, has been the dominant style in the modem era.M
However, in the formative era of American law, the pre-Civil War
period, the dominant mode of legal analysis is better characterized not
as Gilmore's earlier instrumentalist Golden Age, but rather as a
reflection of natural law presuppositions. In this period, while judges
were sensitive to the consequences of adopting a particular rule,' and
note 51, at 109. As Riga notes:
Repressive and unjust laws have too often seen birth in the Halls of Con-
gress (e.g., the Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850) and have too often
been given the imprimatur of the Supreme Court. The only way out of this
difficulty is to recognize that some connection must exist between law and
enduring moral norms, in function of which the performance of government
officials can be judged.
Id. Furthermore, one can imagine natural law theories of judicial decision-making
where conformity with a particular natural law vision would trump, or at least supple-
ment, commands of the Constitution. For discussion of such natural law theories, see
supra note 49.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 102-50, 205-44.
54. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, Precedent, Induction, and Ethical Generalization,
in PRECEDENT IN LAW (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987). The classic example of this in
American legal history is the judicial transformation of contract, tort, property, and
other aspects of the common law during the first half of the 19th century based
upon the economic natural law theories of Adam Smith and John Locke. See infra
notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
55. See HALL, supra note 24, at 211, 284. Hall states:
From the Civil War to about 1900 the trend favored the formalistic and con-
servative judicial approach .... The Great Depression was the catalyst of
liberal legalism ... [which] fused the social reformist impulse of
Progressivism, the relativism and instrumentalism of legal realism and socio-
logical jurisprudence, and the regulatory responsibility of the state associated
with the New Deal.
Ld. See also supra notes 14-23 (citing, articles concerning formalism and
instrumentalism).
56. See, e.g., MORTON J. HoRwr7, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860
2 (1977) ("During the last fifteen years of the eighteenth century, one can identify a
gradual shift in the underlying assumptions about common law rules. For the first
time, lawyers and judges can be found with some regularity to reason about the
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recognized the need to make law that reflected a particular social value
system" (propositions that are consistent with both the instrumentalist
and natural law theories), both lawyers in their argumentation and
judges in their opinions grounded the underlying legitimacy of their
enterprise in a notion of natural law. For them, law could be organized
and systematized around rational principles: the natural law analytic
premise, not the instrumentalist functional premise.' As Gilmore him-
self notes in The Ages of American Law, "[tihe post-Revolutionary
generation of American lawyers approached the problem of providing a
new law for a new land as convinced eighteenth-century rationalists. "'
social consequences of particular legal rules.").
57. As Horwitz writes:
What dramatically distinguished nineteenth century law from its eighteenth
century counterpart was the extent to which common law judges came to
play a central role in directing the course of social change. Especially during
the period before the Civil War, the common law performed at least as great
a role as legislation in underwriting and channelling economic develop-
ment .... As judges began to conceive of common law adjudication as a
process of making and not merely discovering legal rules, they were led to
frame general doctrines based on a self-conscious consideration of social and
economic policies.
1d. at 1-2. For a brief summary on the nature of the changes in property, contract, and
tort law which Professor Horwitz says occurred during the first half of the nineteenth
century, see Stephen B. Presser, Revising the Conservative Tradition: Towards a New
American Legal History, 52 N.Y.U. L REv. 700 (1977) (reviewing MORTON J. HoRowrm,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 (1977)):
58. As Roscoe Pound noted:
A mode of thought [natural law] which produced and developed the classical
international law, which modernized the civil law so that it could go round
the world, which had much influence on the development of equity and the
law merchant-the liberalizing agencies in the Anglo-American common
law-which was the theoretical basis of much of the best work of Lord
Mansfield, of the Declaration of Independence and [B]iU of [R]ights, and of
the legislation, judicial decision, and doctrinal writing of the formative era of
American law, is not to be rated as nothing in legal history.
POUND, supra note 47, at 29-30.
59. GILMORE, supra note 11, at 10. It must be noted that this characterization is
not inconsistent with Gilmore's or Llewellyn's account of judicial decision-making dur-
ing the pre-Civil War era. Gilmore, Lewellyn, and others are right that judges during
this period shared the instrumentalist premise that judges could, and needed, to make
law to advance particular social ends, and that this fact distinguished the pre-Civil
War judicial decision-maling style from the post-Civil War style of formalism. See
generally supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text. To the extent Gilmore and
Llewellyn were focused on a single dichotomy, formalism versus instrumentalism, the
pre-Civil War style is certainly closer to instrumentalism than formalism.
However, once attention is drawn to the two different kinds of normative or
prescriptive judicial decision-making theories listed in Table 1, natural law versus
instrumentalism, the natural law character of the pre-Civil War judicial decision-mak-
ing style clearly emerges. The ends that judges advanced during this period were
defined not in purely functional terms but rather In terms of rationally and systemati-
cally advancing the dominant natural law vision in America at the time-Adam
Smith's theory of competition and economic growth and John Locke's theory of
property rights. From the perspective of the terminology used in this Article, there-
fore, this pre-Civil War period is best termed natural law because most of the change
which occurred in the law during this period, particularly change in the common law,
was based primarily upon economic natural law theories.
Even writers who have used the term instrumentalism to distinguish the pre-Civil
War period from the post-Civil War formalist period agree that judges routinely re-
sorted to economic natural law arguments to alter the common law during the pre-
Civil War period. See, e.g., HoRwrrz, supra note 56, at 3. As Horwitz noted:
This increasing preoccupation with using law as an instrument of policy is
everywhere apparent in the early years of the nineteenth century. Two de-
cades earlier it would have been impossible to find an American judge ready
to analyze a private law question by agreeing 'with Professor Smith, in his
"Wealth of Nations," . . . that distributing the burthen of losses, among the
greater number, to prevent the ruin of a few, or of an individual, is most
conformable to the principles of insurance, and most conducive to the gener-
al prosperity of commerce.'
1d, See also HAL, rap- note 24, at 109, 221. Hall states:
The ethical yardstick employed by colonial courts was replaced by a new
measure that asked judges to consider how legal rules encouraged economic
growth, individual risk taking, and the accumulation of capital ....
[Instrumentaism's] heydey was in the antebellum era. Instrumentalists argued
that law should be applied as a tool to promote economic activity without
resort to legislation. Judges engaged in instrumental activity by using their
common law authority to fashion doctrines that expedited and enhanced pri-
vate business activity and entrepreneurship generally.
As legal historians have observed, this focus on changing the common law to
promote economic growth differed from the colonial period courts' focus on stability in
the law to promote the moral and religious notions of the community. See HORwrrz,
supra note 56, at 1-9; HALL, supra note 24, at 12-17, 28-48 (describing the social insti-
tutions of colonial America and how law was used to impact society and the econo-
my); WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL
CHANGE ON MASSACHUSMrS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 36-63 (1975). As Roscoe Pound has indi-
cated, this change is best conceived as a change from an ethical natural law focus to
an economic natural law focus. See POUND, supra note 47, at 22-23. Pound states:
In the nineteenth century, the stabilizing and conserving natural law takes on
three forms: ethical, political and economic. The ethical form, in which moral
precepts dictated by reason are the ideal, is the oldest, coming from the sev-
enteenth century, where is connects with the theological natural law of the
Middle Ages. It is replaced in early nineteenth-century America by the politi-
cal form in which an ideal of "the nature of American institutions" or the
"nature of free institutions" or the "nature of free government" is the starting
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The Holmesian style of judicial decision-making helps clarify the
transition between the formalist approach of the post-Civil War period
and the modem instrumentalist approach. The breakdown of the
formalist approach occurred initially as a result of increasing accep-
tance after 1900 of Holmes' insight that law should serve particular
social ends, unlike the formalist's insistence on mechanical rule
application and logic or symmetry.' This acceptance began first with
respect to the common law and theories of statutory interpretation in
the 1910s and 1920s,6" and finally in 1937 the "switch in time" was
adopted by the United States Supreme Court as the mode of consti-
tutional law analysis.' However, this breakdown did not immediately
lead to instrumentalism because, following Holmes, the dominant
judicial decision-making style of that time emphasized that judges
should not take into account their own social justice or public policy
perspective, but rather should decide cases to reflect the social ends as
point Later, as the stabilizing side of natural law comes to be the one
stressed chiefly, an economic ideal of a society ordered by the principles of
the classical political economy prevails.
As Pound indicates, the focus on economic natural law arguments still remains a
version of natural law. As with the other subdivisions within the natural law tradition,
see supra note 42, discussion of these subcategories of natural law (theological, ethical,
political, and economic) is outside the scope of this Article. See generally KELso &
KELSO, supra note 14, at 388-90, 398-401, 504-12 (discussing ethical, political, and eco-
nomic natural law arguments in the context of the Constitution and the development
of the common law); infra notes 84-95 (citations to economic, political, and ethical
versions of natural law theory today).
60. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Ad-
ministration of Justice, 40 Am. L REV. 729 (1906), cited in KELso & KELSO, supra
note 14, at 117; HALL, supra note 24, at 211 ("From the Civil War to about 1900 the
trend favored the formalistic and conservative judicial approach, but from then
through World War I sociological jurisprudence and liberalism gained credibility.").
61. See, e.g., CARDozo, supra note 15 (discussing the nature of the judicial process
in common-law cases); HALL, supra note 24, at 269-77 (discussing legal realism's
impact on common law and legislation); Frankfurter, supra note 38, at 542-43 (dis-
cussing the "gradual" change in statutory interpretation led by Justice Holmes during
the 1910s and 1920s with increasing resort to statutory purposes and legislative histo-
ry as a supplement to "pure logic").
62. See generally HAL, supra note 24, at 277-83 (discussing the New Deal, consti-
tutional law, the Court-packing plan of 1937, and Justice Roberts' switch in time, and
how those events eventually resulted in the Court rejecting the Lochner-era formalism
of Justices Sutherland, McReynolds, Van Devanter, and Butler, and replacing it with
'Holmes' posture of deference to Congress, which after 1937 upheld New Deal-style
regulations).
defined by the dominant groups in society, which, in our democracy, is
the outcome of the legislative process.' After World War II, however,
as judges became more activist in using the leeways in the law to
advance particular public policy perspectives, the dominant judicial
decision-making style in all areas-common law, statutory law, and
constitutional law-increasingly moved towards an instrumentalist
approach." This approach is still the dominant approach today,
though, as discussed below, the dynamics that motivated
instrumentalism have lost most of their force, and instrumentalism has
come under increasing attack.'
A second table, building on the earlier one, may help clarify these
relationships. Under the modified version of Gilmore's views discussed
above, modes of judicial decision-making in American legal history have
followed a counterclockwise pattern, from the formative era of natural
law, to the post-Civil War era of formalism, to the early twent-
ieth-century transition to Holmesian jurisprudence, and, finally, to the
instrumentalism which has been the dominant theory for the last fifty
years. The dates listed in Table 2 for each era of decision-making
overlap in each case by twenty years in order to underscore the point
that there was not a sudden transformation in judicial style, and that in
any event it is more appropriate to speak in terms of trends and
tendencies of judges than in terms of a single approach adopted by all
judges during any particular time period.'
63. Id. at 282-84 (discussing judicial restraint and the Supreme Court's acceptance
after 1937 of regulatory measures in the areas of administration and social welfare).
64. See id. at 291-300 (discussing the consequences of modem liberal legalism for
the common law areas of property, contracts, and torts, with its focus on new "prop-
erty" rights, increased use in contract law of doctrines like reliance and unconsciona-
bility, and shifted emphasis in tort law from fault and blameworthiness towards
providing compensation to injured parties); id. at 303-08 (discussing modem develop-
ments concerning legislation and the administrative state, particularly in the public
interest areas of consumer rights and environmentalism); id. at, 309-32 (describing
modem developments with respect to constitutional law, particularly in the form of
increased Court protection in cases involving civil rights and liberties, race and
gender issues, and rights of the accused). See generaUy G. Edward White, The Rise
and Fall of Justice Holmes, 39 U. CHI. L REV. 51 (1971).
65. See infra text accompanying notes 78-101.
66. Gilmore himself observed:
All generalizations are oversimplifications. It is not true that, during a given
fifty-year period, all the lawyers and all the judges are lighthearted innova-
tors, joyful anarchists, and adepts of Lleweliyn's Grand Style-only to be
converted en masse during the next fifty-year period to formalism or concep-
tualism. There are formalists during innovative periods and innovators during
formalistic periods-just as there are frustrated classicists during romantic
periods and frustrated romantics during classical periods. When we recon-
struct the past, we think we see that in one period the innovative impulse
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TABLE 2
Styles of Judicial Decision-Making
Positivism: Prescriptivism:
Judges as Judges as
Scientists Normative Actors
Law as Logical, Formalism Natural Law
Analytic, or (1850-1920, (1700-1870)
Conceptualist except in
Attitude constitutional
law until 1937)
Law as Means to Holmesian Instrumentalism
Ends, Functional, or (1900-1950) (1930-Today)
Pragmatic Approach
Because this summary of the ages of American law incorporates the
generally accepted account of formalism, Holmes, and modern
instrumentalism, this summary should not be particularly controversial.
Indeed, at the level of generality discussed here, this account of the
ages of American law parallels exactly a critical legal studies version of
American legal history. As described by Professor Elizabeth Mensch in
The History of Mainstream Legal Thought,' initially the United States
was in a period of pre-classical legal consciousness, the period identi-
fied in this Article as natural law. As Professor Mensch describes this
period:
In a flowery vocabulary drawn largely from the natural-law tradition,
late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century legal speakers made extravagant
claims about the role of law and lawyers. They described law as reflecting here
on earth the universal principles of divine justice, which, in their purest form,
reigned in the Celestial City. For example, the single most popular legal quotation,
for rhetorical purposes, was taken from the Anglican theologian Hooker. "Of law
no less can be acknowledged, than that her seat is the bosom of God; her voice
was dominant and that in another period the formalistic impulse was domi-
nant We are talking about temporary swings in a continuing struggle of
evenly matched forces.
GILMORE, supra note 11, at 16-17.
67. Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, reprinted in THE
POLnCS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRMQUE 13 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990).
harmony of the world."
Following this time, says Mensch, there arose a period of classical
legal consciousness, what Gilmore and others have called formalism. As
Mensch writes: "By the 'rule of law' classical jurists meant quite specifi-
cally a structure of positivised, objective, formally defined rights. ' Rea-
son, in such an age, is no longer considered as it was by natural law
thinkers. Rather, reason is "now conceived, not as embodying universal
moral principles and knowledge of the public good [as it was by natural
law thinkers], but strictly as the application of objective methodology to
the task of defining the scope of legal rights. "' The goal was to produce
"a grandly integrated conceptual scheme that seemed, for a fleeting mo-
ment in history, to bring coherence to the whole structure of American
law."
71
This vision of a grandly integrated conceptual scheme motored by an
objective methodology to the task of defining the scope of legal
rights--the formalist dream-broke down, notes Mensch, under the on-
slaught of those who argued that logic was not enough to resolve legal
disputes.' As Holmes stated:
[WIhenever a doubtful case arises, with certain analogies on one side and other
analogies on the other,... what really is before us is a conflict between two so-
cial desires, each of which seeks to extend its dominion over the case, and which
cannot both have their way. The social question is which desire is strongest at the
point of conflict. The judicial one may be narrower, because one or the other
desire may have been expressed in previous decisions to such an extent that logic
requires us to assume it to preponderate in the one before us. But if that be clear-
ly so, the case is not a doubtful one. Where there is doubt the simple tool of logic
does not suffice, and even if it is disguised and unconscious the judges are called
on to exercise the sovereign prerogative of choice."
Mensch reflects this Holmesian insight in her discussion of the Realist
Movement, of which Holmes can be seen as the founding father.
The realists pointed out that no two cases are ever exactly alike. There will al-
ways be some difference in the multitude of facts surrounding them. Thus, the
'rule" of a former case can never simply be applied to a new case; rather, the
judge must choose whether or not the ruling in the former case should be extend-
ed to include the new case. That choice is essentially a choice about the relevan-
cy of facts, and those choices can never be logically compelled. Given shared
social assumptions, some facts might seem obviously irrelevant (e.g., the color of
socks worn by the offeree should not influence the enforceability of a contract),
but decisions about the relevance of other distinguishing facts are more obviously
68. Id. at 14.
69. Id. at 18.
70. Id. at 18-19.
71. Id. at 18.
72. Id. at 21-22.
73. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 -RLv. L. REv.
443, 460-61 (1899).
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value-laden and dependent on the historical context (e.g.,'the relative wealth of
the parties) .... [For the realists, tihere was no such thing as an objective legal
methodology behind which judges could hide in order to evade legal responsibility
for the social consequences of legal decision making. Every decision they made
was a moral and political choice."
This realist legacy led into the fourth period of American law, which
Mensch describes as attempts at modem reconstruction.h The focus
during this period, as Mensch states, is the instrumental focus on law as
a functional policy science with judges taking a more active role in mak-
ing explicit policy calculations.' As Mensch describes this modem peri-
od:
During the 1940s, Laswel and McDougal at Yale followed out the implications of
realism by announcing that since law students were destined to be the
policymakers of the future, Yale should simply abandon the traditional law school
curriculum and teach students how to make and implement policy decisions ....
What were once perceived as deep and unsettling logical flaws [were] translated
into the strengths of a progressive legal system. For example, the indeterminancy
[sic] of rules has become the flxibility required for sensible, policy-oriented
decision making; and the collapse of rights into contradiction has been recast as
"competing interests," which are inevitable in a complex world and which obvi-
ously require an enlightened judicial balancing. In other words, we justify as legal
sophistication what the classics would have viewed as the obvious abandonment
of legality."
Consistent with the modified version of Gilmore's discussion of the
ages of American law presented above, Mensch indicates that this at-
tempt at modem reconstruction, while dominating legal discourse since
World War II, has lost much of its force and is under increasing attack
today.m This attack has occurred both at the federal level with respect
to constitutional and statutory interpretation,m and at the state level
with respect to constitutional, statutory, and common-law decision-mak-
ing.8D
74. Mensch, supra note 67, at 22. On Holmes' relationship to legal realism gener-
ally, see supra note 24.
75. See Mensch, supra note 67, at 24-31.
76. Id. at 25.
77. Id. at 24 (footnote omitted).
78. Id. at 31-33 (discussing attacks by "natural-law" theories, "representation-re-
inforcing" theories, "critical legal studies," "law and economics," "libertarianism," and
"outsider" jurisprudence by women and persons of color).
79. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980)
(constitutional critique); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory
State, 103 HARv. L REV. 405 (1989) (statutory interpretation critique); see also intra
notes 81-96 and accompanying text.
80. See generally RICHARD NEELY, HOW COURTS GOVERN AMERICA (1981); see also
These attacks against instrumentalism have come both from those who
would prefer judges to be less activist, strict constructionists in the for-
malist"' or Holmesian' tradition, as well as by commentators who urge
either revival of a classic natural law approach,' or emergence of some
modem version of natural law. This modem natural law reemergence has
taken many forms, including economic natural law, as in the law and
economics movement;- political natural law,' with variations as di-
verse as critical legal studies;" some versions of feminist theory or
critical race theory;' Ronald Dworkin's interpretation theory of Law's
i f ra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, New Theories of "Interpretation": The Activist Right
from the Constitution, 47 OHIO ST. LJ. 1 (1986).
82. See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLrrIcAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW (1986); Edwin Meese, HIl, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark
of a Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEx. L J. 455 (1986).
83. See, e.g., Milner S. Ball, Don't Die Don Quixote: A Response and Alternative to
Tushnet, Bobbitt, and the Revised Texas Version of Constitutional Law, 59 TE_ L.
REv. 787 (1981); Harold Berman, The Interaction of Law and Religion, 31 MERCER L
REV. 405 (1980); Charles E. Rice, Some Reasons for a Restoration of Natural Law
Jurisprudence, 24 WAKE FOREST L REV. 539 (1989).
84. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Intellectual Foundations of "Law and Economics",
33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 184 (1983); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed.
1986); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981); Richard A. Posner, A
Reply to Some Recent Criticisms of the Efficiency Theory of the Common Law, 9
HOF3TRA L REV. 775 (1981). For a discussion of this categorization of modem law
and economics as a version of economic natural law, rather than a conservative kind
of instrumentalism, see infra note 97.
85. The term "political natural law" is used to refer to those theories whose natu-
ral law roots focus on political arrangements and the connection of law to politics,
rather than developing from a natural law base some ethical or economic principles
to guide society.
86. Critical legal studies can be categorized as a modem political natural law the-
ory because of its central insight that law is not autonomous from politics, but part
and parcel of it. On the critical legal studies movement generally, see MARK KELMAN,
A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); John Henry Schlegel, Notes Toward an
Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the Conference on Critical Legal
Studies, 36 STAN. L REV. 391 (1984); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid
Dowm: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L REV. 781
(1983); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L
REV. 561 (1983) (discussing the critique of objectivism and formalism in critical legal
studies and posing an alternative of "transformative ideals and political realism").
87. The feminist legal theory which best exemplifies modem political natural law is
that which shares with the critical legal studies movement the "[p]ost-modem and
post-structural traditions that have influenced left legal critics [to] presuppose the
social construction of knowledge." Deborah L Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42
STAN. L REV. 617, 619 (1990). As discussed by Professor Rhode, this includes most
feminist legal theory. See id. at 619-26. The critical race theory which would be
included in this category would similarly involve those approaches adopting "critical
or modernist approaches." See Richard Delgado, Mindset and Metaphor, 103 HARV. L.
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Empire;' or even Lon Fuller's The Morality of Law; and ethical natu-
ral law,' with theories as diverse as John Rawls," Robert Nozick,'
John Finnis, Bruce Ackerman,' and some versions of feminist theory
or critical race theory." In the realm of constitutional law, this reemer-
REV. 1872, 1873 (1990).
88. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 225 (1986) (stating that "propositions of law
are true if they figure in, or follow from, the principles of justice, fairness, and
procedural due process that provide the best constructive interpretation of the
community's legal practice," i.e., the best political theory that explains the current
legal order).
89. LON L FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-41 (2d ed. 1969) (noting that a legal
order is properly characterized as being legitimate only to the extent that certain
procedural arrangements are followed by the sovereign which give that sovereign
political legitimacy). As Professor Fuller states:
Certainly there can be no rational ground for asserting that a man can have
a moral obligation to obey a legal rule that does not exist, or is kept secret
from him, or that came into existence only after he had acted, or was unin-
telligible, or was contradicted by another rule of the same system, or com-
manded the impossible, or changed every minute.
Id. at 39.
90. The term "ethical natural law" is used to refer to those theories who claim to
have developed through some kind of rational argumentation a set of ethical princi-
ples or a set of conditions for ethical dialogue which determine ethical values for
society.
91. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
92. 'ROBERT Nozimc, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
93. JOHN -FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
94. BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
95. Included in this category would be that feminist legal theory which rejects the
modem political natural law theoretical foundation of post-modem and post-
structuralist thought, see supra notes 85-87, in favor of some "moral realist" version
of our capacity through rational dialogue to develop ethical principles capable of ratio-
nal defense. See Rhode, supra note 87, at 636.
.[A] standard critical strategy is to specify conditions under which answers
would be generated. Habermas' ideal speech situation has been perhaps the
most influential example. Under his theory, beliefs would be accepted as
legitimate only if they could have been acquired through full uncoerced dis-
cussion in which all members of society participate. Some critical feminists,
including Drucilla Comell and Seyla Benhabib, draw on similar conversational
constructs.
Id. Critical race theory which adopts what Richard Delgado has called "conventional,
quasi-scientific analysis", Delgado, supra note 87, at 1872-74, would similarly fall into
this classification. See Scott Brewer, Introduction: Choosing Sides in the Racial Cri-
tiques Debate, 103 HARv. L REV. 1844, 1848-53 (1990) (describing Randall Kennedy's
work as an emmple of this phenomenon).
gence of natural law has also taken the form of advising judges to look
back to the natural law philosophy of the framers and ratifiers of the
Constitution and to interpret the Constitution consistent with this natural
law philosophy."
Given this analysis, one possible way to view the current Supreme
Court is to note that with the retirement of Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall putting liberal instrumentalism on the wane,' the debate on the
96. See infra note 101.
97. For a discussion of Justices Brennan and Marshall's liberal instrumentalism, see
infra text accompanying notes 182-91. For a discussion of Justices Blackmun and
Stevens carrying on the liberal instrumentalist tradition, at least to a moderate extent,
see infra text accompanying notes 252-56.
It is logically possible, of course, to imagine a version of conservative
instrumentalism. Under such an approach, a judge would use leeways in the law to
advance a particular conservative agenda. Indeed, one might classify the law and
economics movement as a version of conservative instrumentalism. See Richard
Posner, Law and Economics is Moral, 24 VAL. U.L REV. 163, 165-66 (1990). "I con-
sider myself to be a pragmatic economic libertarian .... I do not derive my eco-
nomic libertarianism views from a foundational moral philosophy." Id However, it
seems better to classify today's law and economics movement as a modem economic
natural law approach, rather than a conservative version of instrumentalism. See
supra note 59 (giving reasons for such classification with reference to the early 19th-
century focus on law and economics). It is so classified 'above. See supra note 84
and accompanying text The rejection, cited above, by Judge Posner of foundational
moral philosophy as a basis for law and economics may reflect only Posner's reac-
tion to the critiques in the early 1980s of his attempt to ground law and economics
in some foundational moral philosophy. See, e.g., Jules Coleman, The Normative
Basis of Economic Analysis: A Critical Review of Richard Posner's The Economics
of Justice, 34 S'An. L REv. 1105, 1112-31 (1982); Warren J. Samuels, Maximization
of Wealth as Justice: An Essay on Posnerian Law and Economics Policy Analysis,
60 TEx. L REV. 147, 168-72 (1981).
In addition, it is certainly possible for a judge to be a conservative instrumental-
ist at the metaethical level, but not at the level of deciding cases. Such a judge
might decide that the best way to advance the conservative agenda would be to
adopt a formalist or Holmesian judicial decision-making style. This judge would not
adopt such a style because of an underlying belief that the formalist or Holmesan
style represents a more defensible mode of judicial decision-making than
instrumentalism or natural law, but rather would adopt the style because in the
political and social climate in which the judge was deciding cases such a style would
typically lead to a more conservative result in society at large.
Because such a judge would "mouth" the formalist or Holmesian "line" in decid-
ing cases, the only way to determine if such a judge were a true formalist or
Holmesian, rather than a conservative metaethical instrumentalist, would be to exam-
ine those cases in which a formalist or Holmesian approach led to a liberal instru-
mentalist result; then, one would determine whether the judge remained faithful to
the formalist or Holmesian approach when deciding that case. Of course, a conserva-
tive metaethical instrumentalist might still follow the formalist or Holmesian line in a
few of these cases, and thus allow a liberal instrumentalist result to take place. This
would help preserve the illusion that the judge is a committed formalist or
Holmeslan, thereby preserving the judge's ability to argue forcefully that the court
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Court among the conservatives may concern the three remaining ap-
proaches to judicial decision-making. As discussed in Parts II and III,
some of the conservatives on the Court appear to be classic
Holmesians,' others classic formalists,' and some, perhaps, may be con-
sciously or unconsciously part of a reemergence of natural law.k
Though development of the idea is outside the scope of this Article,
given the account of American legal history stated above, it may be that
those Justices who consciously or unconsciously follow a natural law
approach to judicial decision-making are more faithful to the original
intent of the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution, who believed in
natural law, than those Justices who appear to follow a formalist or
Holmesian approach.''
ought to adopt such an approach for every case coming before it. In other words, a
conservative metaethical instrumentalist might conclude that seeming to remain a
formalist or Holmesian purist was more important to the conservative cause than the
result in any one case. In any event, because such a judge would typically follow a
formalist or Holmesian approach when deciding most cases, that judge would proper-
ly be placed in the formalist or Holmesian category in Table 1.
98. See intfra text accompanying notes 167-72, 191-98 (discussing Holmesian posture
of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White).
99. See infra text accompanying notes 147-50, 210-13 (discussing formalist posture
of Justice Scalia).
100. See infra text accompanying notes 114-26, 215-50 (discussing judicial decision-
making philosophies of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas).
101. For citations to articles which discuss the original intent of the framers from
the perspective of the 18th and 19th century natural law tradition, see supra notes
47, 49-50 and accompanying text. In particular, Jefferson Powell's article, The Origi-
nal Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Hv. L REV. 885 (1985), has sparked a
lively debate. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, 'Original Intention" in Historical Perspective,
54 GEO. WASH. L Rev. 296 (1986); H. Jefferson Powell, The Modern Misunderstand-
ing of Original Intent, 54 U. CH. L REV. 1513 (1987); Raoul Berger, The Founders'
Views-According to Jefferson PoweU, 67 TEx. L REV. 1033 (1989); Hans W. Baade,
"Original Intent" in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 Tex L Rev.
1001 (1991); Raoul Berger, "Original Intent". A Response to Hans Baade, 70 TEx. L
REV. 1535 (1992). See also INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGI-
NAL INTENT (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990); Thomas B. McAffee, Constitutional Inter-
pretation.-The Uses and Limitations of Original Intent, 12 U. DAYTON L REV. 275
(1986); Helen K Michael, The Role of Natural Law in Early American
Constitutionalism: Did the Founders Contemplate Judicial Enforcement of "Un-
written" Individual Rights, 69 N.C. L. REV. 421 (1991); Bruce N. Morton, John Locke,
Robert Bork, Natural Rights and the Interpretation of the Constitution, 22 SETON
HALL L REV. 709 (1992). A sequence of articles by Professor Michael Moore are also
intriguing for their elaboration of a natural law approach towards constitutional and
statutory interpretation. See Moore, supra note 46; Moore, Interpretation, supra note
49; Moore, Unwritten Constitution, supra note 49.
I. THE FOuR APPROACHES AND SEPARATION OF PowERs DOCTRINE
In this Section, the four approaches to judicial decision-making will be
discussed as they relate to separation of powers doctrine.
A. The Natural Law Approach
In his 1833 work, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States,' Justice Joseph Story of the Supreme Court discussed the prev-
alent rules of interpretation in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
century. He wrote:
Sec. 400. .The first and fundamental rule in the interpretation of all instruments
is, to construe them according to the sense of the terms, and the intentions of the
parties. Mr. Justice Blackstone has remarked, that the intention of a law is to be
gathered from the words, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and conse-
quences, or the reason and spirit of the law. He goes on to justify the remark by
stating, that words are generally to be understood in their usual and most known
signification, not so much regarding the propriety of grammar, as their general
and popular use; that if words happen to be dubious, their meaning may be estab-
lished by the context, or by comparing them with other words and sentences in
the same instrument; that illustrations may be further derived from the
subject-matter, with reference to which expressions are used; that the effect and
consequence of a particular construction is to be examined, because if a literal
meaning would involve a manifest absurdity, it ought not to be adopted; and that
the reason and spirit of the law, or the causes which led to its enactment, are
often the best exponents of the words, and limit their application.
Sec. 405. I1. In construing the [Clonstitution of the United States, we are, in the
first instance, to consider, what are its nature and objects, its scope and design,
as apparent from the structure of the instrument, viewed as a whole, and also
viewed in its component parts."
Writing more than a century later, Professor William Crosskey of the
102. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrTUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(Little, Brown & Co. eds., 3d ed. 1858).
For a commentary on Justice Story and his place in the natural law tradition of
the 18th and 19th centuries, see James McClellan, Joseph Story and the American
Constitution (orig. ed. 1971, reissued ed. 1990). As Professor McClellan states:
Among the American lawyers and judges of this creative and resourceful era
in legal development [the early nineteenth century), Justice Story stands out
as possibly the most learned and influential defender of the natural law tradi-
tion. To Story it was imperative that American lawyers understand natural
law in interpreting and applying the principles of the Constitution and the
common law. Being "a philosophy of morals," natural law was to Story the
substratum of the legal system, resting "at the foundation of all other laws."
Id. at 65. See also H. Jefferson Powell, Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitu-
tion: A Belated Review, 94 YALE LJ. 1285 (1985).
103. STORY, supra note 102, at 283-85.
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University of Chicago underscored this mode of interpretation as follows:
The rules of interpretation ordinarily followed in the eighteenth century, and,
likewise, the modes of draftsmanship then in use, were in certain important par-
ticulars, different from those in common use today. Thus, the eighteenth-century
draftsman felt no obligation to spell out every last detail in the documents he
drew. This was sometimes done; and when it was done, the results, in point of
verbosity and opacity, were about what they are in such efforts today. But, in the
eighteenth century, there was a well-recognized alternative to this now familiar
technique, another and simpler method, which seems quite generally to have been
preferred in documents addressed to public comprehension. Under this simpler
method, the over-all purpose of a document was stated carefully in general terms;
details were put in, only where, for some particular reason, details seem required;
and the rest was left to the rules of interpretation customarily followed by the
courts. The rules that were followed were partly a result, and partly the cause, of
this method of drafting. Justified by the fact that no draftsman is possessed of an
infinite prescience, they were calculated to give a just and well-rounded interpre-
tation to every document, in the light of its declared general purpose; or, if its
purpose is not declared, then, in the light of its apparent purpose, so far as this
could be discovered.
"The fairest and most rational method of interpreting the will of the legislator,
is," says Biackstone, "by exploring his intentions as at the time when the law was
made, by signs the most natural and probable." "Those signs," he then goes on to
explain, "are either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and
consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law." As for the last of these-that is,
"the reason and spirit of [a law]; or the cause which moved the legislator to enact
it,"-it is, says Blackstone, "the most universal and effectual way of discovering
the true meaning of a law, when the words are dubious.""'
104. WuiLn CROSSKEY, POLrnCS AND THE CONSTITUTION 363-66 (Univ. of Chicago
Press 1953). Though certain aspects of Professor Crosskey's overall constitutional
critique were controversial at the time of publication, and remain so today, see Raoul
Berger, Michaed Perry's Functional Justification for Judicial Activism, 8 U. DAYTON
L REv. 465, 492-95 (1983), Professor Crosskey's summary of the general nature of the
natural law style of interpretation is not particularly controversial. For a modern
phrasing of a natural law approach to constitutional and statutory interpretation, see
Moore, supra note 46, at 51. Moore states:
We should interpret ... (1) by the ordinary meaning of the words that ap-
pear within them, (2) as modified by the technical legal meanings ... or
prior court interpretations, (3) so as to check both ordinary and technical
meaning by the purpose a rule of this kind ought to serve in a just society,
and (4) so as to check meaning and purpose by an all-things-considered val-
ue judgment that acts as a safety-valve against wildly absurd or unjust re-
suits.
Id. For an elaboration of this approach, see Moore, Interpretation, supra note 49. For
further discussion of the natural law interpretation style, see infra notes 205-44 and
accompanying text. On early interpretation theories generally, see supra note 101 and
This regard for the "cause" or "reason" for a law is stated most famously
in Heydon's Case"°' in 1584. The "Rule of Heydon's Case," as stated by
Lord Coke, provides:
[Flor the sure and true... interpretation of all statutes in general (be they pe-
nal... or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are
to be discerned and considered: ... 1st. What was the common law before the
making of the act. 2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common
law did not provide. 3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appoint-
ed to cure the disease of the commonwealth. And, 4th. The true reason for the
remedy, and then the office of all Judges is always to make such... construction
as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle
invention and evasions for continuance of the mischief... and to add force and
life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the
act."0
With regard to the separation of powers doctrine specifically, the clear
"mischief to be remedied," as identified by the framers and ratifiers of
the Constitution, was the prevention of tyranny. 7 As Justice Story not-
sources cited therein.
105. 76 Eng. Rptr. 637 (1584).
106. Id. at 638 (citations omitted). For a theory that James Madison's view of con-
stitutional interpretation took into account this Rule of Heydon's Case, and also re-
jected a purely literalist, or formalist, approach, see David M. O'Brien, The Framers'
Muse on Republicanism, the Supreme Court, and Pragmatic Constitutional
Interpretivism, 8 CONST. COM. 119, 145 (1991). O'Brien notes:
"[Almong the obvious and just guides applicable to [interpreting] the
Const[itutio]n," Madison listed: 1. The evils and defects for which the Consti-
tution was called for & introduced. 2. The comments prevailing at the time is
was adopted. 3. The early, deliberate, and continued practice under the Con-
stitution, as preferable to constructions adapted on the spur of occasions,
and subject to the vicissitudes of party or personal ascendencies.
Ai. These same points concerning Madison's theory of constitutional interpretation are
made in DREW R. McCoy, THE LAST OF THE FATHERS: JAMES MADISON AND THE REPUBLI-
CAN LEGACY 74-76, 78-80 (1989).
107. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 7, at 1515-16, 1533-34. Brown states:
[T]he Madisonian goal of avoiding tyranny through the preservation of sepa-
rated powers should inform the Supreme Court's analysis in cases raising
constitutional issues involving the structure of government .... There was
perhaps a secondary concern for greater efficiency in government, but clearly
"[t]he doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention
of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary
power." In general, then, separation of powers aimed at the interconnected
goals of preventing tyranny and protecting liberty.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The doctrine of separation of powers was adopted by the convention of 1787,
not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.
The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable fric-
tion incident to the distribution of the government powers among the three
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ed in 1833:
Sec. 520. In the establishment of a free government, the division of the three great
powers of government, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial, among dif-
ferent functionaries, has been a favorite policy with patriots and statesmen ....
Sec. 21. Montesquieu seems to have been the first, who, with a truly philosophi-
cal eye, surveyed the political truth involved in this maxim, in its full extent, and
gave to it a paramount importance and value .... "When," says he, "the legislative
and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of mag-
istrates, there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise, lest the same
monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical
manner. Again; there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from
the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liber-
ty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be
the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with
violence and oppression. There would be an end of every thing, were the same
man, or the same body, whether of the nobles, or of the people, to exercise these
three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing public resolutions, and of
trying the causes of individuals."
Sec. 522. The same reasoning is adopted by Mr. Justice Blackstone, in his Com-
mentaries. "In all tyrannical governments," says he, "the supreme magistracy, or
the right both of making and of enforcing laws, is vested in the same man, or one
and the same body of men; and whenever these two powers are united together,
there can be no public liberty."u
With regard to whether the separation of powers philosophy of the fram-
ers anticipated a strict separation of powers approach with three totally
separate branches of government," or instead a sharing of powers and
checks-and-balances approach," most commentators, and most Su-
departments, to save the people from autocracy.
ld. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
108. SToRY, supra note 102, at 364-66.
109. See Brown, supra note 7, at 1523-24 (discussing an approach to separation of
powers based upon "strong substantive separations between the branches of govern-
ment," and "a belief that legislative, executive, and judicial powers are inherently
distinguishable as well as separable from one another"); Peter Strauss, The Place of
Agencies in Government. Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLuM. L
REv. 573, 577 (1984).
(Under one version bf] "separation of powers," ... Congress legislates, and it
only legislates; the President sees to the faithful execution of those laws and,
in the domestic context at least, that is all he does; the courts decide specif-
ic cases of law-application, and that is their sole function. These three pow-
ers of government are kept radically separate, because if the same body
exercised all three of them, or even two, if might no longer be possible to
keep it within the constraints of law.
Id S
110. See Strauss, supra note 109, at 578: "[T]he checks and balances idea does not
preme Court Justices, have concluded that it was the sharing of powers,
checks-and-balances philosophy of Montesquieu and Blackstone which
motivated Madison, Adams, and most of the framers."' This is to be
suppose a radical division of government into three parts, with particular functions
neatly parceled out among them. Rather, the focus is on relationships and intercon-
nections, on maintaining the conditions in which the intended struggle at the apex
may continue." Brown, supra note 7, at 1527-29 (this "separation-of-powers tradi-
tion . .. stresses not the independence, but the interdependence of the branches");
Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74
VA. L REv. 1253, 1261, 1272 (1988). Krent states:
[Ain effective system of separated powers [cannot] be maintained merely by
separating the branches, nor even by inserting "external" checks, such as the
power of impeachment or the power of judicial review .... The goal of the
constitutional scheme was therefore to "contriv[e] the interior structure of the
government, as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual rela-
tions, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places." . . . In
sum, our system of separated powers reflects interests in balance and in ac-
countability.
Id
111. For the views of commentators, see, e.g., DAAN BRAVEMAN ET AL, CONsTrru-
TIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE AND RIGHTS IN OUR FEDERAL SYSTEM 47 (2d ed. 1991) ("Thus,
it appears that by the late 1780s separation had lost ground as an idea to checks
and balances. The text of the Constitution promotes sharing."); Brown, supra note 7,
at 153140 (discussing the separation of powers political philosophy of Montesquieu
and Madison); Krent, supra note 110, at 1259 ("The focus in the Constitution is not
so much on keeping the branches separate as on constructing a scheme of checks
and balances .... The framers made the branches interdependent, and the system
of checks and balances evinces the intent to make each branch accountable to the
other."); Strauss, supra note 109, at 602. Strauss notes:
[Tihe governmental structure [the framers] created embodies both separated
powers and interlocking responsibilities; the purpose was to prevent both
majoritarian rashness and the governmental tyranny that could result from the
conjoining of power in a single source. Maintaining conditions that would
sustain the resulting tension between executive and legislature was to be the
central constraint on any proposed structure of government.
Id. But see Redish & Cisar, supra note 9, at 452-53, 458-05, 474-78 (though rejecting an
"original intent" approach towards separation of powers, Redish and Cisar strongly sug-
gest that their strict separation of powers "pragmatic formalist" approach is consistent
with the intent of the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution).
For the views of Supreme Court Justices, see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 362412 (1989) (Blackmun, J., joined by all Justices of the Court except Scalia, J.).
In applying the principle of separated powers in our jurisprudence, we have
sought to give life to Madison's view of the appropriate relationship among
the three coequal Branches. Accordingly, we have recognized, as Madison
admonished at the founding, that while our Constitution mandates that "each
of the three general departments of government [must remain] entirely free
from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the
others," Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935), the
Framers did not require-and indeed rejected-the notion that the three
Branches must be entirely separate and distinct.
(VoL 20: 531, 19931 Separation of Powers Jurisprudence
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
distinguished from the seventeenth century's more strict separation of
powers political philosophy. 2 As stated by Justice Story in 1833:
Sec. 525. But when we speak of a separation of the three great departments of
government, and maintain, that separation is indispensable to public liberty, we
are to understand this maxim in a limited sense. It is not meant to affirm, that
they must be kept wholly and entirely separate and distinct, and have no common
link of connection or dependence, the one upon the other, in the slightest degree.
The true meaning is, that the whole power of one of these departments should not
be exercised by the same hands, which possess the whole power of either of the
other departments; and that such exercise of the whole would subvert the
principles of a free constitution. This has been shown with great clearness and
accuracy by the authors of the Federalist. It was obviously the view taken of the
subject by Montesquieu and Blackstone in their Commentaries; ....
Sec. 530. It is proper to presume, that it is agreed on all sides, that the powers be-
longing to one department ought not to be directly and completely administered
by either of the other departments; and, as a corollary, that, in reference to each
other, neither of them ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influ-
ence in the administration of their respective powers.
Sec. 540 .... Upon thorough examination of the subject, it will be found, that
[preventing tyranny) can be best accomplished, if not solely accomplished, by an
occasional mixture of the powers of each department with that of the others,
while the separate existence and constitutional independence of each are fully
provided for ....
Sec. 541. There seems to be no adequate method of producing this result but by a
partial participation of each in the powers of the other, and by introducing into
In adopting this flexible understanding of separation of powers, we sim-
ply have recognized Madison's teaching that the greatest security against
tyranny-the accumulation of excessive authority in a single branch-lies not
in hermetic division between the Branches, but in a carefully crafted system
of checked and balanced power within each Branch.
Ld. at 380-81. See also Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 400,
487 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist, CJ.,, and O'Connor, J.) (Chls
is not to say that each of the three Branches must be entirely separate and distinct,
for that is -not the governmental structure of checks and balances established by the
Framers."). But see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 733-34 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ng). Scalia state&
[The majority's opinion] is not analysis; it is ad hoc judgment. And it fails to
explain why it is not true that--as the text of the Constitution seems to
require, as the Founders seemed to expect, and as our past cases have
uniformally assumed--all purely executive power must be under the control
of the President.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
112. See ir-a text accompanying notes 127-29.
every operation of the government in all its branches, a system of checks and
balances, on which the safety of free institutions has even been found essentially
to depend."
Given this natural law view of interpretation and separation of powers
political philosophy, a natural law judge committed to the political phi-
losophy of the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution would first ask in
considering a separation of powers problem whether the Constitution
uses words "understood in their usual and most known signification, not
so much regarding the propriety of grammar, as their general and popu-
lar use""' that resolve the issue on point. If so, then the specific choice
by the framers and ratiflers, reflected by those words, would be fol-
lowed. Such specific choices made in the separation of powers context
include the detailed provisions in the Constitution concerning
bicameralism, presentment, and presidential veto authority regarding the
passage 'of legislation;"' specific exceptions to bicameralism for im-
peachment processes, senatorial power of advice and consent, and sena-
torial power to ratify treaties;"" the presidential pardoning power;"
prohibitions on members of Congress holding appointed offices;" pro-
hibitions on Congress passing a bill of attainder,"' and prohibitions on
Congress reducing the compensation of the President or members of the
federal judiciary."
On many separation of powers issues, however, the Constitution does
not provide specific resolution to separation of powers questions. Issues
like those involved in some 1980s cases, such as Congress' power to cre-
ate commissions, 2' congressional power to remove executive offi-
cials,' or aspects of inferior officer appointments," do not have clear
textual resolutions. Rather, the Constitution provides only the general
structure of three governmental branches and an understanding of the
purposes behind that structure. In such cases, a natural law judge would
resort, as Justice Story stated, to "the context, the subject-matter, the
113. STORY, muprm note 102, at 368, 371, 378. For a short summary of the history of
separation theory's Influence on the framers, and the roles of James Madison, John
Adams, and others in American separation of powers theory of that time, see
BRAVEMAN et al., supra note 111, at 40-49.
114. STORY, supra note 102, at 283.
115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2-3.
116. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2, 5; § 3, cl. 6.
117. Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
118. Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
119. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
120. Id. art. I, § 1, cl. 7; art. Ill, § 1.
121. See infra text accompanying notes 407-08.
122. See ifra text accompanying notes 348-53.
123. See injra text accompanying notes 386-92.
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effects and consequences, or the reason and spirit of the law."" In par-
ticular, this would involve resort to the sharing of powers
checks-and-balances philosophy which guided the Constitution's framers.
Such a philosophy would focus, for example, on Justice Story's admoni-
tion that no branch of government "ought to possess directly or indirect-
ly, an overruling influence in the administration" of another branch of
government.' As discussed below, without stating that the approach is
a natural law approach, this is the approach towards separation of pow-
ers which Justice Kennedy adopted in his concurrence in Public Citizen
v. United States Department of Justice."
It is possible, though not terribly plausible, to adopt the view that the
framers' natural law political philosophy was motivated more by the
seventeenth-century's relatively strict separation of powers theories,'"
rather than by the eighteenth-century sharing of powers,
checks-and-balances approach of Montesquieu, Blackstone, Madison and
Adams.' A judge who reads history in this way would adopt a strict
separation of powers approach in cases where the Constitution does not
clearly spell out the respective powers. This approach would be adopted
not for the formalist reasons discussed below," but rather because the
judge truly believed, however misguidedly, that a strict separation of
124. STORY, supra note 102, at 283.
125. See supra text accompanying note 113.
126. 491 U.S. 440, 486 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). See infra text accompanying
notes 432-43.
127. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 9, at 456-60 (discussing 17th-century separation
of powers political philosophy, including that of John Locke); BRAVEMAN et al., supra
note 111, at 43.
Montesquieu theorized that a separation of powers can be maintained only if
there is also a system of checks and balances .... Indeed, this emphasis
on the relationship between separation and balancing constitutes
Montesquleu's real contribution to both .... This shift in emphasis was the
primary change from the seventeenth to the eighteenth century political phi-
losophies concerning separation.
AL
128. See BRAVEMEN rr .AL., supra note 111, at 40-49 (discussing the movement
during the 18th century in America away from the 17th century's stricter separation
of powers philosophy to Blackstone, Montesquieu, Madison, and Adams' sharing of
powers, checks-and-balances approach); Brown, supra note 7, at 131-40 (discussing
the separation of powers philosophy of Montesquleu and Madison); Redish & Cisar,
supra note 9, at 461-68 (same); see also W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF SEPARATION OF
POWERS (1985). On this sharing-of-powers, checks-and-balances approach, see supra
notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
129. See iqfra text accompanying notes 131-34, 144-50.
powers approach was the natural law political philosophy-the reason
and spirit-that motivated the framers and ratifiers of the Constitu-
tion.' As discussed in Part III, Justice Thomas might take this ap-
proach when he begins to consider separation of powers cases."
B. The Fornalist Approach
In general, a formalist judge follows a positivist approach to judicial
decision-making."D This means a formalist sees the judge as a scientist
who attempts to decide cases in light of existing positive law." Such a
judge would naturally tout the virtues of an original intent approach to
the Constitution or statutes under consideration."
At the same time, the formalist's general preference for logic and sym-
metry would mean that a formalist approach to separation of powers
doctrine would prefer doctrinal development in which the judge's sole
function would be to apply rules mechanically to the case at handm re-
gardless of the original intent of the framers. A formalist would have a
preference for clear, bright-line rules, organized into a system of pure
logical categorization and deduction. Under such an approach, judges
would not be required to engage in a flexible balancing inquiry to resolve
the case or to inquire into the particular consequences of applying the
rule in the case before them. The judge's sole duty would be to apply the
130. It should be noted that sometimes the argument for the framers adopting a
strict separation of powers approach is that a number of state constitutions were
drafted in strict separation of powers terms at the time. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalla, J., dissenting). Quoting from the Massachusetts
Constitution, Justice Scalia wrote as follows:
"In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall
neither exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: The
executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either or
them: The judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers,
or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of
men."
I& (Scalia, J., dissenting). Remember, however, that the first Congress specifically re-
jected the inclusion of such a strict separation of powers amendment in the original
BiD of Rights. See Brown, supra note 7, at 1539 (noting that the House passed an
amendment tracldng the language of the Massachusetts Constitution, but the Senate
rejected the proposed amendment).
131. See itfro text accompanying notes 248-52.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 16, 20.
134. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing the formalist assumption
that judges should not make law, and that changes in the law should come only
from the legislative branch). For an example of such an approach in the separation
of powers area, see infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
135. See supra text accompanying note 14.
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rule (or rules) applicable to the case at hand.'
One example of this tension between a formalist doctrinal desire for
mechanical rule application and a formalist desire for original intent
jurisprudence is the formalist approach applied to the Commerce Clause
between 1888 and 1937. During this period, the formalist approach was
to read the phrase "commerce among the states" mechanically, requiring
a clear, bright-line distinction between interstate commerce and intra-
state commerce.' Under this approach, federal power under the Com-
merce Clause was reserved exclusively for commerce which had a direct
effect on interstate commerce, such as the use of interstate malls; how-
ever, an indirect effect, such as the effect of in-state wages and prices on
nationwide supply and demand, would be beyond the scope of federal
power.' The Court said that this approach was consistent with the origi-
nal intent of the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution," though cas-
136. See supra text accompanying notes 14, 20-21. For examples of this approach's
application to the separation of powers doctrine, see infra notes 144, 379 and accom-
panying text.
137. See generay JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
143-46 (4th ed. 1991); LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 307-08 (2d ed.
1988).
138. See generay Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 307-08 (1936). In Carter,
the Court stated:
That the production of every commodity intended for interstate sale and
transportation has some effect upon interstate commerce may be, if it has
not already been, freely granted; and we are brought to the final and deci-
sive inquiry, whether here that effect is direct, . . . or indirect .... The dis-
tinction between a direct and an indirect effect turns, not upon the magni-
tude of either the cause or the effect, but upon the manner in which the
effect has been brought about.
Id See also Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271-72 (1918). In Hammer, the Court
stated.
In each of these instances [including use of the interstate mails to promote
an illegal lottery,] the use of interstate transportation was necessary to the
accomplishment of harmful results .... This element is wanting in the pres-
ent case. The thing to be accomplished by. this statute is the denial of the
facilities of interstate commerce to those manufacturers in the states who
employ children within the prohibited ages. The act in its effect does not
regulate tramnsportation among the States, but aims to standardize the ages at
which children may be employed in mining and manufacturing within the
states.
ICS
139. See Carter, 298 U.S. at 295 ("The determination of the Framers Convention and
the ratifying conventions to preserve complete and unimpaired state self-government
es initially interpreting the Commerce Clause suggest that the framers
and ratifiers had a less mechanical intent in mind.
For example, Chief Justice Marshall stated in 1824, "[T]he genius and
character of the whole government seem to be, that its action is to be
applied to all external concerns of the nation, and to those internal con-
cerns which affect the states generally."" Under this approach, the
Court decided what "affects the states generally" without regard to a me-
chanical distinction between direct or indirect effects, and instead con-
sidered whether the commerce empirically affected other states in any
way."' Chief Justice Marshall resolved this issue of empirical effects by
stating that federal power would not extend to those aspects of com-
merce
which are completely within a particular state, which do not affect other states,
and which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of
the general powers of the government. The completely internal commerce of a
state, then, may be considered as reserved for the state itself."
However, all other commerce that affected other states, whether directly
or indirectly, was fit for federal regulation."
With respect to separation of powers, the same tension is present.
Because of a desire for clear, bright-line rules, a formalist approach to
separation of powers would prefer a strict separation of powers ap-
proach, with three completely separate spheres of governmental author-
ity." In such a case, the judge would not have to decide whether a par-
in all matters not committed to the general government is one of the plainest facts
which emerges from the history of their deliberations."); see also Hammer, 247 U.S.
at 276.
This [Clourt has no more important function than that which devolves upon
it the obligation to preserve inviolate the constitutional limitations upon the
exercise of authority federal and state to the end that each may continue to
discharge, harmoniously with the other, the duties entrusted to it by the
Constitution.
Id.
140. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).
141. See generaUy NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 137, at 139 ("[In Gibbons] the
federal power extended to commerce wherever it was present, and thus, 'the power
of Congress may be exercised within a state.'"); TRIBE, supra note 137, at 307-08 ("In
place of the empirical test suggested in Gibbons, [from 1887 to 19371 the Court
substituted a formal classification of economic activity far more restrictive of congres-
sional power.").
142. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) at 195.
143. TRIBE, supra note 137, at 306 ("Marshall indicated [in Gibbons) that, in his
view, congressional power to regulate 'commercial intercourse' extended to all activity
having any interstate impact-however indirect."); NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 137,
at 139 -("Marshall thus described the 'internal commerce of a state' as beyond the
reach of federal power but simultaneously created a standard under which few com-
mercial activities could be found to meet the definition of internal commerce.").
144. See, e.g., BRAvEMAN et. al., supra note 111, at 52-53.
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ticular sharing of power constituted, in Justice Story's natural law words,
"an overruling influence in the administration of their respective pow-
ers. 15 This balancing need not be done if there are three strictly sepa-
rate branches of government."
Justice Scalia's approach to the separation of powers doctrine as indi-
cated in his dissents in Morrison v. Olson"7 and Mistretta v. United
States" are well-reasoned examples of this formalist preference for
bright-line rules and mechanical rule application. Justice Scalia claims, as
would any formalist, that this approach is the only approach that is faith-
ful to the original intent of the Constitution." Of course, a balancing of
interests done in the context of a sharing of powers, checks-and-balances
At times, the doctrine of separation of powers has been construed to mean a
simplistic and complete formal separation of governmental functions that
precludes one branch from performing tasks that bear resemblance to the
obligations of another branch .... The formal analytic approach to separa-
tion ... views separation as a unitary concept, unburdened by internal or
external complications such as checks and balances. Under a formal ap-
proach to a separation of powers dispute, then, the single focus of the
courts' inquiry becomes whether one branch has transgressed the literal
bounds of constitutional text by invading the territory of another branch, or
by acting without express constitutional authorization in a sphere where an-
other branch appear literally to be the proper constitutional actor.
ld. See also Brown, supra note 7, at 1523-27 (1The formalist approach is committed to
strong substantive separations between the branches of government .... Moreover,
formalism, at least as promoted by Justice Scalia, appears to be concerned ... with
forcing the Court to adhere to bright-line rules to foster predictability and restraint in
judging."); supra notes 109, 127-30 (discussing a strict separation of powers approach);
infra notes 381-82, 406 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's formalistic
dissents in Morrison v. Olson and Mistretta v. United States).
145. SToR', supra note 102, at 371.
146. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 9, at 474-91 (discussing this fact as one of the
main virtues of their "pragmatic formalist" approach towards separation of powers).
147. 487 U.S. 654, 697-733 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See infra text accompany-
ing notes 379-80.
148. 488 U.S. 361, 413-427 (1989) (Scalia, J, dissenting). See infra text accompany-
ing note 406.
149. See, eg., Morrison, 487 U.S. at 733-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting):
[The Court's majority] fails to explain why It is not true that- as the text of
the Constitution seems to require, as the Founders seemed to expect, and as
our past cases have uniformly assumed- all purely executive power must be
under the control of the President .... I prefer to rely upon the judgment
of the wise men who constructed our system, and of the people who ap-
proved It, and of two centuries of history that have shown it to be sound.
td. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
natural law philosophy may be exactly what the framers and ratifiers of
the Constitution had in mind in cases where they did not provide clear
constitutional text on point."
C. The Holmesian Approach
As a positivist theory of law, the Holmesian approach to separation of
powers shares with the formalist approach a strong belief that the judge
must follow the specific commands of the Constitution where such spe-
cific commands exist."'I However, because this is a functional approach
to judicial decision-maldng, rather than an analytical approach, the
Holmesian judge does not have a predisposed preference for me-
chanically applied rules.'" Rather, in the absence of clear, specific com-
mands on point, either clearly stated text or clear inferences from the
purpose of the Constitutional text, the Holmesian view counsels judicial
deference to the dominant forces in society." Under this view, legisla-
tors, as the elected representatives in our democractic society, are the
proper balancers of public policy in society, not the courts."
This difference between a formalist approach and a Holmesian ap-
proach in interpreting the Constitution is best reflected by the differing
approaches to "liberty of contract" and "Commerce Clause" questions be-
tween 1888 and 1937. During this period, the formalists on the Court
used the term "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment to create the
Lochner era approach to liberty of contract, a relatively mechanical ap-
proach to determine which types of economic activity the government
could regulate constitutionally." Under this approach, the government
could regulate the economy with regard to health and safety, morals,
public municipal corporations or with regard to limiting the negative eco-
nomic impact of monopolies." Other kinds of economic regulations
150. See generally supra text accompanying notes 101-31.
151. See supra notes 33-34, 39-41 and accompanying text.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 35-40.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 31-34, 37-40.
154. See supra text accompanying note 33.
155. See geeraly NowAK & ROTUNDA, aupra note 137, at 362-67.
156. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
The right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by [the
Fourteenth] [Almendment, unless there are circumstances which exclude the
right. There are, however, certain powers, existing in the sovereignty of each
state in the Union, somewhat vaguely termed police powers, the exact de-
scription and limitation of which have not been attempted by the courts.
Those powers, broadly stated, and without, at present, any attempt at a more
specific limitation, relate to the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of
the public.
Id. During this period, the phrase "general welfare of the public" was typically read to
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were held to be unconstitutional, however, because they interfered with
an individual's liberty of contract, which was grounded in the market
mechanism and the economic theory of laissez-faire. '
In contrast, Holmes stated that our Constitution was
not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and
the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez-faire. It is made for
people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain
opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude
our judgment upon the question whether the statutes embodying them conflict
with the Constitution of the United States.'"
Thus, since the Constitution did not clearly command a reading of "lib-
erty of contract" consistent with the formalist understanding, Holmes ar-
gued that -the Court should defer to the legislatures and allow the eco-
nomic regulations at issue in the Lochner era cases to stand.'"
Similarly, between 1888 and 1937 the formalists took the phrase "com-
merce among the states" in the Commerce Clause and constructed from
this a conceptual and analytical approach to federal power based on the
distinction between direct and indirect effects."w According to this ap-
proach, Congress could regulate direct effects on interstate commerce,
such as the use of interstate mails. Conversely, Congress could not regu-
late indirect effects on interstate commerce, such as the effects of
in-state wages and prices on nationwide supply and demand, if the activi-
encompass only regulation of municipal corporations, including public utilities, or mo-
nopolies. See id. at 55 ('Te Atkin case was decided upon the right of the state to
control its municipal corporations, and to prescribe the conditions upon which it will
permit work of a public character to be done for a municipality."); Munn v. Illinois, 94
U.S. 113, 126-32 (1877) (businesses regulated in Munn were clearly "affected with the
public interest" because they had a 'virtual monopoly").
157. See generally NoWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 137, at 362. Nowak states:
Freedom in the marketplace and freedom to contract were viewed as liber-
ties which were protected by the due process clause. Thus, the justices
would invalidate a law if they thought it restricted economic liberty in a way
that was not reasonably related to a legitimate end. Because they did not
view labor regulation, price control, or other economic measures as legitimate
"ends" in themselves, only a limited amount of business regulation could pass
this test.
Id.
158. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
159. See GEOFFREY STONE et. al., CONSTrruTIONAL LAw 802-03 (2d ed. 1991) ("Justice
Holmes ... dissented regularly from the Court's -invalidation of economic regula-
tions.").
160., See supra text accompanying notes 137-39.
ties, such as manufacturing, mining, or agriculture, took place physically
(analytically or logically) within a state's borders.""'
In contrast, Holmes focused functionally, or pragmatically, on the actu-
al effects of regulation." Holmes concluded that as long as the subject
under regulation had some effect on interstate commerce,, that subject
was fit for congressional regulation." This was true for Holmes even if
the effects on interstate commerce were only indirect, such as the effects
of in-state wages and prices on nationwide supply and demand."s Such
an approach focused functionally on the fact that effects on interstate
commerce are equally effects whether direct or indirect. Thus, Holmes
counseled deference to Congress and concluded that Congress, as the
dominant balancer of public policy in our democratic society, "may carry
out its views of public policy whatever indirect effect they may have
upon the activities of the States.""M
161. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
162. In legal theory terms, Holmes thus adopted a realist approach to Commerce
Clause cases, and rejected a formal approach. See STONE ET AL, supra note 159, at
152.
The cases invoke two general approaches. Under the formal approach, the
Court examines the statute and the regulated activity to determine whether
certain objective criteria are satisfied. For example, upholding regulations
triggered by the fact that goods cross state lines is a formal approach that
ignores actual economic effects and actual legislative motiviation. In contrast,
the realist approach attempts to determine the actual economic impact of the
regulation or the actual motivation of Congress.
Id On the relationship between Holmes and the American legal realist movement gen-
eraly, see supra note 24.
163. See, e.g, Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing). Holmes states:
The first step in my argument is to make plain what no one is likely to dis-
pute-that the statute in question is within the power expressly given to Con-
gress if considered only as to its immediate effects and that if invalid it is
so only upon some collateral ground. The statute confines itself to prohibiting
the carriage of certain goods in interstate or foreign commerce. Congress is
given power to regulate such commerce in unqualified terms.
Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 281 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes wrote:
But if an act is within the powers specifically conferred by Congress, it-
seems to me that it is not made any less constitutional because of the indi-
rect effects that it may have .... The act does not meddle with anything
belonging to the States. They may regulate their internal affairs and their
domestic commerce as they like. But when they seek to send their products
across the state line (thus affecting interstate supply of goods] they are no
longer within their rights .... Under the Constitution such commerce be-
longs not to the States but to Congress to regulate.
Md at 277, 281 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
166. Id, at 281 (Holmes, J., dissenting). See generally STONE ET AL, supra note 159,
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By the same token, with regard to separation of powers, unless the
Constitution's command is clear, either reflected in clearly stated lan-
guage or clear inferences of purpose, a Holmesian judge would likely de-
fer to arrangements set out by Congress."u Indeed, an extreme
Holmesian might look for ways to avoid holding that the specific lan-
guage of the Constitution requires a finding that the statute is unconstitu-
tional and thus defer to Congress. As discussed below, Justice White's
dissents in INS v. Chadha'e' and Bowsher v. Synar may represent
such an extreme Holmesian view, while Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent
in Chadha,' but joining the majority in Bowsher,"70 may represent the
more moderate Holmesian approach. As is discussed below, Justice
White's dissent in Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citi-
zens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Morrison v.
Olson," also represent a Holmesian approach towards separation of
powers.
D. The Instrumentalist Approach
The instrumentalist approach to separation of powers requires a clear
focus on how the purposes of separation of powers are either advanced
or retarded in the context of a particular case." As Gilmore indicated,
at 189 (discussing the eventual adoption of Holmes' realist approach by the Supreme
Court after 1937, with the slight caveat that this "'economic' or 'pragmatic' approach
to determining whether an activity affects interstate commerce . . . turns on whether
the activity it regulates has a 'substantial effect on interstate commerce.'"). No con-
gressional regulation since 1937, however, has failed to meet this test of establishing
that the activity regulated has such a substantial effect. See Archibald Cox, Foreword."
Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L REV.
91, 118 (1966) ("Logically, Congress can regulate every detail of almost every com-
mercial transaction. .. ").
166. On Holmeslan deference generally, see supra notes 29-41 and accompanying
text.
167. 462 U.S. 919, 967 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). See infra text accompanying
notes 312-22.
168. 478 U.S. 714, 759 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). See infra text accompanying
notes 358-62.
169. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 1013 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See infra text accompany-
ing notes 340-43.
170. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 714. See infra text accompanying notes 344-55.
171. 111 S. Ct. 2298, 2312 (White, J., dissenting). See infra text accompanying notes
464-79.
172. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). See infra text accompanying notes 383-403.
173. On the! connection between instrumentalism and the purposes to be advanced
for an instrumentalist judge, the act of interpreting a constitution, stat-
ute, or prior common law decision will often call for consideration of
sound social policy to resolve leeways in the law." Furthermore, there
may be cases where the law does not command a particular result be-
cause no law exactly covers the situation or because each of two con-
flicting rules arguably applies. In such cases, a judge can and must make
law that achieves a sound social policy result."
With respect to separation of powers cases, such an approach counsels
careful attention to the checks and balances function of separation of
powers to help avoid tyranny by either the legislative or executive
branch.'m Examples of attempts to short-circuit checks and balances
would thus be viewed with great disfavor.'" One such example is
Chadha, where the legislature attempted to avoid the structural
protections of bicameralism and presentment by delegating legislative
power to a sub-part of the legislature, with a one-house veto provi-
sion." Another example is Bowsher, where the legislature delegated
appropriation power to a sub-part of itself, the rationale given by Justice
Stevens and Marshall for their finding the Gramm-Rudman Act unconsti-
tutional. On the other hand, judges following an instrumentalist ap-
proach would greatly favor attempts to strengthen a checks-and-balances
system, such as requiring judicial appointment of independent
prosecutors to investigate executive official wrongdoing as in Morr/-
son.Iu
by a particular doctrinal result, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
174. See GILMORE, supra note 11, at 91-98; see also supra note 15 and accompany-
ing text.
175. See GILMORE, supra note 11, at 91-98; see also supna note 15 and accompany-
ing text.
176. Justice Stevens explained, "The men who met in Philadelphia in the summer
of 1787 were practical statesmen, experienced in politics, who viewed the principle of
separation of powers as a vital check against tyranny.'" Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714, 748 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.) (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976)). On preventing tyranny as the core focus of separation
of powers doctrine, see supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
177. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 755 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens wrote:
If Congress were free to delegate its policymaking authority to one of its
components, or to one of its agents, it would be able to evade 'the carefully
crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution.'... Even scholars who
would have sustained the one-House veto appear to agree with this ultimate
conclusion.
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
178. See infra text accompanying notes 304, 310, 316-17.
179. See infra text accompanying notes 363-67.
180. See infra text accompanying notes 384-85. Of course, instrumentalist judges
would also want to balance against these benefits the possible drawbacks of an
independent prosecutor law. See infra text accompanying notes 396-403.
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H. THE FOUR APPROACHES TO JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING AND
THE SUPREME COURT GENERALLY
Prior to discussing the post-1980 separation of powers cases, it is use-
ful to illustrate the approach to judicial decision-making taken by the
Supreme Court Justices since 1980. This is not to say that the Justices
have self-consciously adopted one of these four decision-making styles in
deciding cases. Rather, once these styles are described, the decision-
making styles of the Justices seem to be reflected more in one style than
the other. Of course, no judge is a perfect model of consistency, particu-
larly since the claim is not being made that the current Justices have
decided cases self-consciously against the backdrop of the styles present-
ed here. Nevertheless, the four decision-making approaches can help to
clarify what appear to be systematic differences among the Justices in
decision-making style.8"
The instrumentalists on the Court are the easiest to recognize. This is
the legacy of the Warren Court's activism.' During the 1980s, Justices
Brennan and Marshall were the strongest protagonists of this view."m
Probably the clearest example of their willingness to read constitutional
provisions in light of their view of sound, social policy is their position
that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment." While on the
Court, Justices Brennan and Marshall have maintained this view despite
acknowledging that it differed from the views of the framers and ratiflers
of the Constitution and contemporary community values." Justice
181. For a table summarizing differences among the current Justices on the Su-
preme Court from the perspective of the four decision-making styles discussed in this
Article, see nfra note 266 and accompanying text.
182. On Warren Court activism generally, see ARCHIBALD Cox, THE WARREN COURT:
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF REFORM (1968); JOHN DENTON CARTER,
THE WARREN COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL VIEW OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
(1973).
183. Other members of the Warren Court who would clearly count as instrumental-
ists were Justices Douglas, Goldberg, Fortas, and Chief Justice Warren. See generally
KESO & KELSO, supra note 14, at 417-19.
184. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227-28 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id.
at 231-32 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
185. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contempo-
rary Ratification, 27 S. TEx L REV. 433, 444 (1986) ("This is an interpretation [the
death penalty is always unconstitutional] to which a majority of my fellow Justic-
es-not to mention, it would seem, a majority of my fellow countrymen-does not
subscribe.") Gregg, 428 U.S. at 232 (Marshall, J, dissenting). Marshall states:
Brennan has written, "On this issue, the death penalty, I hope to embody
a community, although perhaps not yet arrived, striving for human digni-
ty for all.""'
In other noteworthy cases, an instrumentalist approach would counsel
for an expansive reading of the right to privacy, and thus would support
the Roe v. Wade' right to choose an abortion if the judge decided that
would be good social policy." From a liberal instrumentalist perspec-
tive, concerns about an individual's right to protest would dictate that
the Court recognize a First Amendment right to burn the American flag,
as in Texas v. Johnson." When dealing with corporations, as opposed
to individuals, a liberal instrumentalist would likely hold that corpora-
tions have a weaker First Amendment claim to spend money acquired in
commercial transactions for political purposes than individuals, because
the threat of distortion of the political process that unlimited corporate
spending poses is greater than the threat that individuals pose; this was
the result in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.'" Justices
But If the constitutionality of the death penalty turns, as I have urged, on
the opinion of an informed citizenry, then even the enactment of new death
statutes cannot be viewed as conclusive. In Furman, I observed that the
American people are largely unaware of the information critical to a judg-
ment on the morality of the death penalty, and concluded that if they were
better informed they would consider it shocking, unjust, and unacceptable.
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
186. Brennan, supra note 185, at 444 (emphasis added).
187. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
188. For arguments that such a right would advance sound social policy, see id. at
153.
Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may
be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a
distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and
physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all
concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of
bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise,
to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and
continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.
ld.
189. 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). The Court stated:
If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the
Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because soci-
ety finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable .... In short, nothing in
our precedents suggests that a State may foster its own view of the flag by
prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it.
Id,
190. 110 S. CL 1391, 1402 (1990). The Court stated:
Michigan identified as a serious danger the significant possibility that corpo-
rate political expenditures will undermine the integrity of the political pro-
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Brennan and Marshall adopted each of these liberal instrumentalist posi-
tions.1
91
For a Holmesian judge, judicial consideration of sound social policy is
an anathema.'" A judge's role is not to impose a particular vision on
the Constitution.'" For a statute to violate the Constitution, the viola-
tion must appear in clearly stated constitutional language or from a clear
inference shown from the purpose of a constitutional provision.'" For
Justice Holmes, a deferential approach would apply to cases involving
individual rights as well as economic rights.' " In most cases, therefore,
the government is likely to prevail. Thus, for example, this approach
would counsel against an expansive reading of the right to privacy and
thus against finding the right to choose an abortion recognized in Roe v.
cess, and it has implemented a narrowly tailored solution to that problem. By
requiring corporations to make all independent political expenditures through
a separate fund made up of money solicited expressly for political purposes,
the Michigan Campaign Finance Act reduces the threat that huge corporate
treasuries amassed with the aid of favorable state laws will be used to influ-
ence unfairly the outcome of elections.
Ild.
191. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 115; Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414; Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1395,
1402.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 29-34.
193. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Holmes wrote:
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the
country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with that
theory, I should desire to study if further and long before making up my
mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe
that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a
majority to embody their opinions in law.
Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40, 153-54, 166; KELSo & KELso, supra
note 14, at 392.
[lIf the Constitution specifically mandated the protection of particular rights,
Holmes would faithfully interpret the Constitution to protect those rights. In
First Amendment cases, for example, Holmes is known for his view that the
text and history of the First Amendment required protection of speech which
did not constitute a "clear and present danger."
Id,
195. See, e.g., Yosal Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15 STAN. L
REV. 3, 254, 307-08 (1962-63) (between 1908 and 1928, in 25 non-unanimous civil
rights cases, Holmes was only once on the side of what in the 1960s would be
called protecting civil liberties; in all other cases he deferred to the political process-
es).
Wade.' Similarly, it would counsel against finding the First Amend-
ment right to burn the American flag recognized in Texas v. Johnson,'
or against finding that corporations, as statutory creations of the state,
have the same First Amendment rights as individuals to spend money
acquired in commercial transactions for political purposes, which was
the result in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce." Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice White are consistent Holmesian Justices in each of,
these cases. '"
Separate considerations apply when considering judges who approach
judicial decision-making from a more analytical perspective. Such judges
will be driven more by application of legal categories, without regard to
the sound social policy of the instrumentalists, or the strong deference to
government posture of the Holmesians.' Thus, such an approach
196. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221-22 (1973) (White, J.,
dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent stated:
I find nothing in the language or history of the Constitution to support the
Court's judgments. The Court simply fashions and announces a new constitu-
tional right for pregnant women and, with scarcely any reason or authority
for its action, invests that right with sufficient substance to override most
existing state abortion statutes.
Id. (White, J., dissenting). The dissent further stated that "[tjhe decision here to break
pregnancy into three distinct terms and to outline the permissible restrictions the State
may impose in each one ... partakes more of judicial legislation than it does of a
determination of the intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment." Roe, 410
U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
197. 491 U.S. 397, 421-22 (1989) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). Rehnquist stated:
In holding this Texas statute unconstitutional, this Court ignores Justice
Holmes' familiar aphorism that "a page of history is worth a volume of log-
ic." For more than 200 years, the American flag has occupied a unique posi-
tion as the symbol of our Nation, a uniqueness that justifies a governmental
prohibition against flag burning in the way respondent Johnson did here.
Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
198. 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1397 (1990). The Court stated:
State law grants corporations special advantages-such as limited liability,
perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of
assets-that enhance their ability to attract capital and to deploy their re-
sources in ways that maximize the return on their shareholders' investments.
These state-created advantages not only allow corporations to play a domi-
nant role in the nation's economy, but also permit them to use "resources
amassed in the economic marketplace" to obtain "an unfair advantage in the
political marketplace" . . . We therefore have recognized that "the compelling
governmental interest in preventing corruption support[s] the restriction of the
influence of political war chests funneled through the corporate form."
Id. (citations omitted).
199. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 171, 221 (White, J., dissenting); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 421-
22 (Rehnqulst, C.J., dissenting); Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1394-95.
200. For a discussion of sound social policy and instrumentalism, see supra text ac-
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would counsel that standard First Amendment protection for free speech
should apply even in an emotionally charged case such as the flag burn-
ing issue considered in Texas v. Johnson." It would also suggest that
standard First Amendment rights should apply to corporations spending
money acquired in commercial transactions for political purposes, as in
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.'s Thus, this approach
would agree with the instrumentalists in protecting free speech in Texas
v. Johnson,' but disagree with both instrumentalists and Holmesians in
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.'
From both formalist and natural law perspectives, one would also
expect a judicial push for greater consistency in legal categories, more
clearly defined tests, and dislike of functional balancing approaches
where they can be avoided.' However, there is this difference between
companying notes 16, 173-80. For a discussion of deference towards the government
and Holmesianism, see supra text accompanying notes 31-34, 153-66.
201. 491 U.S. 397, 420-21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
The hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do not like. We
make them because they are right, right in the sense that the law and the
Constitution, as we see them, compel the result .... For all the record
shows, this respondent was not a philosopher and perhaps did not even pos-
sess the ability to comprehend how repellent his statements must be to the
Republic itself. But whether or not he could appreciate the-enormity of the
offense he gave, the fact remains that his acts were speech, in both the
technical and the fundamental meaning of the Constitution. So I agree with
the Court that he must go free.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
202. 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1426 (1990) (Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor, J., and Scalia,
J., dissenting). The dissent wrote:
It is an unhappy paradox that this Court, which has the role of protecting
speech and of barring censorship from all aspects of political life, now be-
comes itself the censor. In the course of doing so, the Court reveals a lack
of concern for speech rights that have the full protection of the First Amend-
ment.
Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
203. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). See supra text accompanying note 189.
204. 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990). See supra text accompanying notes 190, 198.
205. See, e.g, Beau James Brock, Mr. Justice Antonin Saia: A Renaissance of
Positivism and Predictability in Constitutional Adjudication, 51 L& L REv. 623,
637-49 (1991) (discussing examples of Justice Scalla's concern with making the law
more certain and predictable, and eschewing balancing tests whenever possible); Dean
Alfange, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Separation of Powers: A Welcome Return to
Normalcy?, 58 GEo. WASH. L REv. 668, 752 (1990) ('Justice Scalia seems to be
claiming that the absence of a bright-line absolute, and reliance instead on
case-by-case adjudication for the resolution of separation of powers issues, represents
the formalist and natural law approaches. A natural law approach would
acknowledge that sometimes there is a need for practical balancing
against a backdrop of natural law principles, as in the context of balanc-
ing whether a sharing of powers creates "an overruling influence in the
administration of their respective powers." ' Indeed, no natural law phi-
losophy has ever developed a mechanized, formalist list of detailed,
rule-oriented doctrine to guide resolution of every case.'n This lack of
detailed, rule-oriented doctrine would frustrate the formalist judge.'
intolerable arbitrariness."); Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Reason, Rhetoric, and Re-
spect, Commencement Address at University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law
(May 21, 1988) "([I]f there is one common premise that all lawyers share in the
national common language that we speak to each other, it is the idea of rea-
son .... [T]he tradition of American law is based on the rule of law .... ."); Jay
M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classifications, 41 STAN. L REv. 661, 676 (1989).
Feinman states:
More modest versions of analytic classifications are widespread in the judicial
and scholarly literature. These versions view abstraction, order, and system as
necessary and desirable elements of the legal process, even though instru-
mental objectives must be balanced against the urge toward doctrinal purity.
Despite the demise of classical formalism, law's claim to authority still rests
in part on logic, order, and consistency. Consistency in particular entails the
internal consistency of treating like cases alike and different cases differently,
and the external consistency of justifying results according to some general,
positive, public principle.
Id.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 121-25.
207. See Fried, supra note 50, at 37, 54. Fried notes:
[A) priori moral reflection on rights seems inadequate to yield the necessary
richness of our legal system .... Political philosophy can tell us that a just
regime, a regime of liberty, is one in which persons have rights .... Philos-
ophy may be able to tell us in a general way what some of these rights
should be . . . . Yet philosophy cannot possibly determine the exact shape
and extent of such rights .... [I~t is preposterous to imagine that philoso-
phy can tell us whether there should be a right to privacy in a public tele-
phone booth or in a department store dressing room, or whether the impera-
tive that property rights be respected includes the right of ancient lights or
the use of percolating waters.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Lloyd, supra note 16, at 106-07. Lloyd states:
But it is difficult to avoid the reflection that even if a universally acknowl-
edged set of values could be established, so that in this qualified sense it
could be said that such a [natural law] code "exists" as a fact, its content
would be likely to be so vague and subject to so much qualification, as to
be vacuous.
Id. (footnote omitted).
208. Of course, the fact that no existing natural law doctrine has developed a
methodology to generate the kind of detailed, rule-oriented doctrine that would satisfy
a formalist does not mean that it cannot be done. It does mean, however, that the
burden is on the natural law theorist to show that it can be done.
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To date, no Justice on the current Supreme Court has clearly adopted
a natural law approach. However, among the more analytically minded
Justices, Justice Scalia is the only consistent formalist. In many areas of
law, Justice Scalia has pushed strongly for a formalist approach.' For
example, only Justice Scalia has taken a consistently formalist, strict
separation of powers approach."° So, too, in the area of statutory inter-
pretation, Justice Scalia has pushed most strongly for a rigidly formalis-
tic, literal approach to statutory interpretation."' In terms of giving con-.
It might be possible, for example, to develop a natural law theory that does
specify results at the precise level of "whether there should be a right to privacy in
a public telephone booth," Fried, supra note 50, at 54, but which does not depend
upon rule-oriented doctrine. Such an approach might rely instead upon principles ap-
plied empirically to specific fact situations, or rational dialogue about specific fact
situations. See JURGEN HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (T. McCarthy
trans., 1984) (discussing the general possibility of creating a natural law theory
around principals of rational dialogue in situations of uncoerced communication);
Ronald Dworldn, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L REV. 14, 22-29 (1967) (discussing
the difference between the rules and principles in this context).
Again, however, the burden is on the natural law theorist to develop a theory
capable of withstanding rational critique. Recent attempts at such modem ethical
natural law theories, like those of Rawis, Nozick, Ackerman, and Finnis, seem not to
have succeeded in withstanding rational critique. See supra notes 91-95 for citations
to these works. See generally READING RAWLS: CRITICAL STUDIES ON RAWLS' A THEORY
OF JUSTICE (Norman Daniels ed. 1975); READING NOzicLv ESSAYS ON ANARCHY, STATE
AND UTOPIA (J. Paul ed., 1982); Larry Alexander, Liberalism as Neutral Dialogue:
Man and Manna in the Liberal State, 28 UCLA L REv. 816 (1981) (book review of
BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE); William H. Wilcox, Book
Remiew: Natural Law and Natural Rights by John Finnis, 68 CORNELL L REV. 408
(1983).
Of course, if a judge is relying on natural law only to the extent that a particu-
lar natural law theory was embedded in a document under review, the question for
such a judge is not whether that natural law theory is capable of perfect rational
defense, but rather what was the natural law theory in which the framers and rati-
flers of the document believed. For further discussion of this point, see supra note
50.
209. See ifra text accompanying notes 210-14. See also Brock, supra note 205, at
63749 (discussing Justice Scalia's analytic positivist approach); Antonin Scalia, The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L REv. 1175 (1989). It should be noted
that, like Professor Summers, see supra note 24, Mr. Brock identifies four major
schools of jurisprudence--analytic positivism, history, natural law, and pragma-
tism--and Mr. Brock uses the term "analytic positivism" to refer to the judicial deci-
sion-making style described in this Article as formalism, that is, the approach to law
described in Table I as a combination of analytic logic and positivist premises. See
Brock, supra note 205, at 627-34. As indicated in supra note 24, the terms "analytic
positivism" and "formalism" describe the same decision-making style.
210. See infra text accompanying notes 379-80, 406.
211. See generally Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Sealia's Textualism: The "New" New
tent to substantive due process rights, Justice Scalia is most closely iden-
tifled with restricting such rights to those mechnically describable by ref-
erence to tradition as reflected in prior legislative enactments, and then
giving that tradition a specific, or narrow, reading."2 Similarly, with re-
spect to interpreting the contours of the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment, Justice Scalia has advocated a
narrow, literalist interpretation of that provision."3
Each of these conclusions would be troubling to a Justice approaching
constitutional or statutory interpretation from the perspective of natural
law. As indicated in Part II, a natural law approach does not call for an
exclusively literalist approach to interpretation."' Under a natural law
approach, the purpose behind the law, the "mischief to be remedied,""'
may be a better sign of the framers' intent than "grammatical propri-
ety.""' Of course, the words used are primary. A judge cannot substi-
tute his or her views for those of the framers. However, understanding
the limits of human capacity to express intent perfectly in the literal
words used, under a natural law approach to interpretation, the purpose
behind the words used is critical even in the initial stage of determining
the words' plain meaning." ' As stated by Justice Story in 1833, "the rea-
Legal Process, 12 CGkmozo L REV. 1597, 1597-99 (1991); see also William D. Popldn,
An "Internal" Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76
MINN. L REV. 1133 (1992).
212. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989) (In deter-
mining substantive due process rights, consider "the most specific level at which a
relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be
identified."); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377 (1989). In Stanford, an Eighth
Amendment case applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice
Scalia noted that to determine the evolving American tradition on what constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment, judges may consider only legislative enactments and
their application, not "public opinions polls, the views of interest groups and the
positions adopted by various professional associations .... A revised national con-
sensus ... must appear in the operative acts (laws and the application of laws) that
the people have approved." Id. See generally Bethany A. Cook & Lisa C. Kahn, Jus-
tice Scalia's Due Process Model: A History Lesson in Constitutional Interpretation, 6
ST. JOHN'S J. LEG. COMMENT 263 (1991); Timothy L Raschke Shattuck, Justice Scalia's
Due Process Methodology: Examining Specific Traditions, 65 S. CAL L. REV. 2743
(1992).
213. See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillan, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1004-1011 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
joined by Scalia, J., dissenting); Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2684-701
(1991) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 102-06.
215. Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rptr. 637, 638 (1584). See also supra text accompany-
ing notes 105-06 (discussing Heydon's Case).
216. STORY, supra note 102, at 283.
217. See Moore, Interpretation, supra note 49, at 383-84. Moore notes:
Once a judge determines the ordinary meanings of the words that make up a
text and modifies that ordinary meaning with any statutory definitions or
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son and spirit of the law, or the causes which led to its enactment, are
often the best exponents of the words, and limit their application."2 18
Furthermore, as Justice Story indicated, if the words used are "dubious"
(i.e., ambiguous), the judge must examine the context and subject-matter
of the words under consideration, and if the words used lead to a "mani-
fest absurdity," the judge must consider the words' effects and conse-
quences.
21 0
Given this approach towards interpretation, a natural law judge would
differ with a formalist judge on each of the interpretation questions dis-
cussed above. With respect to separation of powers, a natural law ap-
proach would recognize that the natural law political philosophy which
motivated the framers was a sharing of powers, checks-and-balances
approach, not a strict separation of powers theory.'m This willingness to
embrace a sharing of powers approach where constitutional text is not
clear, even if that means a reduction in the clear, bright-line rules of a
strict separation of powers approach, distinguishes a faithful natural law
approach from a formalist view."
With respect to statutory interpretation issues, the same line distin-
guishing a formalist approach from a natural law approach can be made.
While both a formalist and a natural law approach pay great attention to
the words used by the framers of a document,' and eschew reading
arguments of sound social policy into a document if the words do not
carry that meaning,' in the first instance of deciding what the words
case law developments, there is still at least one more task. A judge must
check the provisional interpretation reached from these ingredients with an
Idea how well such an interpretation serves the purpose of the rule in ques-
tion. The necessity for asking this question of purpose Ion Fuller made famil-
iar to us in his famous 1958 debate with H.LA. Hart.
Id,
218. STORY, supra note 102, at 283.
219. Id. at 284.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 109-13, 120-31.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 109-30, 144-50.
222. See Moore, Interpretation, supra note 49, at 320 (noting that under both a
natural law approach to interpretation and a formalist approach to plain meaning,
"ordinary meanings of the words used are the place to start in constructing the
meaning of L legal text .... [Plrima facie, the meaning of a legal text is its ordi-
nary meaning").
223. See id. at 314-18 (discussing under a natural law approach six basic values
that "Justify the judge in accepting a humbler, more constrained mode of decision-
maldng" based in part on the separation of powers observation that "[b]ecause leg-
islatures represent the majority's wishes better than courts do, democracies' legisla-
of a statute mean, a natural law approach will interpret the statute in
light of its evident purpose, rather than resort only to literal meaning
devoid of purpose.' Thus, while the formalist would follow what is
called in England the Golden Rule of statutory interpretation (purposes
may not be considered in determining a statute's plain meaning),' and
a rigid formalist might even follow the Literal Rule (the statute's literal
meaning should be followed even if it leads to an absurd result),'s it
would be consistent with a natural law approach to follow the American
Plain Meaning Rule, which permits judges to resort to both statutory
purposes and effects of a statute as part of determining the plain mean-
ing of a statute if its plain meaning appears to lead to an absurd re-
sult.,
tures should have their wishes carried out by a judge even if that judge disagrees
with the wisdom of such wishes").
224. See supra text accompanying notes 214-19.
225. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 417-21 (1899). In Rathbone, the
Court stated:
The general rule is perfectly well settled that, where a statute is of doubtful
meaning and susceptible upon its face of two constructions, the court may
look into prior and contemporaneous acts, the reasons which induced the act
in question, the mischiefs intended to be remedied, the extraneous circum-
stances, and the purpose intended to be accomplished by it, to determine its
proper construction. But where the act is clear upon its face, and when
standing alone it is fairly susceptible of but one construction, that construc-
tion must be given to it.
Id. at 419. The Court concluded that "[t]he whole doctrine may be summed up in the
single observation that prior acts may be resorted to to solve, but not to create, an
ambiguity." Id. at 421. For an English statement of the rule, see Grey v. Pearson, H.L
Cas. 61, 106 (1857). In Grey the court held:
[T]he grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, un-
less that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnancy with the rest of
the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the
words may be modified so as to avoid the absurdity and inconsistency but
no further.
Id. See generally KELSO & KESO, supra note 14, at 280-82 (discussing Hamilton and
Grey).
226. See, e.g., Regina v. City of London Court Judge, I Q.B. 273, 290 (1892) ("If the
words of an Act are clear, you must follow them, even though they lead to a mani-
fest absurdity.*); see generally KELsO & KELSO, supra note 14, at 280 (discussing the
Literal Rule of statutory interpretation).
227. The most famous American statement of the plain meaning rule during the
pre-Civil war natural law period was in Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
122, 202 (1819), in which Justice Marshall stated the following:
Where words conflict with each other, where the different clauses of an in-
strument bear upon each other, and would be inconsistent unless the natural
and common import of words be varied, construction becomes necessary, and
a departure from the obvious meaning of the words is justifiable. But if, in
any case, the plain meaning of a provision, not contradicted by any other
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A similar line can be drawn that distinguishes a natural law approach
from a formalist approach with respect to substantive due process rights.
While Justice Scalia has argued that courts should give the "history and
tradition" prong of Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis a specif-
ic, narrowly literal reading,' a natural law approach would not be will-
ing to fully embrace that approach. Instead, a faithful natural law ap-
proach would counsel that interpreting "tradition" as part of the Four-
teenth Amendment should take into account the background concept of
liberty that. the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment
placed into the Constitution, as elaborated by the traditional Anglo-Amer-
ican respect for precedent and reasoned interpretation of the law.'
provision in the same instrument, is to be disregarded, because we believe
the framers of that instrument could not intend what they say, it must be
one in which the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the
case would be so monstrous that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite
in rejecting the application.
Id.
As phrased, this plain meaning rule would not constrain a court from considering
purposes stated on the face of the statute when determining the meaning of particular
language. As Justice Marshall's phrasing of the plain meaning rule indicates, courts may
consult "any other provision of the same instrument" including statements of purpose,
to determine a statute's meaning. Id. In contrast, the Court's statement of the Golden
Rule of statutory interpretation indicates that courts cannot consider "the purpose in-
tended to be accomplished" by the statute and the "mischief to be remedied" as creat-
ing an ambiguity, even if that purpose is stated in the statute itself. See generally
KELso & KEiso, supra note 14, at 281-82 (discussing use of purpose in determining a
statute's plain meaning under the Literal, Golden, and Plain Meaning Rules).
228. See supra text accompanying note 212.
229. For a summary of this natural law interpretation style, see supra text accom-
panying notes 46-50. For the most recent example of this approach, which specifically
rejected Justice Scalia's formalist interpretation of the term "liberty" in the Fourteenth
Amendment, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). In Planned Parent-
hood, the Court stated.
It is tempting, as a means of curbing the discretion of federal judges, to
suppose that liberty encompasses no more than those rights already guaran-
teed to the individual against federal interference by the express provisions
of the first eight [A]mendments to the Constitution. But of course this Court
has never accepted that view.
It is also tempting, for the same reason, to suppose that the Due Pro-
cess Clause protects only those practices, defined at the most specific level,
that were protected against government interference by other rules of law
when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. But such a view would be in-
consistent with our law. It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a
realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter ....
The inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process
claims may call upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise
that same capacity which by tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned
judgment .... Our cases recognize "the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child ... ." At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept
of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood
were they formed under compulsion of the State.
Id. at 2804-05, 2806, 2807 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
At a jurisprudential level, one can perhaps understand better the differences
among the formalist, Holmesian, and natural law approaches towards interpreting a
term like "liberty" by resort to Ronald Dworkin's distinction between "concepts" and
"conceptions.". As used by Professor Dworkin, conceptions are the specific "discrete
ideas" or examples held by individuals, while concepts are the broader, more abstract,
idea reflected in the conceptions. See RONALD DWORIwN, LAW'S EMPIRE 71 (1986).
From this perspective, the formalist focus on interpreting traditions of liberty in
light of the most specific level at which the tradition can be identified, see supra note
212 and accompaning text, Involves asking what were the specific conceptions of the
framers about the contours of the constitutional provision in question. In the context
of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), such an approach would likely counsel that the
specific conceptions of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not include the
right of privacy recognized in Roe. See Planned Parenthood, 112 S. Ct. at 2874 n.1
(Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting) ("The enterprise launched in Roe . . . sought to estab-
lish-in the teeth of a clear, contrary tradition-a value found nowhere in the consti-
tutional text."); id. at 2859 (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting) ("At the time of
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, statutory prohibitions or restrictions on abor-
tion were commonplace."). Of course, as noted by the majority in Planned Parenthood,
strict application of this approach suggests that the Court wrongly decided Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), in which it held that a law banning interracial marriages
was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause, id. at 12, because state statutes
banning interracial marriages were commonplace in 1868. Planned Parenthood, 112 S.
Ct at 2805. It might also suggest that the Court wrongly decided Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which held unconstitutional a law banning access to contra-
ceptives. Id. at 485-86. By the same token, strict application of this approach to the
Equal Protection Clause would suggest that the Court also wrongly decided Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), because segregated schools were common-
place in 1868. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDIcIARY 244-45 (1977).
In response to such concerns, Justice Scalia indicated in his opinion in Planned
Parenthood that, consistent with a formalist approach, his "specific level" test concern-
Ing tradition cannot be used to override clear textual commands. Thus, for example, he
indicated that the Court properly decided Loving, and presumably Brown, based upon
the clear text of the Equal Protection Clause and its commitment to equality without re-
gard to the specific conceptions of the framers on particular issues. Planned Parent-
hood, 112 S. CL at 2874 n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Scalia left
unanswered whether the liberty component of the Due Process Clause, as opposed to
the Equal Protection Clause, has such a clear textual component that it would override
specific traditions.
In contrast to the formalist perspective, the pragmatic or functional Holmesian
perspective would be willing to consider the framers' concept of liberty or equality,. not
just their particular conceptions, and to give their concept a pragmatic or functional
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Finally, under the Eighth Amendment, a natural law approach would
reading today. However, because of the strong deference to government posture of the
Holmesian position, a Holmesian judge would not be willing to interpret the concept of
liberty or equality to hold unconstitutional governmental action unless the clear mean-
ing of the concept, or the clear purpose behind it, would require such a finding. See
supra text accompanying notes 37-40, 153-54, 166. Such clear meaning or purpose is
present when considering the meaning of equality as applied to education today. Thus,
under this approach, Brown was properly decided. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND: LJ. 1, 14 (1971). Bork stat-
ed:
[T]he men who put the [Fourteenth A]mendment in the Constitution intended
that the Supreme Court should secure against government action some large
measure of racial equality. That is certainly the core meaning of the
[Almendment .... The Court cannot conceivably know how these long-dead
men would have resolved [specific] issues had they considered, debated and
voted on each of them. Perhaps it was precisely because they could not
resolve them that they took refuge in the majestic and ambiguous formula-
the equal protection of the laws. But one thing the Court does know: [the
Equal Protection Clause] was intended to enforce a core idea of black equali-
ty against governmental discrimination.
Id. Loving and Griswold would also likely be viewed as properly decided today. Note
that in each case, Holmesian Justice White was in the majority. See Loving, 388 U.S.
at 2 (White, J., joining the majority opinion of the Court); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 502
(White, J., concurring). But see BORK, supra note 82, at 257-59 (criticizing the Court's
decision in Griswold). However, it would be difficult to conclude that the clear mean-
ing of the concept of liberty or the clear purpose behind it would support the right of
privacy recognized in Roe. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 221-22 (White, J., joined by Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); supra note 196 (discussing the difficulty in recognizing the right to pri-
vacy in Roe under this approach).
Finally, wider a natural law approach faithful to the framers and ratifiers'of the
Constitution, the concept of liberty or equality must be elaborated consistent with the
framers' and ratifiers' understanding of the traditions of that concept. This would in-
clude any natural law philosophy inherent in the concept of liberty or equality, as
elaborated by the traditional Anglo-American respect for precedent and reasoned inter-
pretation of the law, in which the framers and ratifiers believed. This is the underlying
approach of Planned Parenthood and Lee. See infra text accompanying notes 286-92 (dis-
cussing Lee). Of course, an alternative natural law approach would suggest 'that today,
judges should interpret the concept of liberty or equality in light of our understanding
of natural law philosophy, not that of the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution; that
is either because the framers and ratifiers expected us to do so, or merely because we
should interpret the concept of liberty or equality without regard to whether today's
natural law understanding reflects that of the framers and ratifiers. For discussion of
such an approach, see Moore, Interpretation, supra note 49, at 393-96. For a later
argument by Professor Moore that the framers and ratifiers believed in what he calls a
"moral realist" natural law approach, thereby indicating that his "moral realist" ap-
proach is consistent with the framers' and ratifiers' original intent, see Moore, Unurit-
ten Constitution, supra note 49, at 133-37.
reject a narrow, formalistic reading of the phrase "cruel and unusual pun-
ishment," such as that proposed by Justice Scalia,'s and instead favor
an approach faithful to the background concerns of the framers. Such a
natural law approach would likely include the natural law principle of
proportionality of punishment." Justice Scalia has indicated a reluc-
tance to interpret the Eighth Amendment in light of that principle.'
With respect to these issues, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor have indi-
cated some trouble with Justice Scalia's approach and some receptive-
ness toward the positions stated above as reflecting a natural law posi-
tion. For example, as discussed in Part IV of this Article, Justices Kenne-
dy and O'Connor have consistently rejected Justice Scalia's strict separa-
tion of powers approach in cases such as Morrison v. Olson'x and
Mistretta v. United States,' and have adopted what appears to be a
faithful natural law approach to separation of powers in Public Citizen
v. United States Department of Justice." In Michael H. v. Gerald
D.,' Justices Kennedy and O'Connor were unwilling to "foreclose the
unanticipated" by embracing Justice Scalia's formalist approach toward
history and tradition under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause, which they acknowledged was "somewhat inconsistent with our
past decisions in this area."" In Harmelin v. Michigana and Hudson
230. See supra text accompanying note 213.
231. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284-85 (1983). The Court stated:
The principle that a punishment should be proportionate to the crime is
deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence ....
The English Bill of Rights repeated the principle of proportionality in lan-
guage that was later adopted in the Eighth Amendment: "excessive Baile
ought not to be required nor excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall
Punishments inflicts." Although the precise scope of this provision is uncer-
tain, it at least incorporated "the long-standing principle of English law that
the punishment . .. should not be, by reason of its excessive length or se-
verity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged."
Id (quoting English Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M., ch. 2 (Eng.)).
232. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2684-701 (1991) (Scalia, J., joined by
RehnquLst, C.J.).
233. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
234. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
235. 491 U.S. 440 (1989). See infra text accompanying notes 436-43.
236. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
237. Id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor
stated:
I concur in all but footnote 6 of Justice Scalla's opinion. This footnote
sketches a mode of historical analysis to be used when identifying liberty in-
terests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
that may be somewhat inconsistent with our past decisions in this area. On
occasion this Court has characterized relevant traditions protecting asserted
rights at levels of generality that might not be 'the most specific level' avail-
[VoL 20: 531, 1993] Separation of Powers Jurisprudence
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
v. McMillian,5 Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, along with other mem-
bers of the Court, rejected Justice Scalia's narrower approach to the
Eighth Amendment and remained faithful to the natural law principle of
proportionality of punishment.'
With respect to statutory interpretation, the possible differences among
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and O'Connor are not yet clear because the
Court has not explicitly struggled in recent years with the difference be-
tween a Golden Rule approach to statutory interpretation and the Plain
Meaning Rule."I Rather, the struggle in recent years has concerned
moving away from an instrumentalist use of legislative history (which
permits resort to legislative history to help support an interpretation of
the statute which advances sound social policy, at least where leeway
exists in the statute)' to a more judicially restrained use of legislative
able. I would not foreclose the unanticipated by the prior imposition of a
single mode of historical analysis.
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Along with Justice Souter, Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor recently rejected Justice Scalia's formalist approach to the Lib-
erty Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791 (1992). See supra note 229 (discussing this rejection of Scalia's approach to the
Fourteenth Amendment Liberty Clause).
238. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
239. 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
240. Hudson, 112 S. CL at 997-1002; Harmelin, 111 S. CL at 2702-05 (Kennedy, J.,
joined by O'Connor, J., and Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); idt. at 2709-19 (White, J., joined by Blaclmun, J., and Stevens, J., dissent-
ing); id. at 2719 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
241. For a discussion of the differences between the Golden Rule and Plain
Meaning Rule approaches to statutory interpretation, see supra text accompanying
notes 225-27.
242. See, e.g., John M. Kernochan, Statutory Interpretation: An Outline of Method, 3
DALHOUSIE LJ. 333, 356-57 (1976). Kernochan writes:
Some' statutes, by virtue of their generality, or otherwise, clearly contemplate
judicial creativity .... Resort to purpose will resolve many [problems, but]
there is often leeway in defining purposes .... Where such leeway remains,
legislative choices must be made by the courts .... The considerations
beyond [legislative] intent to be weighed in . . . [interpretation] we may label
"policy" or "public policy."
Id. See Zeppos, supra note 211, at 1619. Zeppos notes:
The textualist critique of the Brennan opinion in Weber is obvious. It disre-
gards the clear text, followed by a selective reading of the legislative history
to produce a result compatible with the Court's view of social policy. Once
text is abandoned, answers to statutory cases are found not in the "law" but
the judge's own views of justice, fairness, or social welfare.
history.' This is a move with which Holmesian, formalist, and natural
law judges would all agree.'
Justices Souter and Thomas have not been on the Court long enough
to predict accurately their decision-making style. Nevertheless, some ob-
servations can be made. With respect to many issues which have come
before the Court, Justice Souter has joined most often with Justices Ken-
nedy and O'Connor in their positions." It is thus likely that Justice
Id. See also West Winds, Inc. v. M.V. Resolute, 720 F.2d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 1983).
The court stated:
[A] court interpreting a statute should: "ask itself not only what the legisla-
tion means abstractly, or even on the basis of legislative history, but also
what it ought to mean in terms of the needs and goals of present day soci-
ety. This approach is required by the insuperable difficulties of readjusting
old legislation by the legislative process and by the fact that it is obviously
impossible to secure an omniscient legislature."
Id. (quoting Arthur W. Phelps, Factors Influencing Judges in Interpreting Statutes, 3
VAND. L REV. 456, 469 (1950)).
243. Compare Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 443
(1989) (Brennan, J., for the Court) (quoting Boston Sand and Gravel Co. v. United
States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928) (Holmes, J., for the Court) (stating that it would be
proper for the court to look beyond the words of the statute "when the result it
apparently decrees is difficult to fathom or where it seems inconsistent with
Congress' intention, since the plain-meaning rule is 'rather an axiom of experience
than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it
exists'") with id. at 473 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
Where it is clear that the unambiguous language of a' statute embraces cer-
tain conduct, and it would not be patently absurd to apply the statute to
such conduct, it does not foster a democratic exegesis for this Court to rum-
mage through unauthoritative materials to consult the spirit of the legislation
in order, to discover an alternative interpretation of the statute with which
the Court is more comfortable.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
244. See, e.g., Frankfurter, supra note 38, at 529 (citation omitted) (under the
Holmesian approach, use of legislative history should not be seen as an opportunity
"to use [the statute's] words as 'empty vessels into which [the judge) can pour any-
thing he will'-his caprices, fixed notions, even statesmanlike beliefs in a particular
policy."); supra notes 222-27 (discussing under a formalist or natural law approach a
judicially restrained version of statutory interpretation). See generaly Ardestani v.
INS, 112 S. Ct. 515, 520 (1991) (O'Connor, J., joined by every member of the Court
deciding the case except instrumentalists Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J.) (citations
omitted) ("The 'strong presumption' that the plain language of the statute expresses
congressional intent is rebutted only in 'rare and exceptional circumstances,' when a
contrary legislative intent is clearly expressed."). For further discussion of these and
other related points concerning statutory interpretation and the four judicial decision-
making styles, see Keiso, Interpretation, supra note 10.
245. For example, in his first year on the Court, Justice Souter was aligned most
often with Justice O'Connor (88.9%), closely followed by Justice Kennedy (83.8%).'See
The Supreme Cour, 1990 Term The Statistics, 105 HARv. L REv. 77, 420 (1991)
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Souter will be part of that group on the Court that appears to approach
cases from what is described in this Article as the framers' and ratifiers'
original natural law approach.' As indicated above, that approach per-
mits a balancing of factors against a backdrop of natural law principles
in cases where those natural law principles were incorporated into the
Constitution and the Constitution does not contain specific contrary text
on point."4
In his confirmation hearings, Justice Thomas also indicated some pre-
disposition for a natural law decision-making style.' His pre-confirma-
tion praise of Justice Scalia's lone dissent in Morrison v. Olson,"Q how-
ever, and his siding with Justice Scalia in most cases since joining the
Court,' including their two-Justice dissent in the Eighth Amendment
[hereinafter .1990 Term Statistics]. During the 1991 Term, Justice Souter continued to
be aligned most often with Justices Kennedy and O'Connor. See, e.g., Linda Green-
house, Changed Path for the Court?: New Balance is Held by 3 Cautious Justices,
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1992, at Al ("[E]ffective control of the Court has passed to a
subgroup of the majority, a moderately conservative middle group of three Justices,
Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony M. Kennedy, and David H. Souter."). Paul M. Barrett,
High Court Wanders from Path to Right, WALL ST. J., July 1, 1992, at B6 ("Emerging
Center Justices: Sandra O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy and David Souter voted for the
same results 71% of the time.")
246. For the discussion of this approach generally, see supra notes 46-50, 205-44
and accompanying text. For the discussion of the natural law approach as it relates
to separation of powers issues, see supra text accompanying notes 102-50. See also
Greenhouse, supra note 245 (noting that Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter are
generally cautious when deciding cases, are hesitant "to overturn precedent and
[have] a distaste for aggressive arguments, whether" made by lawyers or other Justic-
es).
247. See supra text accompanying notes 109-25, 205-08, 214-32.
248. See, e.g., David Margolick, The Thomas Hearings: Sizing Up the Talk of "Natu-
ral Law". Many Ideologies Discover a Precept, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1991, at A22; see
also Scott D. Gerberg, Note, The Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas, 8 J.L. & Pol.
107 (1991).
249. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). See Linda Greenhouse, Questions About Thomas, the Man,
Obscured Clues About Thomas, the Jurist, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1991, § 4, at 1 (dis-
cussing an exchange between Senator Joe Biden and Judge Thomas in which
Thomas' pre-confirmation praise of Justice Scalia's dissent in Morrison was dis-
cussed).
250. See Paul M. Barrett. Justice Thomas Confirms Fears of His Critics, WALL ST.
J., July 1, 1992, at B6 [hereinafter Barrett, Coqfirms] (observing that Justices Thomas
and Scalia voted for the same results 8796 of the time); Paul M. Barrett, Despite
Expectations, Sealia Fails to Unify Conservatives on the Court, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28,
1992, at A6 [hereinafter Barrett, Scalia] ("[T]his term Justice Scalia might have found
his first true ally in Clarence Thomas."); Claire Cooper, High Court Disappoints Con-
servatives: Three Factions Make Rulings by Coalition, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 1, 1992,
case of Hudson v. McMilian," suggests that Justice Thomas may read
the natural law background of the Constitution differently from Justices
Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter, and in ways to reach results similar to
those of Justice Scalia, that is, results consistent with a formalist ap-
proach.'
The remaining two Justices on the Court to discuss are Justices
Blackmun and Stevens. Although both often sided with Justices Marshall
and Brennan,'m and observers perceive both as part of the liberal, instru-
mental wing of the Court,' neither are consistent instrumentalists. For
example, neither agrees with Justices Brennan and Marshall on their
death penalty rationale.' However, in many cases, these two Justices
have seemed to adopt an instrumental, sound social policy approach.'
at A20 ("'Clarence Thomas' soul has been captured 'by Justice Scalia,'" said former
Reagan administration lawyer Bruce Fein.").
251. 112 S. Ct. 995, 1004-1011 (1992) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting).
For examples of other cases during the 1991 Term where Justices Scalia and Thomas
wrote separately from the rest of the Court, see Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810,
1821 (1992) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting); White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct
736, 744 (1992) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2632 (1992) (Scalia,
J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
252. See Christopher Cox, The Sad Career of Reagan Justices, WALL ST. J., July 1,
1992, at A14.
The flurry of important decisions issued by the [Clourt in its final days
shows that Justice Clarence Thomas has vindicated the hopes of judicial
conservatives. They supported his nomination hoping that he would, like Jus-
tice Antonin Scala, interpret both the Constitution and legislative enactments
in accordance with their apparent meaning.
Id. See also Barrett, Confirms, supra note 250, at B6 ('[Justice Thomas] has signed on
with Justice Scalia's continuing-and largely unsuccessful-effort to simplify and narrow
the court's interpretation of the Constitution and to curb the authority of the Judicia-
ry.").
253. For example, during the 1989 Term of the Court, the last term that both
Justices Brennan and Marshall served on the Court, Justice Blackmun sided most
with Justice Brennan (73.4%) and second most with Justice Marshall (69.896). The
Supreme Court, 1989 Term: 7he Statistics, 104 HARV. L REv. 40, 360 (1990) [herein-
after 1989 Term Statistics). Similarly, during the 1989 Term, Justice Stevens sided
most with Justice Brennan (65.596) and second most with Justice Marshall (64.096). Id.
254. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 250, at A20 ("On the left were Justices Harry
Blackmun and John Paul Stevens."); Laura McCoy, High Court Disappoints Conserva-
tives: Kennedy Irks His Backers on Abortion and Religion, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 1,
1992, at A20 ("[Tlhe court's two remaining liberals [are] Justices Harry Blackmun and
John Paul Stevens.").
255. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 158 (1976) (opinion by Stewart, J., Powell,
J., and Stevens, J.); id. at 227 (Blaclkmun, J., concurring).
256. This approach counsels for an expansive reading of the right to privacy and
thus a reading favoring finding the right to choose an abortion, which the Court
recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Similarly, it counsels finding that
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With the retirements of Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justices
Blackmun and Stevens remain the two Justices on the Court most faith-
ful to the instrumentalist tradition of the Warren Court.'? Thus, observ-
ers best describe them as moderate instrumentalists.
This summary of the judicial decision-making styles yields the follow-
ing tentative categorization of the current Justices on the Supreme Court:
one formalist (Justice Scalia); two Holmesians (Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice White); two moderate instrumentalists (Justices Blackmun
and Stevens); and four Justices who, to varying extents, appear to ap-
proach cases most closely from the framers and ratifiers' original natural
law approach (Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas). A num-
ber of caveats are in order, however, concerning this tentative categoriza-
tion.
First, as indicated at the beginning of Part III, the author is not claim-
ing that any of the Justices have self-consciously adopted one of the four
decision-maidng styles described in this Article.'s Rather, the author
only claims that the decision-making styles of the Justices reflect them-
selves more in one style than another.
Second, given its cursory nature, the intent of this discussion is not to
establish conclusively, the placement of the current Supreme Court Jus-
tices in light of the four judicial decision-making styles. Such a discus-
sion is beyond the scope of. this Article. Rather, this discussion suggests
possible groupings of Justices and indicates the methodology that led to
their respective placement. This discussion should help preface the sub-
sequent discussion of the six separation of powers cases in Part IV.
there are compelling governmental interests which override corporate rights to spend
money acquired in commercial transactions for political purposes, which was the re-
sult in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, '494 U.S. 652 (1990).
257. This shows itself most clearly in those cases decided during the 1991 Term of
the Court in which Justices Blackmun and Stevens were alone in dissent. Typically,
these cases involved overruling or limiting some modem line of precedent which had
been supported by Justices Brennan and Marshall. See, e.g., Suter v. Artist M., 112 S.
CL 1360, 1377 (1992) (Blackmun, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting); Ardestani v.
INS, 112 S. Ct. 515, 527 (1991) (Blackmun, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting); Zatco
v. California, 112 S. Ct. 355, 357 (1991) (Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing).
Overall, during the 1991 Term, Justices Stevens and Blaclmmn were the most
consistent allies on the Court, voting together 87% of the time, a few tenths of a
percent higher than Justices Scalia and Thomas, who were the next most consistent
Court allies. See Barrett, Coqfirms, supra note 250, at B6.
258. See supra text accompanying note 181.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the claim is not being made that
any individual Justice represents a pure example of any of the four deci-
sion-making styles.' Particularly because the author is not claiming
that any Justice has self-consciously chosen one of these decision-making
styles, one can expect some departures from the "ideal" or "pure" deci-
sion-making. Such departures, however, when they occur, do appear to
have an order about which some observations can be made.
As stated above, while Justice Thomas might be predisposed to adopt
a natural law style of judicial decision-making, since joining the Court, he
has voted with Justice Scalia most often. Thus, on a spectrum be-
tween a formalist style and a natural law style, it would be appropriate
to place Justice Thomas closer to Justice Scalia than any other natural
law Justice based upon Justice Thomas' early performance on the Court.
Indeed, in a few cases, Justices Scalia and Thomas have decided the case
differently from all seven other Justices on the Court." Incorporating
this fact, a table of judicial decision-making styles would thus place Jus-
tice Thomas very close to Justice Scalia near the formalist decision-mak-
ing style.
Among the three other Supreme Court Justices who appear to follow
most closely the framers' and ratifiers' original natural law approach,
Justice Kennedy has been more willing to depart from Justices O'Connor
or Souter and join Justices Scalia and Thomas in formalist-sounding
opinions.' A table incorporating this fact would thus place Justice Ken-
nedy slightly closer to a formalist decision-making style than Justices
O'Connor or Souter.
259. Indeed, given the idiosyncracies that each judge brings to the task of judicial
decision-making, it would be rare for any judge to represent a pure example of any
decision-making style. Further, *the separation of judicial decision-making styles into
four' ideal types ... should not obscure the fact that in most cases judges resort to
a mixed blend of justificatory arguments .... To repeat, what differentiates judges
of the various decision-making styles are largely matters of degree and emphasis, not
rigid categorical differences." KELso & KEIso, supra note 14, at 119.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 248-52.
261. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
262. See, gg., Barrett, Scalia, supra note 250, at A6 (noting that "[mlore than
Justice O'Connor has done, Justice Kennedy has flirted with the Scalia view of using
literal text and a rigid view of tradition to curb expansive interpretation of constitu-
tional protections"); Zeppos, supra note 211, at 1598-99 (observing that "Justice Ken-
nedy has expressed some sympathy for (Scalia's] textualist rejection of legislative
history"). Throughout the 1990 Term, Justice Kennedy sided with Justice Scalia 72.4%
of the time, slightly more often than did Justice Souter (71.096) or Justice O'Connor
(68.9%). 1990 Term Statistics, supra note 245, at 420; see also United States v. R.I.C.,
112 S. Ct. 1329, 1339 (1992) (Scali J., joined by Kennedy, J., and Thomas, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia argued, '[Ilt is not
consistent with the rule of lenity to construe a textually ambiguous penal statute
against a criminal defendant on the basis of legislative history.* Id
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Similarly, among the two Holmesian Justices on the Court, it has been
Chief Justice Rehnquist who has more often departed from the
Holmesian line to join Justices Scalia and Thomas in formalist-sounding
opinions.' Evans v. United States' and Franklin v. Gwinnett Coun-
ty Public Schools' are two recent examples of this phenomenon. A ta-
ble incorporating this fact would thus place Chief Justice Rehnquist clos-
er to a formalist decision-making style than Justice White. Table 3 below
attempts to capture each of these aspects of judicial decision-making
style.
263. See Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992) (opinion by Thomas, J., joined by
Rehnquist, CJ., and Scalia, J.); Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. CL 2222, 2235 (1992) (Scala,
J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ., and Thomas, J., dissenting); McCarthy v. Madigan, 112 S.
Ct. 1081, 1092-93 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., concur-
ring in the judgment); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 804 (1992) (Scala, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, CJ., and Thomas, J., dissenting); see also infra text accompany-
ing notes 26465.
As a general matter, Chief .Justice Rehnquist has sided with Justice Scalia much
more often than has Justice White. See, e.g., 1990 Term Statistics, supra note 245, at
420 (noting that Rehnquist sided with Scalia 73.1% of the time, while White sided
with Scalia. 62.296); 1989 Term Statistics, supra note 253, at 360 (noting that
Rehnqust sided with Scalia 81.396 of the time, while White sided with Scalia 70.5%);
see also inrfra text accompanying notes 272-76 (discussing Justice Rehnqulst's slightly
more formalist approach to statutory interpretation than Justice White's more pure
Holmeslan approach).
264. 112 S. Ct. 1881, 1899, 1903 (1992) (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ., and
Scalla, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas stated:
As serious as the Court's disregard for history is its disregard for well-estab-
lished principles of statutory construction .... I have no doubt that today's
opinion is motivated by noble alms. Political corruption at any level of gov-
ernment is a serious evil, and, from a policy perspective, perhaps one well
suited for federal law enforcement. But federal judges are not free to devise
new crimes to meet the occasion.
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
265. 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1039 (1992) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ., and Thomas,
J., concurring) ("Although we have abandoned the expansive rights-creating approach
exemplified by Cannon-and perhaps ought to abandon the notion of implied causes
of action entirely-causes of action that came into existence under the ancien re-
gime should be limited by the same logic which gave them birth.").
TABLE 3
Styles of Judicial Decision-Making
Positivism: Prescriptivism:
Judges as Judges as
Scientists Normative Actors
Law as Logical, Formalism Natural Law
Analytic, or SCALIA THOMAS
Conceptualist KENNEDY Powell
Attitude Burger SOUTER
O'CONNOR
REHNQUIST BLACKMUN
STEVENS
Law as Means to Holmesian Instrumentalism
Ends, Functional, or WHITE Brennan
Pragmatic Approach Marshall'
266. It should be noted that this Table is an updated version of a similar Table of
Justices of the Supreme Court which was prepared in 1984. See KELSO & KELso,
supra note 14, at 423. For Justices who were on the Court then and today, the
following updates should be noted.
First, Table 3 places Chief Justice Rehnqulst and Justice White slightly differently
than the 1984 Table. The 1984 Table defined both as Holmesian Justices, and both
remain so today. However, the 1984 Table placed Chief Justice Rehnquist as a pure
Holmesian Justice, not, as indicated in Table 3, a Holmesian judge with slight formal-
ist leanings. As a consistent advocate for formalism has emerged on the Court (Jus-
tice Scalla), see supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text, and as a second Justice
routinely supported that approach last term (Justice Thomas), see supra notes 249-52
and accompanying text, Chief Justice Rehnquist's occasional willingness to join a
formalist argument has become increasingly clear. See supra notes 263-65 and accom-
panying text. Thus, Table 3 places him leaning slightly in a formalist direction today.
However, as underscored by the separation of power cases, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 169-72, and other cases where a Holmesian and formalist would disagree,
see supra text accompanying notes 192-204, Chief Justice Rehnquist's basic decision-
making style remains Holmesian.
Similarly, Justice White's basic decision-making style today remains Holmesian, as
it was in 1984. However, the 1984 Table placed Justice White leaning slightly more in
an instrumentalist direction than does Table 3 today. While Justice White still occa-
sionally joins the two remaining instrumentalists on the Court in separate concurrenc-
es or dissents, see infra note 271 and accompanying text, he is less likely to do so
today .than in 1984. For example, during the 1983 and 1984 terms, Justice White
joined Justice Blackmun 77.896 and 77.096 of the time, while, during the 1989 and
1990 terms, Justice White joined Justice Blackmun only 61.096 and 64.296 of the time.
See 1990 Term Statistics, supra note 245, at 420; 1989 Term Statistics, supra note
253, at 360 The Supreme Court, 1984 Term: The Statistics, 99 HARv. L REv. 323
(1985) [hereinafter 1984 Term Statistics]; The Supreme Court, 1983 Term: The Sta-
tistics, 98 HARv. L REv. 308 (1984) [hereinafter 1983 Term Statistics]. Thus, it seems
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appropriate to recognize that over the past decade Justice White has moved from a
slightly instrumentalist Holmesian posture to a more pure Holmesian judicial restraint
posture.
Justice O'Connors decision-making style also has gone through a slight evolution
since 1984. For example, during the 1983 and 1984 terms, Justice O'Connor joined
Justice Relhquist 91.9% and 90.5% of the time and Justice White 84.5% and 84.2% of
the time. See id.; 1984 Term Statistics, supra, at 323. Thus, it was appropriate in
1984 to place her within the Holmesian camp. Furthermore, because during the 1983
and 1984 terms Justice O'Connor joined Justice Powell 84.996 and 85.7% of the time,
see 1983 Term Statistics, supra, at 308; 1984 Term Statistics, supra, at 323, it was
also appropriate to place Justice O'Connor leaning slightly in a natural law direction,
that is, away from Justice Rehnquist and toward Justice Powell. See infra note 278
(discussing Justice Powell's adoption of a natural law approach).
By the 1989 and 1990 terms of the Court, however, Justice O'Connor joined
Justices Rehnquist and White less often (81.9% and 80.0% for Chief Justice Rehnquist
and 74.6% and 71.7% for Justice White, respectively), while joining most often Justices.
Kennedy and Souter (83.2% and 84.6% for Justice Kennedy, respectively, and 88.9% for
Justice Souter during his first Term on the Court). See 1989 Term Statistics, supra
note 253, at; 380; 1990 Term Statistics, supra note 245, at 420. Thus, while acknowl-
edging that among Justices Kennedy, Souter, and O'Connor, Justice O'Connor's deci-
sion-malting style is slightly more toward the Holmesian or instrumentalist function-
al/pragmatic side of Table 3, see Brock, supra note 205, at 629-30 (discussing general-
ly Justice O'Connors pragmatism), and while acknowledging that in some cases,
therefore, Justice O'Connor may be more likely than Justices Kennedy or Souter to
join a Hoimesian or instrumentalist opinion, see, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
421 (1989) (Justice O'Connor joining with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White
to uphold the flag-burning statute in a Holmesian-sounding opinion), discussed supra
note 197, infra note 277 (Justice O'Connor joining Justices Blackmun and Stevens in
Instrumentalist-sounding opinions), it seems better to place Justice O'Connor principal-
ly among a Kennedy-Souter-O'Connor natural law decision-making style, see supra
notes 233-47 and accompanying text, rather than principally a Holmesian judge, only
as leaning In a natural law direction.
For a critique of Justice O'Connor's opinion in City of Richmond v. Croson, 488
U.S. 469 (1989), alleging that her opinion represented a flawed natural law approach
and was inconsistent with John Finnis's modem version of natural law, see David
Bamhizer, Natural Law as Practical Methodology: A Finnisian Analysis of City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 38 CLEv. ST. L REV. 15, 19 (1990).
Finally, in 1984, Justice Blackmun's decision-maling style was characterized as a
blend of instrumentalist and natural law rhetoric, but with the natural law roots in
the ascendancy. See KELSO & KELso, supra note 14, at 420, 422, 429. In Table 3, Jus-
tice Blackmun is likewise characterized as being somewhere between instrumentalism
and natural law. However, with the emergence of the Kennedy-Souter-O'Connor wing
of the Court, which seems even more faithful to the framers' and ratifiers' original
natural law decision-making style, see supra text accompanying notes 46-50, 101, 233-
47, and with Justice Blackmun joining Justice Stevens most often today, see supra
note 257, it seems best to place Justice Blackmun a little closer to the instrumental-
1st decision-making style than in 1984, and to call him principally a moderate instru-
With respect to the instrumentalist style of decision-making, Table 3 at-
tempts to capture the fact that, as noted above, Justices Brennan and
Marshall were core instrumentalists during their tenure on the Court,
while Justices Blacknun and Stevens are better described as moderate
instrumentalists.' Thus, Table 3 does not place Justices Blackmun and
Stevens directly under the instrumentalism heading, unlike Justices
Brennan and Marshall, the core instrumentalists of the modem court era.
Table 3 also places Justice Stevens leaning slightly in a Holmesian di-
rection because Justice Stevens has shown a greater willingness than
Justice Blackmun to break with an instrumentalist approach and adopt
Holmesian-style reasoning.' Indeed, Justice Stevens' particular empha-
sis on the realities of the legislative process suggests a pragmatic, func-
tional approach somewhere between Holmesian and instrumentalist deci-
sion-making styles. Justice Stevens has shown some willingness to defer
to the legislature in those cases in which the political process appears to
operate properly.' However, Justice Stevens appears to acknowledge
that Holmesian deference is not proper when concerns arise about the
political process, and that in such cases, instrumental concerns about
insuring a sound social policy result come to the foreY0
mentalist, with some natural law tendencies. That adjustment is made in Table 3.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 253-57.
268. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 435 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
269. See, eg., Metro Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3028 (1990)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
I remain convinced... that racial or ethnic characteristics provide a rele-
vant basis for disparate treatment only in extremely rare situations and that
It is therefore "especially important that the reasons for any such classifica-
tion be clearly identified and unquestionably legitimate." The Court's opinions
explains how both elements of that standard are satisfied.
Id. See also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 315 (1986) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (arguing "that a school board may reasonably conclude that an integrated fac-
ulty will be able to provide benefits to the student body that could not be provided by
an all-white, or nearly all-white, faculty").
270. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at,513 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment) (arguing that "instead of carefully identifying the characteristics
of the two classes of contractors that are respectively favored and disfavored by its
ordinaince, the Richmond City Council ha[d] merely engaged in the type of stereotypi-
cal analysis that is a hallmark of violations of the Equal Protection Clause"); Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 550-51 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens states:
Although it is traditional for judges to accord the same presumption of regu-
larity to the legislative process no matter how obvious it may be that Con-
gress has acted precipitately, I see no reason why the character of their
procedures may not be considered relevant to the decision whether the legis-
lative product has caused a deprivation of liberty or property without due
process of law.. . . [It seems to me that judicial review should include a
consideration of [whether] . . . the classification was not adequately preceded
by a consideration of less drastic alternatives or adequately explained by a
[Vol 20. 531, 19931 Separation of Powers Jurisprudence
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Similarly, Table 3 attempts to reflect the fact that among the
Holmesian Justices, Justice White, rather than Chief Justice Rehnquist,
has generally been more willing to join Justices Stevens and
Blackmun." This has been particularly true in cases of statutory inter-
pretation, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist has often appeared to adopt a
more formalist or literal style of statutory interpretation and thus es-
chewing the classic Holmesian pragmatic or functional approach to inter-
pretation issues.' Under the classic pragmatic or functional approach,
a judge can properly look not only to the clear text of the statute, but
also to clear inferences of statutory purpose, both as revealed in the stat-
ute itself and in the statute's legislative history.' The classic Holmesian
or instrumrentalist style of statutory intepretation thus rejects the plain
meaning rule's legislative history limitation. 4 A Holmesian judge would
feel it appropriate to resort to legislative history in every case, but only
to effectuate the "in fact" intent of the legislature. However, a Holmesian
judge would not attempt to justify a particular sound social policy inter-
statement of legislative purpose.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
271. As a general matter, Justice White has routinely sided with Justices Blackmun
and Stevens more often than Chief Justice Rehnquist. See, e.g., 1990 Term Statistics,
supra note 245, at 420 (noting that White sided with Blaclanun 64.296 of the time
and with Stevens 59.296, while Rehnquist sided with Blackmun only 52.596 of the time
and with Stevens 49.296); 1989 Term Statistics, supra note 253, at 360 (noting that
White sided with Blackmun 61.096 of the time and with Stevens 53.29, while
Rehnquist sided with Blackunun only 54.796 of the time and with Stevens 48.296).
For examples of cases during the 1991 term in which Justices White, Blaclnun,
and Stevens joined in separate opinions, see New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct.
2408, 2446 (1992) (White, J., joined by Blaclanun, J., and Stevens, J., concurring and
dissenting); United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1640 (1992)
(White, J., joined by Blaclanun, J., and Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting); Presley
v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820, 832 (1992) (Stevens, J., joined by White,
J., and Blackmun, J., dissenting). There were no cases during the 1991 term where
Chief Justice Rehnquist joined with Justices Blackmun and Stevens in a separate
opinion.
272. For a suggestion of Chief Justice Rehnquist's flirtation with Justice Scalia's
formalism, see, e.g., Zeppos, supra note 210, at 1599 ("Justice Rehnqist ... has
embraced [Scalla's] textualism on occasion.") For a discussion of the pragmatic or
functional nature of the Holmesian approach to statutory interpretation, see supra
note 37-40 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 37-40, 241-44 and accompanying text. On use of legislative his-
tory generally in formalist, natural law, Holmesian, and instrumentalist judicial de-
cision-making styles generally, see KEILso & KELSO, supra note 14, at 262-64, 275-93,
310-15; Kelso, Interpretation, supra note 10.
pretation of a statute through resort to isolated bits of legislative history,
as might an extreme instrumentalist. Thus, Table 3 reflects the fact
that on matters such as statutory interpretation, Justice White is basically
a consistent Holmesian judge, while Chief Justice Rehnquist's style of
interpretation points in a formalist direction.'
Table 3 also reflects that Justice O'Connor, rather than Justices Souter
or Kennedy, has been more willing to join Justices Blackmun and
Stevens in those few cases where Justices Kennedy, Souter, and
O'Connor separate and one joins with Justices Blackmun and Stevens.'
Finally, based upon their tenure on the Court, Table 3 tentatively plac-
es former Chief Justice Burger between a formalist and a Holmesian, and
former Justice Powell as a natural law judge.'
275. See supra notes 40, 242-44 and accompanying text.
276. In making this statement, it should be noted that Justice Robert Jackson, for
whom Chief Justice Rehnquist clerked, also had a similar aversion to legislative
history, even though Justice Jackson would also typically be considered a practitioner
of the Holmesian judicial decision-making style. On Justice Jackson's aversion to
legislative history, see Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384,
395-97 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
277. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2661 (1992) (Blackmun, J., joined by
Stevens, J., and O'Connor, J., concurring); United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct.
2188, 2197 (1992) (Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J., and O'Connor, J., dissenting);
United States v. Williams, 112 S. CL 1735, 1746 (1992) (Stevens, J., joined by
Blackmun, J., and O'Connor J., as to Part I, dissenting); Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. CL
1430, 1455 (1992) (Blackmnn, J., joined by Stevens, J., and O'Connor, J., concurring);
INS v. Elios-Zacarlas, 112' S. CL 812, 817 (1992) (Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J.,
and O'Connor, J., dissenting).
As a general matter, during the 1990 Term, Justice O'Connor sided with Justices
Blackmun and Stevens slightly more often than Justices Kennedy and Souter. See
1990 Term Statistics, supra note 245, at 420 (observing that O'Connor sided with
Blackmun 60.096 of the time and with Stevens 54.296, and Souter sided with Blackmun
59.396 of the time and with Stevens 55.69, and Kennedy sided with Blackmun 54.7%
of the time and with Stevens 52.1%).
278. Chief Justice Burger is placed between a formalist and a Holmeslan mode of
decision-making because sometimes his opinions pointed in a formalist direction and
sometimes they pointed in the Holmesan direction. For examples of Chief Justice
Burger's formalism in the separation of powers area, see infra notes 308, 354 and
accompanying text. For examples of Chief Justice Burger's Holmesianism, see KEtso
& KEiso, supra note 14, at 313-14, 421-29 (citing statutory interpretation and constitu-
tional law examples). Although Table 3 places Justice Powell as leaning in a natural
law direction with the other "natural law" Justices on the Court, this does not mean
that Justice Powell consciously adopted or relied upon natural law rhetoric in decid-
ing cases. Rather, the argument is that the positions Justice Powell took in deciding
cases can best be understood in natural law terms. See generally KELso & KELSO,
supra note 14, at 420-29. See also Greenhouse, supra note 245, at AS (comparing
Justice Powell to Justices Kennedy and Souter); ijfra text accompanying notes 323-35
(discussing Justice Powell's natural law approach in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(19m3)).
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A final caveat The author does not claim that Table 3 will predict the
groupings of Justices in every case coming before the Supreme Court.
Judges are too complex, and facts of each case are too distinctive, to be
captured completely in a two-dimensional Table.' However, such an
analysis can help indicate basic judicial tendencies, and thus can provide
what in another context Karl Llewellyn termed a "horse-sense":' an
idea of what the Justices' initial instincts are likely to be before the equi-
ties of a particular case begin to bite.
Two recent cases support Part III's main thesis that among the conser-
vatives on the Court, different judicial decision-making philosophies may
yield quite different results in certain situations. In Lee v. Weisman," a
majority of the Court held that allowing clerical members to offer
prayers at a public high school graduation ceremony violates the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment.' The majority opinion by Jus-
tice Kennedy was based upon an elaboration of the basic concept that
freedom of religion lies at the heart of the Establishment Clause: an ap-
proach consistent with a natural law interpretation of the Constitu-
tion.' As phrased by Justice Kennedy:
[T]he lesson of history that was and is the inspiration for the Establishment
Clause [is] the lesson that in the hands of government what might begin as a tol-
erant expression of religious views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and co-
erce. A state-created orthodoxy puts at grave risk that freedom of belief and con-
science which are the sole assurance that religious faith is real, not imposed.'
From a formalist or Holmesian perspective, however, the Court would
decide Lee quite differently. For a strict formalist, the relevant question
would be whether this specific practice of prayer in schools was under-
279. Thus, a number of cases each Term are decided where Justices who usually
do not join one another end up on the same side of some particular issue. From the
1991 Term, see Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2031, 2054 (1992)
(Stevens, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ., and Blackmun, J., dissenting); Wyatt v. Cole,
112 S. Ct. 1827, 1829 (1992) (O'Connor, J., joined by White, J., Blackmun, J., Stevens,
J., Scalia, J., and Kennedy, J.); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston and Maine
Co., 112 S. Ct. 1394, 1405 (1992) (White, J., joined by Blackmun, J., and Thomas, J.,
dissenting); INS v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719, 728 (1992) (Scalia, J., joined by Stevens,
J., and Souter, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
280. LLEWtLLYN, supra note 14, at 121-22, 359-60.
281. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
282. 1l at 2658.
283. See supra note 229 and accompanying text (discussing the natural law resort
to the concept embedded in a particular natural law principle, as opposed to the
formalist reliance on particular historical conceptions).
284. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2658.
stood to be unconstitutional by the framers at the time the Establishment
Clause was ratified.' Absent clear constitutional text regarding the is-
sue of prayer in schools, a Holmesian would be more flexible than a
strict formalist and would ask what the framers and ratifiers might have
concluded about a contemporary problem given the purpose of the con-
stitutional provision under scrutiny. However,, a Holmesian would likely
defer to the governmental body unless the clear purpose of the clause
were to ban such activity.' As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in
Wallace v. Jaffree,w the clear purpose of the Establishment Clause was
to prevent the formal establishment of an official national religion, and to
prevent government from preferring one religion over another, not to ban
reasonable accomodation between church and state.' Thus, under a
formalist or Holmesian decision-making style, the prayer at the gradua-
tion ceremony in Lee would probably be upheld.'
An analogous argument can be made regarding Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,' in which the two most formalist and two most Holmesian Jus-
tices were in dissent."'
IV. THE SIX MAJOR SEPARATION OF POWERS CASES DECIDED SINCE 1980
AS ANALYZED FROM THE FOUR APPROACHES TO
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
In this section, the six major separation of powers cases since 1980
will be discussed in light of the four approaches to judicial decision-mak-
ing.
285. For elaboration of the strict formalist approach to constitutional text, which
focuses on the framers' specific conceptions regarding a constitutional provision, see
supra note 229.
286. See generalty supra notes 34-41, 153-54, 229 and accompanying text.
287. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
288. Id. at 93-107 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
289. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2149, 2678-79 (1992) (Scalia, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., White, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (noting "'that
the meaning of the [Establishment) Clause is to be determined by reference to histor-
ical practices and understandings' . . . [and that] prayer has been a prominent part of
governmental ceremonies and proclamations [since our nation's origin]").
290. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
291. In Planned Parenthood, Justices Kennedy, Souter, and O'Connor voted with the
moderate instrumentalists, Justices Blackmun and Stevens, to uphold the right of
privacy recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), at least in a limited form.
For the reasons supporting their conclusion that the term "liberty," as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, includes protection against undue burdens on a woman's
right to have an abortion, see supra note 229. For reasons supporting the dissent by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas, see supra note 229.
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A. INS v. Chadha
INS v. Chadha,' a 1983 case, considered whether the one-house veto
provision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act' was constitution-
al. Chadha, a Kenyan-born East Indian with a British passport, was ini-
tially held deportable for overstaying his visa.' Pursuant to an excep-
tion in the Act, an immigration law judge suspended Chadha's deporta-
tion.' A House of Representatives' subcommittee then reviewed 340
cases of deportation suspension, and decided in six cases (Chadha's and
five others) that the suspension was not warranted.2m Pursuant to the
one-house veto provision, the House then passed a resolution vetoing the
suspension by the immigration law judge in these six cases.' Chadha
then brought suit alleging that the House action vetoing his deportation
suspension was unconstitutional.'The Bicameralism and Presentment
Clauses of the Constitution provide that no law can take effect without
the concurrence of both houses of Congress and presidential approval; in
the event of a presidential veto, the law can take effect only if Congress
overrides that veto by a two-thirds majority.'s These two clauses are
among the more detailed and specific parts of the Constitution."a The
292. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
293. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (c) (1988).
294. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 923.
295. Id. at 923-25.
29. Id. at 925-26.
297. Id. at 926-27.
298. Id. at 928.
299. Article I, section one, of the Constitution provides: "All legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist
of a Senate and House of Representatives." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. Article I, section
seven, provides in pertinent part: "Every Bill which shall have passed the House of.
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President of the United States." Id. § 7, cl. 2. Article I, section seven, further pro-
vides:
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Sen-
ate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of
Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and
before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disap-
proved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House
of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the
Case of a Bill.'
Id. § 7, cl. 3.
300. Professor Crosskey noted that typically the framers included details in the
framers did not hesitate to make specific exceptions to the detailed
scheme of bicameralism and presentment. As Chief Justice Burger indi-
cated in his majority opinion in Chadha, the Constitution lists four spe-
cific exceptions that allow one house of Congress to act without present-
ment to the President: (1) the House of Representatives' power to initiate
impeachment proceedings; (2) the Senate's power to conduct impeach-
ment trials; (3) the Senate's power to approve or disapprove presidential
appointments; and (4) the Senate's power to ratify treaties."
Given these facts, a formalist, instrumentalist, or natural law judge
would likely hold that the a one-house veto provision in Chadha is un-
constitutional. From a formalist perspective, Congress failed to follow
the specific language of the Constitution, which lays out a clear,
bright-line procedure for passing legislative enactments. In Chadha, the
specific text of the Constitution is consistent with a bright-line mechani-
cal approach-the formalist's dream.' From a natural law perspective,
the one-house veto is also unconstitutional because specific language in
the Constitution clearly commands that result. As indicated earlier,
where the framers and ratifiers made a clear choice in specific constitu-
tional text, the natural law approach requires that choice to be fol-
lowed." An instrumentalist judge would be concerned about a legisla-
tive attempt to short-circuit checks and balances through delegation of
legislative power to one house, and would, therefore, also support a
holding that the one-house veto provision in Chadha is unconstitutional.
In Chadha, not only are the constitutional provisions detailed and specif-
ic, but the purposes underlying the separation of powers also support the
same result.'
Indeed, given the Constitution's relative clarity on the point, perhaps
only an extreme Holmesian judge, adopting an approach deferential to
the legislative branch, could find ways around the textual language of the
Constitution to support the legislative action in this case.' Even a
moderate Holmesian judge, committed to following clearly stated lan-
guage or clear inferences of purpose in the Constitution," would find
the statute unconstitutional.
Constitution only where they seemed required, leaving the rest to judicial interpre-
tation. See supra text accompanying note 104.
301. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 955-56.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 132-50.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 114-25.
304. For a discussion regarding the instrumentalist concern with the purposes be-
hind the separation of powers, particularly a concern with the legislature delegating
to one part of itself, see supra text accompanying notes 173-80.
305. On extreme Holmesan deference to the legislature, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 166-70.
306. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40, 153-54, 166, 229.
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Given this fact, it should be no surprise that a strong majority of the
Court found that the one-house veto provision in Chadha was unconsti-
tutional.' Chief Justice Burger's opinion was driven by an analytic, al-
most formalist, concern for the clear literal language of the Bicameralism
and Presentment Clauses, and by a preference for clear, bright-line
rules.' However, Chief Justice Burger also included language in his
opinion reflecting the natural law concern of the framers' and ratiflers'
purposes behind the separation of powers" and the instrumental con-
cern of short-changing the legislative process." Perhaps language re-
flecting these concerns made it easier for six of the nine Justices on the
Court to join Chief Justice Burger's opinion."'
Only one Justice dissented from the majority's conclusion that the
307. Indeed, only one Justice dissented from the Court's conclusion on this point.
See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
308. See id. at 951, 957-59; Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 1088 (stating that "Chief
Justice Burger's opinion for the majority of the Court was a paradigm example of
originalism and formalism"); E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Juris-
pndence Is So Abysmal, 57 GEo. WASH. L REV. 506, 514 (1989) (noting that the Su-
preme Court used an "exceedingly literal and legalistic mode of analysis").
309. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 947, 949. The Court stated:
The decision to provide the President with a limited and qualified power to
nullify proposed legislation by veto was based on the profound conviction of
the Framers that the powers conferred on Congress were the powers to be
most carefully circumscribed .... By providing that no law could take ef-
fect without the concurrence of the prescribed majority of the Members of
both Houses, the Framers reemphasized their belief, already remarked upon
in connection with the Presentment Clauses, that legislation should not be
enacted unless it has been carefully and fully considered by the Nation's
elected officials.
310. See id. Justice Burger wrote:
In the Constitutional Convention debates on the need for a bicameral legisla-
ture, James Wilson, later to become a Justice of this Court, commented:
"Despotism comes on mankind in different shapes ... [Tihe Legislative au-
thority ... can only be restrained by dividing it within itself, into distinct
and independent branches. In a single house there is no check, but the inad-
equate one, of the virtue & good sense of those who compose it."
Id (citation omitted).
311. Justice Powell filed a separate concurrence. Id, at 959-67 (Powell, J., concur-
ring). See infra text accompanying notes 323-35. Justice White dissented on the mer-
its. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967-1003 (White, J., dissenting). See infra text accompanying
notes 312-22. Justice Rehnquist dissented only on the severability issue. Chadha, 462
U.S. at 1013.16 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See infra text accompanying notes 340-43.
one-house veto was unconstitutional."' In his dissent, Justice White
struggled to avoid the clear implications of the constitutional text. Both
houses of Congress had passed and the President had signed the statute
that initially set up the one-house veto provision.'3 Justice White sug-
gested that because the authorizing Act satisfied the Bicameralism and
Presentment Clauses, later legislative acts pursuant to that Act need not
satisfy those clauses. " ' However, neither the specific language nor spe-
cific purposes of the Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses suggest that
the Constitution provides a mechanism for delegating the bicameralism'
and presentment requirements for later enactments. Indeed, the presence
of specific exceptions to bicameralism and presentment in the Constitu-
tion"' suggests that the framers and ratifiers intended no further excep-
tions. Furthermore, Justice White was unlikely to receive much support
from instrumentalist judges who, in other cases, might be willing to devi-
ate from the original intent of the Constitution."' Instrumentalist con-
cerns about the legislature's authority to delegate their joint power to
one house would likely preclude instrumentalists like Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, or Stevens from accepting a strained argument to
uphold the one-house veto provision."
Perhaps more forcefully, Justice White argued that bicameralism and
presentment were at least functionally satisfied.1 8 He noted that once
Mr. Chadha was declared deportable, the only way to suspend deporta-
tion was for the INS judge to authorize suspension (an executive act
perhaps the functional equivalent of presentment to the President) and
for both houses of Congress not to veto that decision (perhaps the func-
tional equivalent of bicameralism)."' In such a case, both houses of
Congress and a representative of the President (the INS judge acting
pursuant to authority delegated from the President to the Attorney Gen-
eral to the INS judge) must agree.'m From a purely functional per-
spective, Justice White might be correct. However, as the majority opin-
ion indicated, the procedure in Chadha does not satisfy what the
Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses analytically require: formal ap-
proval by both houses and then presentment to the President." The
312. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967 (White, J., dissenting).
313. Id. at 993 (White, J., dissenting).
314. Id. at 982 (White, J., dissenting).
315. See supra text accompanying note 301.
316. On instrumentalist willingness to be flexible with original intent where sound
social policy so counsels, see supra text accompanying notes 174-76, 182-91.
317. On instrumentalist concerns regarding legislative delegation of power to one
house, see supra text accompanying notes 304, 310.
318. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 996 (White, J., dissenting).
319. Id. at 994-96 (White, J., dissenting).
320. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
321. See id. at 958 n.23 ('To allow Congress to evade the strictures of the Consti-
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procedure in Chadha included action by a presidential surrogate, fol-
lowed by congressional inaction through failure to veto. Furthermore, as
the majority opinion stated, even on a functional level, there is a great
deal of difference between an actual vote on a bill and a decision not to
veto.' Thus, only an extreme Holmesian judge, actively searching for
ways to uphold the statute, could feel comfortable with this functional
argument.
Justice Powell's concurrence' is also interesting from the perspec-
tive of the four decision-making styles discussed in this Article. In his
separate opinion, Justice Powell took a less positivist and more natural
law view. He noted that one problem in Chadha was that the congressio-
nal act was narrow, aimed at a few named individuals, rather than gener-
al, aimed at a class of people.' Under our system of separation of
powers, judges, not legislators, act on individual cases.' Referring to
the Bill of Attainder Clause as one example of this principle,' Justice
Powell stated that the philosophy behind that clause, as well as the na-
ture of eighteenth-century separation of powers philosophy generally,
demands that attention be paid to the differing institutional responsibili-
ties of the legislature (to pass laws), the executive (to enforce laws), and
the judiciary (to decide cases). 27 Basically, the one-house veto in
Chadha allowed the legislature to perform the judicial act of deciding
individual cases.'
Therefore, this particular legislative veto scheme is flawed from a natu-
ral law perspective regardless of the Bicameralism and Presentment
Clauses.' Other one- or two-house veto schemes that authorize vetoes
tution and in. effect enact Executive proposals into law by mere silence cannot be
squared with Art L").
322. See id.
323. ld. at 959-67 (Powell, J., concurring).
324. Id. at 964-65 (Powell, J., concurring) ("The House did not enact a general rule;
rather it made its own determination that six specific persons did not comply with
certain statutory criteria.").
325. Id. at 965 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that the House assumed a function
ordinarily entrusted to the federal courts).
326. Id. at 962 (Powell, J., concurring).
327. Id. (Powell, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (observing that "'the Bill of
Attainder. Clause was intended . . . [as] a general safeguard against legislative exer-
cise of the judicial function, [Le.,] ... trial by legislature,' (and that both the
Clause] ... and the separation-of-powers doctrine generally, reflect the Framers'
concern that trial by a legislature lacks the safeguards necessary to prevent the
abuse of power).
328. Id. at 964-65 (Powell, J., concurring). See supra notes 324-25.
329. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959 (Powell, J., concurring) (MThe Court's decision,
of regulations which administrative agencies pass pursuant to their dele-
gated powers would not constitute legislative action taken on individual
cases.' Justice Powell's opinion, therefore, represents a narrower hold-
ing grounded on general separation of powers political philosophy.'
His opinion represents a natural law decision-making style in two impor-
tant respects. First, it accepted as a base the framers' notions of natural
law political philosophy and read the words of the Constitution accord-
ingly.' Second, it followed the Anglo-American judicial tradition of de-
ciding cases on narrower grounds whenever possible.' It is interesting
to note that Justice Kennedy, who displayed a natural law decision-mak-
ing style in Public Citizen v. Department of Justice,' wrote the Ninth
Circuit's opinion in Chadha v. INS,' and opted for much the same ra-
tionale that Justice Powell used later in the Supreme Court decision.
A final point to note about Chadha. In addition to the basic question
based on the Presentment Clauses, Art. I., § 7, cls. 2 and 3, apparently will invalidate
every use of the legislative veto. The breadth of this holding gives one pause.").
330. See id. at 967 (Powell, J., concurring). Powell stated:
Chief Justice Marshall observed: "It is the peculiar province of the legislature
to prescribe general rules for the government of society;, the application of
those rules [to individuals in society] would seem to be the duty of other de-
partments." In my view, when Congress undertook to apply its rules to
Chadha, It exceeded the scope of its constitutionally prescribed authority. I
would not reach the broader question whether legislative vetoes are invalid
under the Presentment Clauses.
Id. (Powell, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
331. See id. at 960 (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court should have
adopted the narrow holding that the legislative consideration of individual cases vio-
lated the principle of separation of powers).
332. See id. at 960-62, 967 (Powell, J., concurring) (observing that the framers'
concern was that the legislature should not be allowed to make unilateral judicial de-
terminations).
333. For discussion of the traditional Anglo-American principle of deciding cases on
narrower grounds, see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
334. 491 U.S. 440 (1989). See infra text accompanying notes 428-43.
335. 634 F.2d 408, 430-35 (9th Cir. 1980). Kennedy stated:
Here, the Legislative branch has disrupted or severed the Judiciary's relation
to the alien in a substantial way .... The Judiciary's duty to decide cases
now becomes subject to review by the Legislature, thus undermining the
integrity of the third branch .... We are of .the view that this departure
from the separation of powers norm is not necessary. Although the practi-
cality of alternatives to legislative disapproval in other situations raises diffi-
cult questions, we are not here faced with... the broad scope and com-
plexity of the subject matter of an agency's rulemaking authority . . . .Such
factors might present considerations different from those we find here, both
as to the question of separation of powers and the legitimacy of the unicam-
eral device.
Id.
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of the constitutionality of the one-house veto, there was also the ques-
tion of whether, given the unconstitutionality of the statute, the Court
could sever the one-house veto provision from the Act and enforce the
rest of the Act as written.m The literal language of the statute clearly
provided for severability. The Act stated, "If any particular provision of
this Act, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held
invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of such provision to
other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby."' There-
fore, formalist and natural law judges looking analytically at the statute
would likely hold that the one-house veto provision was severable.m
Instrumental .judges, concerned with legislative delegation of power to
one house, would likely argue that severing the one-house veto provision
would solve the separation of powers problem, and that the statutory
scheme remains workable even without that provision.'
Justices approaching the problem from a Holmesian perspective, how-
ever, would focus on deference to legislative intent in light of a function-
al or pragmatic understanding.' In this case, there was clear evidence
in the statute's legislative history that the legislature wanted to deny the
executive branch the power to suspend deportations without congressio-
nal checks."1 Thus, Justices who are aware of the functional impor-
tance of the one-house veto in the overall legislative scheme would likely
decide that the one-house veto provision was so critical that, should they
336. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 931.
337. Id. at 932 (citing the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101
(1988)).
338. l& ("[Tlhe language is unambiguous and gives rise to a presumption that Con-
gress did not intend the validity of the Act ... to depend upon whether the veto
clause ... was invalid.").
339. Id. at 934 (citation omitted) ("[A] provision is further presumed severable if
what remains after severance 'is fully operative as a law.' There can be no doubt
that § 244 is 'fully operative' and workable administrative machinery without the veto
provision of § 244(c)(2).). In addition to the clear language regarding severability,
and the argument concerning administrative workability, an instrumental judge would
also consult legislative history to determine the meaning of the severability provision.
On this point, the Court noted that the "legislative history is not sufficient to rebut
the presumption of severability raised by [the statute]." Id.
340. For Holmesian deference to the legislature in the context of statutory interpre-
tation, see generally supra notes 37-40, 242-44 and accompanying text.
341. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 1013-15 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Congress has always
Insisted on retaining ultimate control, whether by concurrent resolution, as in the
1948 Act, or by one-House veto, as in the present Act. Congress has never indicated
that it would be willing to permit suspensions of deportation unless it could retain
some sort of veto.").
declare it unconstitutional, the entire Act should fall." Justices
Rehnquist and White refused to find severability in this case.'
B. Bowsher v. Synar
Bowsher v. Synar,'" a 1986 case, addressed whether Congress could
give the Comptroller General, Charles Bowsher, the power to make gov-
ernment spending cuts if Congress failed to meet Gramm-Rudman deficit
reduction targets while, at the same time, exercising its power to remove
Bowsher from office.
The majority of the Court found that Bowsher's power to determine
which spending cuts to make under the Gramm-Rudman Law was an
executive power."' Logically and analytically, this is so. It is the es-
sence of executive power to implement laws passed by Congress,' and
Charles Bowsher would be doing exactly that by deciding which funds to
sequester as required under the Gramm-Rudman Law. 7 The question in
Bowsher then becomes whether it is constitutional for Congress to exer-
cise removal power over an executive official.
Unlike Chadha, there is no specific text in the Constitution dealing
with Congress' removal power of executive officials.' From either a
342. Id. at 1016 (Rehnqulst, J., dissenting). Rehnquist noted:
Congress' continued insistence on retaining control of the suspension process
indicates that it has never been disposed to give the Executive Branch a free
hand. By severing § 244(c)(2), the Court has "'confounded'" Congress'
"intention'" to permit suspensions of deportation "'with their power to carry
that intention into effect.'" Because I do not believe that § 244(c)(2) is sever-
able, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Id. (citation omitted).
343. Id. at 1013 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
344. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
345. Id. at 732-33 (stating that "the duties assigned to the Comptroller General in
the Act are essentially ministerial and mechanical[, but actually] entail(] execution of
the law in constitutional terms").
346. Id. at 733.
347. Id. at 732. As the Court stated:
The primary responsibility of the Comptroller General under the instant Act
is the preparation of a 'report.' This report must contain detailed estimates of
projected federal revenues and expenditures. The report must also specify the
reductions, if any, necessary to reduce the deficit to the target for the appro-
priate fiscal year .... [T]he Act plainly contemplates that the Comptroller
General will exercise his independent judgment and evaluation with respect
to those estimate.
IdL
348. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 137, at 264 ("There is no express Constitu-
tional grant of a removal power (other than Congress' removal power in connection
with impeachments).").
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formalist or natural law approach, however, the case is still relatively
easy. For a formalist judge, preference for a strict separation of powers
approach would mean that any legislative power to limit the President's
ability to remove executive officials from office would be an anath-
emaY' Under the formalist approach, such sharing or intermingling of
powers should not be permitted unless specifically authorized by clear
constitutional text.'
Even under a natural law approach, general separation of powers polit-
ical philosophy would suggest that interbranch removal power should be
impermissible. If one branch of government had the power to remove
officials from another branch, this would lead to the kind of "overruling
influence" of one branch over another that Justice Story identified as one
of the framers' core concerns in separation of powers political philoso-
phy." The rejection of interbranch removal power is underscored by
constitutional provisions regarding impeachment power.' When the
framers were willing to permit one branch to remove members of anoth-
er branch, as in impeachment proceedings, the framers set out specific
and detailed provisions to govern that activity.'
Thus, either a formalist or natural law approach judge should find the
law in Bowsher unconstitutional. This is exactly what Chief Justice
Burger's majority opinion held. As in Chadha, Chief Justice Burger's
opinion, adopted formalist sounding rhetoric,' but included references
349.. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 723 (noting that while Congress may remove execu-
tive officers "only upon impeachment by the House of Representatives and conviction
by the Senate" any other congressional attempt to remove executive officers would
not be consistent with separation of powers).
350. The impeachment power of the House and Senate would be an example of
such clear constitutional text on point. See U.S. CONST. art. H, § 4.
351. See suym text accompanying notes 124-25.
352. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 723 (observing that "the Constitution explicitly provides
for removal of Officers of the United States by Congress only upon impeachment by
the House of Representatives and conviction by the Senate").
353. Id. See also U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 4. In the First Congress of 1789,
James Madison urged rejection of a congressional role in the removal of
Executive Branch Officers, other than by impeachment .... Madison's posi-
tion ultimately prevailed, and a congressional role in the removal process was
rejected. This "Decision of 1789" provides "contemporaneous and, weighty evi-
dence" of the Constitution's meaning since many members of the First Con-
gress "had taken part in framing that instrument."
Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 723-24 (citations omitted).
354. See id. at 722-23.
The Constitution does not contemplate an active role for Congress in the
to the "overruling influence" argument, perhaps to gain support from
Justices interested in that kind of reasoning.3N
The four Justices who refused to join the majority opinion were Justic-
es Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun (all instrumentalists), and Justice
White, the extreme Holmesian.m These are the Justices who most often
reject the analytic presuppositions of formalist or natural law reason-
mng.7
As in Chadha, Justice White concluded that absent a specfic constitu-
tional provision denying Congress the power to structure governmental
relations in a particular way, the functionally attractive choice made by
the Congress in the Gramm-Rudman law should withstand constitutional
scrutiny.' If Congress concluded that the Comptroller General was the
best person to implement the required Gramm-Rudman cuts, then the
Court should uphold that decision.'m This is particularly so, Justice
White argued, because, as a practical matter, Congress would probably
not exercise the removal power.' ° For a functional Holmesian, the con-
stitutionality of the Gramm-Rudman Act should not turn on the slight
possibility that Congress might exercise its removal power."' Further,
supervision of officers charged with the execution of the laws it enacts ....
A direct congressional role in the removal of officers charged with the exe-
cution of the laws beyond this limited one [the impeachment power] is in-
consistent with separation of powers.
Id. See also id. at 759 (White, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's "willingness to
interpose its distressingly formalistic view of separation of powers as a bar to the
attainment of governmental objectives"); Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 1090 (recogniz-
ing that Chief Burger's opinion "is pure originalism and formalism").
355. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 721-23.
356. See id. at 759 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 736 (Stevens, J., concurring) (Jus-
tice Marshall joined in Justice Stevens' concurring opinion); idS at 776 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). For a summary of the judicial decision-making styles of the Justices who
have served on the Rehnquist Court, see Table 3, at supra note 266 and accompa-
nying text.
357. See generally supra text accompanying notes 14-66. For an overview of formal-
ist versus functionalist approaches to Bowsher, see Romney B. Cullers, The Appoint-
ment of the Comptroller General: Formal and Functional Perspectives, 6 ADMIN. L.J.
AM. U. 235 (1992).
358. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 759 (White, J., dissenting).
359. Id. (White, J., dissenting) ("Like the Court, I will not purport to speak to the
wisdom of the policies incorporated in the legislation the Court invalidates; that is a
matter for the Congress and the Executive, both of which expressed their assent to
the statute barely half a year ago.").
360. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
361. Id. at 759-60 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White commented:
In attaching dispositive significance to what should be regarded as a triviality,
the Court neglects what has in the past been recognized as a fundamental
principle governing consideration of disputes over separation of powers: "The
actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform
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Justice White noted that the separation of powers principles expressed
by the majority in Chadha did not apply in Bowsher because the
Gramm-Rudman Act provides that Congress may remove the Comptroller
only by a resolution which both houses of Congress pass and the Presi-
dent signs; hence, both Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses were
satisfied.'
Justices Marshall and Stevens concurred with the majority's result in
Bowsher, but not with the majority's reasoning.' They rejected the
majority's argument that Bowsher was performing an executive function
and, thus, that Congress's power to remove him from office created the
constitutional problem.. Instead, they noted that the real problem in
Bowsher was that Congress had delegated to the Comptroller General,
typically thought to be a member of the legislative branch,' the respon-
sibility of making decisions regarding appropriating money." Justices
Stevens' and Marshall's finding of unconstitutionality was based on this
functionally grounded instrumental concern with congressional self-dele-
gaion, rather than on an analytically grounded argument concerning removal'
to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated
clauses or even single Articles torn from context. While the Constitution
diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice
will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government."
Id. (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
362. Id. at 767 (White, J., dissenting).
363. Id. at 736 (Stevens, J., concurring) (Justice Marshall joined in Justice Stevens'
concurring opinion).
364. Id. at 737 (Stevens, J., concurring).
365. Both the majority and concurring opinions in Bowsher agreed with this charac-
terization of the Comptroller General. See id. at 731 (Burger, CJ., for the Court) ("It
is clear that Congress has consistently viewed the Comptroller General as an officer
of the Legislative Branch."); id. at 737 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("I am convinced that
the Comptroller General must be characterized as an agent of Congress.").
366. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that "Congress may not exercise its funda-
mental power to formulate national policy by delegating that power ... to an indi-
vidual agent of Congress").
367. Id. at 757-59 (Stevens, J., concurring). Stevens wrote:
In short, even though it is well settled that Congress may delegate legislative
power to independent agencies or to the Executive, and thereby divest itself
of a portion of its lawmaking power, when it elects to exercise such power
itself, it may not authorize a lesser representative of the Legislative Branch
to act on its behalf .... Rather that turning the task over to its agent, if
the Legislative Branch decides to act with conclusive effect, it must do so
through a process akin to that specified in the fallback provision-through
Finally, Justice Blackmun's separate opinion directly attacked the re-
moval provision because Congress was not likely to use it, and it lacked
any real functional importance to Congress.'s Blackmun's acknowledge-
ment that the removal provision caused an analytical problem' re-
vealed his tendency to move slightly away from functionalism and lean in
an analytic direction."'0 Justice Blackmun's typically pragmatic re-
sponse, however, was to strike the removal provision from the law while
leaving the remaining portion of the Gramm-Rudman Act intact." Why
strike down a major piece of legislation, asked Justice Blackmun, in
order to preserve a never-used removal provision?' However, Justice
Blackmun's instrumentally based pragmatic response did not carry the
day; from an analytic perspective, it is Congress' decision to repass the
Act without the removal provision, not the Court's decision to pre-judge
what Congress might do by severing the removal provision itself.' The
value of this approach is exemplified by Congress' action after Bowsher.
Following the Court's decision in Bowsher, Congress did repass the
Gramm-Rudman Act. ' However, instead of striking the analytically un-
sound and functionally unimportant removal provision, Congress instead
transferred the problematic executive functions from the Comptroller
General to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
enactment by both Houses and presentment to the President.
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
368. Id. at 777 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) Cl agree with Justice White that any such
claim (that the removal power Congress has over the Comptroller General renders
him subservient to Congress] Is unrealistic.").
369. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("But it seems to me that an attempt by Con-
gress to participate directly in the removal of an executive officer-other than
through the constitutionally prescribed procedure of impeachment-might well violate
the principle of separation of powers.").
370. See supra text accompanying note 266 (Table 3). For a discussion of Justice
Blackmin's decision-making style as poised between instrumentalism and natural law,
see supra note 266.
371. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 777 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
372. Id. at 778 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I cannot see the sense of invalidating
legislation of this magnitude in order to preserve a cumbersome, 65-year-old removal
power that has never been exercised and appears to have been all but forgotten until
this litigation.").
373. See id. at 735.
(T]his matter must be resolved on the basis of congressional intent ... [not
ad hoc] weighing of the importance Congress attached to the removal provi-
sions in the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 as well as in other subse-
quent enactments against the importance it placed on the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.
Id.
374. See Pub. L No. 100-119, 101 Stat. 754 (1987) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§ 901(a)(1)(B) (1988)).
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(OMB).' This transfer solved the constitutional problem identified in
Bowsher because Congress has no removal power over the Director of
the OMB.
In addition to the specific opinions in the case, Bowsher is important
for another reason. The split in reasoning among the Justices on the
Court clearly reveals that the Court did not have a monolithic view with
respect to separation of powers. The separate opinions in Bowsher made
it clear that. a number of the Justices had slightly different perspectives
on separation of powers questions and that although a majority of the
Court joined Chief Justice Burger's opinions in Chadha and Bowsher, the
analytic, bordering on formalist, rhetoric in his opinions would not nec-
essarily carry the day in every case.
C. Morrison v. Olson
Morrison v. Olson,' decided in 1988, involved the constitutionality of
the Independent Prosecutor Law. The specific question in Morrison was
whether it was constitutional for Congress to give a special three-judge
panel of the Judicial Division the power to appoint a special prosecutor
to investigate cases against certain executive branch officials.'
Naturally, from a strict separation of powers approach, such inter-
branch appointments (a member of the judiciary appointing an executive
official, the independent prosecutor) would be unconstitutional absent
clear constitutional authorization.' Absent such authorization, a strict
separation of powers approach would call for appointments to be made
only intrabranch. Thus, a formalist judge following a strict separation of
powers approach would find this scheme of interbranch appointments
unconstitutional.' Given Chief Justice Burger's majority opinions in
Chadha and Bowsher, which both reflect formalist rhetoric," one
might have expected a majority of Justices to reach a similar formalist
conclusion in Morrison. However, only Justice Scalia adopted a formalist
375. 2 U.S.C. § 901(a)(1) (West 1992).
376. For discussion of the practical import of this action, see Alfange, supra note
205, at 741 n.457.
377. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
378. Id. at 659-61.
379. See id. at 715-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that congressional delegation
of the power to appoint executive officials was unconstitutional).
380. See id. at 697, 705-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
381. See supra text accompanying notes 308, 354.
approach.' Justice Scalia's lone dissent in Morrison is peppered with
comments concerning the benefits of clear, bright-line rules and a strict
separation of powers approach.' As such, it is an example of a formal-
ist approach to separation of powers issues.
For -Justices approaching the Morrison case from natural law,
Holmesian, or instrumentalist perspectives, however, the statute's uncon-
stitutionality is not so clear. From a purely functional or pragmatic per-
spective, the statute provides a mechanism to solve what otherwise
would be a clear problem: the conflict of interest that arises from allow-
ing a high-ranking executive department official to pick its own' prosecu-
tor to investigate another high-ranking executive department official.'
Delegating the power of appointment to a presumably neutral three-judge
panel creates a less conflict-ridden checks and balances scheme.'
From a natural law perspective, the separation of powers political philos-
ophy which our framers adopted countenances sharing of powers and
checks-and-balances schemes as long as they advance the fundamental
purposes of separation of powers and are not expressly prohibited by the
Constitution.'
Therefore, under all three non-formalist approaches, a judge would
likely uphold the statute absent clear constitutional text prohibiting the
arrangement. The specific language of the Appointments Clause of the
Constitution provides:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of Sen-
ate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments
are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but
the Congress may be Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
382. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 697-99, 703-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
383. See, e.g., id. at 705 (Scalla, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) ("To repeat, Article
II, § 1, cl. 1, of the Constitution provides: Trhe executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States.' As I described at the outset of this opinion, this does
not mean some of the executive power, but a/l of the executive power."), id. at 709
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It is not for us to determine, and we have never presumed
to determine, how much of the purely executive powers of government must be
within the full control of the President. The Constitution prescribes that they all
are.*); id at 711 (Scalla, J., dissenting) ("The Court has, nonetheless, replaced the
clear constitutional prescription that the executive power belongs to the President
with a 'balancing test.' What are the standards to determine how the balance is to be
struck, that is, how much removal of Presidential power is too much."); see also
Alfange, supra note 205, at 752 ("At bottom, Justice Scalia seems to be claiming that
the absence of a bright-line absolute, and reliance instead on case-by-case adjudi-
cation for the resolution of separation of powers issues, represents intolerable arbi-
trariness.').
384. See Alfange, supra note 205, at 742.
385. See id. at 745.
386. See supra text accompanying notes 109-25.
[Vol. 20: 531, 19931 Separation of Powers Jurisprudence
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of De-
partments.'
Under this provision, the "courts of law" may appoint "inferior"
officers.' A judge following the strict separation of powers approach,
who is looking for bright-line rules and mechanical application of the
law, might read the Clause as providing that the "President" or "Heads of
Departments" are to appoint inferior executive officers only, while the
"Courts of Law" may only appoint inferior judicial officers, that is, em-
ployees within their own branch of government. This was the approach
that the appellees in Morrison took.' However, the express language
of the provision does not mandate this approach.' Furthermore, as in-
dicated above, a strict separation of powers approach is neither consis-
tent with the framers' natural law political philosophy,"' nor func-
tionally or pragmatically sound. Viewed functionally or pragmatically
government needs some flexibility to accommodate the realities of politi-
cal practice.'
387. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
388. Id.
389. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 673 (1988) ("[Appellees] contend that the
Clause does not contemplate congressional authorization of 'interbranch appointments,'
in which an officer of one branch is appointed by officers of another branch.").
390. See id. at 673-74. The Court noted:
On its face, the language of this "excepting clause" admits of no limitation
on interbranch appointments. Indeed, the inclusion of "as they think proper"
seems clearly to give to Congress significant discretion to determine whether
it is "proper" to vest the appointment of, for example, executive officials in
the "courts of Law." We recognized as much in one of our few decisions in
this area, Ex Parte Siebold, where we stated: "it is no doubt usual and prop-
er to vest the appointment of inferior officers in that department of the gov-
ernment, executive or judicial, or in that particular executive department to
which the duties of such officers appertain. But there is no absolute require-
ment to this effect in the Constitution. . . . [A]s the Constitution stands, the
selection of the appointing power, as between the functionaries named, is a
matter resting in the discretion of Congress."
Id. (citations omitted).
391. See supra text accompanying notes 109-25. See also Morrison, 487 U.S. at
674-75.
We also note that the history of the Clause provides no support for
appellees' position .... [Tihere was little or no debate on the question
whether -the Clause empowers Congress to provide for interbranch appoint-
ments, and there is nothing to suggest that the Framers intended to prevent
Congress from having that power.
Id,
392. See, e.g., Alfange, supra note 205, at 753. Alfange states:
If independent prosecutors are considered inferior officers, then there
is no specific language in the Constitution that prohibits the courts from
appointing them. As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in his opinion, be-
cause independent prosecutors have limited duties, limited tenure, limit-
ed jurisdiction, and are subject to removal by a higher executive branch
official, it is appropriate to categorize independent prosecutors as non-
inferior officers.' This conclusion is buttressed by comparing indepen-
dent prosecutors to those officers listed in the Appointments Clause as
inferior officials: Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
Justices of the Supreme Court;' independent prosecutors are clearly
not in the same rank of employee as these individuals. Thus, the decision
that independent prosecutors are best categorized as inferior officials
makes sense from either an analytic or functional perspective."
Despite this initial view that the Independent Prosecutor Law is consti-
tutional, there are some considerations on the other side of the scale.
Bright-line rules promote certainty, but at the cost of eliminating the flexibil-
ity that the government may need in order to adapt to changing conditions in
changing times or to meet newly emerging problems resulting from shifts in
the relative strengths or capacities of the branches . . The independent
counsel provisions offer an important example of this "needed and innovative
action." They were devised as a remedy for the problem of excesses within
the executive branch that seemed to be serious and recurring.
1d.
393. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671-7?.
394. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
395. In dissent, Justice Scala argued "that the independent counsel is not an in-
ferior officer because she is not subordinate to any officer in the Executive Branch
(indeed, not even to the President)." Morrison, 487 U.S. at 719 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added). Scalia also noted that 'the Act specifically grants her the AX
power and independent authority to exercise ail investigative and prosecutorial func-
tions of the Department of Justice,' and makes her removable only for 'good cause,'
a limitation specifically intended to ensure that she be independent of, not subordi-
nate to, the President and the Attorney General." Id. at 719-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
However, as Professor Alfange remarks:
[I]f "good cause" is shown, the independent counsel is subject to removal by
the Attorney General; the Attorney General is not subject to removal by the
independent counsel no matter how good the cause, which would certainly
suggest that the independent counsel is not on the same hierarchical level as
the Attorney General .... But Justice Scalia insisted that one is not an in-
ferior officer unless one is removable at wilt by someone else, a puzzling no-
tion that would make a principal officer of every federal appointee who has
some statutory protection against arbitrary dismissal.
Alfange, supra note 205, at 744 (emphasis added). In addition, as Professor Alfange
notes, in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694 (1974), the Supreme Court had de-
scribed the Watergate Special Prosecutor as a "subordinate officer." Id. The same
characterization should apply to the independent prosecutor in this case.
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First, excessive intrusion by the legislature or the judiciary into executive
prerogatives would tip the pragmatic or functional checks-and-balances
scheme wrought by the Independent Prosecutor Law in a negative direc-
tion.'" Second, and equally important, excessive intrusion by the judi-
ciary might represent the kind of "overruling influence" in the administra-
tion of a coequal branch, which would be of great concern to a natural
law judge." All three non-formalist approaches, therefore, would be
concerned that the judiciary not unduly interfere with executive preroga-
tives. Similarly, each approach would want to ensure that the judicial act
is neither incongruous with judicial responsibilities nor compromising of
judicial independence. Such occurrences would not advance the
checks-and-balances function of the framers' natural law separation of
powers philosophy, and would not be functionally wise or pragmatic.'
Given this analysis, the case becomes relatively easy. As Chief Justice
Rehnquist indicated in his opinion, while the Court must be concerned
about (1) undue interference or intrusion or (2) incongruous or
independence-compromising activities, none of these concerns were pres-
ent in this case. ' Of course, the exact line where activity crosses over
into "undue'" interference or "incongruous" action requires a sensitive
396. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 694-95 ("We observe first that this case does not in-
volve an attempt by Congress to increase its own powers at the expense of the
Executive Branch .... Similarly, we do not think that the Act works any judicial
usurpation of properly executive functions.").
397. See supra text accompanying notes 114-25.
398. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 675-76. The Court stated:
We do not mean to say that Congress' power to provide for interbranch ap-
pointments of "inferior officers" is unlimited. In addition to
separation-of-powers concerns, which would arise if such provisions for ap-
pointment had the potential to impair the constitutional functions assigned to
one of the branches, Siebold itself suggested that Congress' decision to vest
the appointment power in the courts would be improper if there was some
"incongruity" between the functions normally performed by the courts and the
performance of their duty to appoint.
Id. The Court further stated:
(Tihe Special Division's power to terminate does not pose a sufficient threat
of judicial intrusion into matters that are more properly within the
Executive's authority to require that the Act be invalidated as inconsistent
with Article M .... Nor do we believe, as appelee's contend, that the Spe-
cial Division's exercise of the various powers specifically granted to it under
the Act poses any threat to the "impartial and independent federal adjudica-
tion of claims within the judicial power of the United States."
I& at 683 (citations omitted).
399. Id. at 675-77, 683.
balancing of considerations. This call for judicial temperament is re-
quired under any functional approach, either Holmesian or instrumental-
ist, and under a natural law balance concerned with "overruling influ-
ence." While the line might be drawn slightly differently by the three ju-
dicial decision-making styles-a Holmesian more willing to defer to Con-
gress," an instrumentalist more willing to rely on whether the result is
sound or not,"° and a natural law judge more focused on the kinds of
separation of powers and checks and balances principles advocated by
the framerse-ein this case the result is clearly the same. Because the
Constitution does not clearly prevent such an arrangement and there are
no meaningful concerns of (1) undue interference or intrusion or (2) in-
congruous or independence-compromising activities in this case, the
Court held that the legislation was constitutional.'
D. Mistretta v. United States
From the perspective of the four decision-making styles discusssed in
this Article, the next major separation of powers case decided by the
Supreme Court, Mistretta v. United States,' is easy to describe. It is
Morrison v. Olson revisited.
The particular issue in Mistretta was whether judges could sit on a
sentencing commission to help develop sentencing guidelines for use in
the federal criminal justice system." From a formalist, strict separation
of powers approach, such participation would be unconstitutional be-
cause judges sitting on the Commission would have delegated legislative
power to help create legislation which they then would apply as
judges." However, the Constitution does not contain specific language
400. See supra text accompanying notes 151-67.
401. See supra text accompanying notes 174-81.
402. See supra text accompanying notes 109-25.
403. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696-97 (all Justices joined in this conclusion except Jus-
tice Kennedy, who did not participate in the case, and Justice Scalla, who dissented).
404. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
405. Id. at 362-71.
406. See id. at 419-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated:
Strictly speaking, there is no acceptable delegation of legislative power. As
John Locke put it almost three hundred years ago, "[tihe power of the legis-
lative being derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant . . . . the
legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws, and
place it in other hands." . . . In the present case, however, a pure delegation
of legislative power is precisely what we have before us.
Id (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also id. at 425
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Jludicial and legislative powers have never been thought dele-
gable .... [HIere we have an anomaly beyond equal: an independent agency [the
Sentencing Commission] exercising governmental power on behalf of a Branch [the
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discussing how commissions can be created or whether judges can sit on
them. 7 Thus, as in Morrison," no clear textual language prevented
the arrangement in Mistretta.
Given this fact, the issue for non-formalist judges would be whether
the arrangement raises sufficient concerns of (1) undue interference or
intrusion or (2) incongruous or independence- compromising activi-
ties."s Given the facts of the case, this decision is relatively easy. Since
the Commission only had the power to make recommendations, which
the legislature would decide whether to adopt, there was no undue inter-
ference or intrusion."' Additionally, because judges are familiar with
sentencing, there was no incongruity with using their expertise in this
area." ' Finally, because the judges were acting on the Commission in
an advisory capacity unrelated to pending cases, there was no real con-
cern regarding judicial independence"' or impartiality."3
The fact that judges sat on various commissions from the beginning of
the republic confirms that such judicial service on commissions is consis-
tent with the framers' views of separation of powers."' The historical
Judicial Branch] where all governmental power is supposed to be exercised personally
by the judges of courts.").
407. Id. at 397-98 (Blackmun, J., for the Court) ("The text of the Constitution
contains no prohibition against the service of active federal judges on independent
commissions such as that established by the Act. The Constitution does include an
Incompatability Clause applicable to national legislators .... No comparable re-
striction applies to judges .... ").
408. See supra text accompanying notes 348-53.
409. See supra text accompanying notes 396-403.
410. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 393-94 (citations omitted) (noting that "the Commission
[was] fully accountable to Congress, which can revoke or amend any or all of the
Guidelines ... within the 180-day waiting period").
411. Id. at 395 (arguing that "[pIrior to the passage of the Act, the Judicial Branch,
as an aggregate, decided precisely the questions assigned to the Commission: what
sentence is appropriate to what criminal conduct under what circumstances").
412. Id. at 406 (concluding that absent a more specific threat to judicial indepen-
dence, the fact that Congress had included federal judges on the Commission did not
itself threaten the integrity of the judicial branch).
413. Id. at 403-08.
414. Id. at 398-99.
The first Chief Justice, John Jay, served simultaneously as Chief Justice and
as Ambassador to England,... Oliver Ellsworth served simultaneously as
Chief Justice and as Minister to France[; and] . . . [w]hile he was Chief Jus-
tice, John Marshall served briefly as Secretary of State and was a member of
the Sinking Fund Commission with responsibility for refunding the Revolution-
ary War debt.
evidence that judicial service on commissions is consistent with the sepa-
ration of powers political philosophy of the framers is important from a
natural law perspective. ' The fact that permitting such service by
judges involves deference to congressional will in the absence of clear
constitutional text is important to a Holmesian judge..16 An instrumen-
talist judge would find that the presence of judicial expertise on the com-
mission advances sound social policy."" It is thus no surprise that the
Court found that the Commission was constitutional by an eight-to-one
margin, with only the consistent formalist, Justice Scalia, in dissent.""
E. Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice"9
By 1989, after the opinions in Chadha, Bowsher, Morrison, and
Mistretta, a number of observations had emerged concerning modem
Supreme Court doctrine on the separation of powers. Despite the sug-
gestions from Chadha and Bowsher that a majority of the Court had
adopted a formalist approach to separation of.powers issues, only one
consistent formalist Justice emerged on the Court: Chief Justice Burger
in Chadha and Bowsher, and Justice Scalia, who replaced Burger, in
Morrison and Mistretta.' Justice White emerged as the only consistent
extreme Holmesian.'' Justice Rehnquist's concurrence with Justice
White in Chadha on the severability issue and Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion in Morrison suggested a moderate Holmesian decision-making
style.' Justices Stevens' and Marshall's concurrence in Bowsher strong-
ly suggested an instrumentalist approach,' as did Justice Blackmun's
dissent in that case.'
As this summary indicates, relatively clear statements of formalist,
Holmesian, and instrumentalist perspectives on separation of powers
issues emerged in Chadha, Bowsher, Morrison, and Mistretta. The case
of Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice provided a
d.
415. See supra text accompanying notes 109-25.
416. See supra text accompanying notes 151-66.417. See spra text accompanying notes 174-81.
418. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 413 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
419. 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
420. For an example of Chief Justice Burger's formalism, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 308 and 354; see supra text accompanying notes 381-82, 406 for an exam-
ple of Justice Scalia's formalism.
421. See supra text accompanying notes 312-22, 340-42, 360-62, (Justice White's
Holmesianism).
422. See supra text accompanying notes 340-42, 383-403 (Chief Justice Rehnquist's
Holmesianism).
423. See supra text accompanying notes 363-67.
424. See supra text accompanying notes 368-75.
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similar opportunity for a natural law approach.
Public Citizen raised two basic questions: (1) whether the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (FACA), which requires committees under its
jurisidiction to conduct their procedures in certain ways, applied to the
ABA Committee that makes pronouncements on nominees to the Su-
preme Court, and more broadly the federal judiciary; and (2) if FACA did
apply, would that violate the separation of powers principle of the Con-
stitution.'
A majority of the Court held that the Act did not apply to the ABA
Committee, and thus did not reach the constitutional issue.' This deci-
sion is consistent with a functional or pragmatic approach to statutory
interpretation. As the functional opinion for a majority of the Court indi-
cated, "[A] literalistic reading of... [FACA] would bring the Justice
Department's advisory relationship with the ABA Committee within
FACA's terms .... A literalistic reading, however, would catch far more
groups and consulting arrangements than Congress could conceivably
have intended."'
For Justices who approach statutory interpretation from an analytic
perspective, however, the plain meaning of the statute did seem to in-
clude the ABA advisory committee within its ambit.' For these Justic-
es, therefore, the issue of the constitutionality of the statute was not
425. Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 443 (1989).
426. Id.
427. Id. at 463-64. As the functional majority opinion stated:
Where the literal reading of a statutory term would "compel an odd result,"
we must search for other evidence of congressional intent to lend the term
its proper scope. "The circumstances of the enactment of particular legisla-
tion," for example, "may persuade a court that Congress did not intend
words of common meaning to have their literal effect." Even though, as
Judge Learned Hand said, "the words used, even in their literal sense, are
the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the mean-
ing of any writing," nevertheless "it is one of the surest indexes of a mature
and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary, but
to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accom-
plish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to
their meaning.
Id. at 454-55 (citations omitted).
428. Id. at 471 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (noting that the Court
disregarded the statute's plain meaning "not because its application would be patently
absurd, but rather because, on the basis of its view of the legislative history, the
Court is 'fairly confident' that 'FACA should [not] be construed to apply to the ABA
Committee'").
moot.
It would clearly be impermissible under a formalist, strict separation of
powers approach to permit the legislature to pass guidelines restricting a
President's ability to obtain information in making a Supreme Court ap-
pointment-a clear presidential right.'
From a natural law perspective, FACA is also unconstitutional because
the Appointments Clause clearly states that the President shall nominate
Justices to the Supreme Court." The nomination power rests squarely
in the hands of the President, unfettered by any other source. No separa-
tion of powers balancing test is needed to resolve this case because the
Constitution clearly allocates the power to the executive. From a natural
law perspective, this fact distinguishes the case from Morrison and
Mistretta.'
Under a natural law view, the majority opinion in all four of the previ-
ous separation of powers cases can be embraced. The natural law view
embraces Chadha and Bowsher because in Chadha the constitutional
text concerning bicameralism and presentment was cleat,' and in
Bowsher the legislative power to remove an official exercising executive
power crossed the line into "overruling influence" of one branch in the
administration of another.'n Similarly, the natural law view embraces
Morrison and Mistretta because, in each case, no clear constitutional
text prevented the legislative arrangement and no "overruling influence,"
"undue influence," "impermissible intruding," "incongruity," or "compro-
mise of independence" existed.' Indeed, in Morrison, having a presum-
ably neutral judicial panel appoint the special prosecutor, rather than one
high-ranking executive official select a prosecutor to investigate another
high-ranking executive official, is supported by the checks and balances
political philosophy which motivated the framers on separation of pow-
ers issues.'
This natural law explanation for each of these four cases is exactly
what appears in Justice Kennedy's separation of powers opinion in Pub-
lic Citizen. As Justice Kennedy stated, "Where a power has been com-
mitted to a particular Branch of the Government in the text of the Con-
stitution, the balance has already been struck by the Constitution it-
429. Unfortunately, the formalist, strict separation of powers cite to Justice Scalia is
not possible in this case, because Justice Scalia took no part in the consideration or
decision of Public Citizen. See id. at 442.
430. U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cl. 2
431. See supra text accompanying notes 387-92, 405-08 (stating that no clear consti-
tutional text governs the issues involved in Morrison and Mistretta).
432. See supra text accompanying notes 299-306.
433. See supra text accompanying notes 348-53.
434. See supra text accompanying notes 396-403, 409-18.
435. See supra text accompanying notes 384-86.
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self." Citing Chadha, Justice Kennedy stated that "[i]t is improper for
this Court to arrogate to itself the power to adjust a balance settled by
the explicit terms of the Constitution.'c
On the other hand, citing Mistretta, Justice Kennedy noted, "This is
not to say that each of the three Branches must be entirely separate and
distinct, for that is not the governmental structure of checks and balanc-
es established by the Framers.""m Further, citing Morrison, Justice Ken-
nedy remarked, "[When] the power at issue was not explicitly assigned
by the text of the Constitution," then the Court has "employed something
of a balancing approach."' In the context of presidential power, this
balancing approach asks "whether the statute at issue prevents the Presi-
dent 'from accomplishing (his] constitutionally assigned functions,' and
whether the extent of the intrusion on the President's powers 'is justified
by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional
authority' of Congress. '" This balance tracks Justice Story's concern
expressed in 1833 with whether or not an "overruling influence" is pres-
ent.4"
It is interesting to note that, of the four judicial decision-making styles,
only one, the natural law approach, was unreservedly in the majority in
each of the four separation of powers cases prior to Public Citizen.'"
Aside from Justice Kennedy, the only other Justice to be in the majority
in each case was Justice O'Connor.'
Given the clear constitutional text on point, a Holmesian judge (analyt-
ic enough to read FACA to apply to nomination questions) would likely
have agreed that FACA would be unconstitutional if applied to the ques-
tion of presidential nomination. It should thus be no surprise that Justice
Rehnquist joined Justice Kennedy and O'Connor in deciding the separa-
tion of powers case that way.'" Indeed, given the relatively clear consti-
436. Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 486 (1989).
437. ld. (citations omitted).
438. Id.
439. Id. at 487 (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1989)).
440. Id. (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)).
441. See mupra text accompanying notes 113, 125.
442. See aupra text accompanying notes 432-35.
443. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983). Justice Kennedy was in the majority only in Mistretta, the only case of the
four he heard. Id.
444. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 486. For discussion of Chief Justice Rehnquist's
analytic posture, particularly in dealing with cases of statutory interpretation, see
tutional text on point, the instrumentalists and extreme Holmesian Jus-
tice White might also have agreed on the separation of powers issue had
they faced it. They did not address the issue, however, because, as indi-
cated above, they decided that the Act did not apply to the ABA Commit-
tee on statutory interpretation grounds." It is possible, of course, to
argue that the Constitution only provides that the President shall nomi-
nate Justices, but that Congress can place some procedural limits on the
way in which recommendations are made to the President, as long as
those limitations do not unduly interfere with the President's job. Such
limitations would not necessarily be inconsistent with the President hav-
ing the sole prerogative of nominating. Perhaps Justice White, as an ex-
treme Holmesian looking for ways to defer to Congress,' would have
taken that tack had he reached the separation of powers issue in the
case.
F. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for
Abatement
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for Abate-
ment," the last of the six major separation of powers cases decided in
the past decade, provides the best example of the split between a
Holmesian functional approach and the other approaches to separation
of powers.
The case involved whether Congress could set up a special Review
Board to oversee regulations regarding the operation of National Airport
in Washington, D.C.' Congress could make all rules and regulations
regarding the operation of the airport if Congress so wished."9 Respon-
sive to home rule and neighboring states' concerns, however, Congress
passed a law establishing a Maryland-Virginia-District of Columbia Air-
ports Authority, while still maintaining some oversight."' Because a
one- or two-house veto was unconstitutional after Chadha, Congress set
up a Review Board as an alternative." This Review Board would be
composed of legislators with the responsibility to oversee transportation
at the airport.'
According to a majority of the Court, this case was similar to either
supra text accompanying notes 263-65, 272-76.
446. See supra text accompanying notes 426-27.
446. See supra text accompanying notes 305-06, 312-22, 356-62.
447. 111 S. Ct. 2298 (1991).
448. Id. at 2301.
449. Id.
450. Id. at 2302.
451. Id. at 2302-03.
452. Id. at 2303-04.
[VoL .2 531, 1993] Separation of Powers Jurisprudence
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Chadha or Bowsher.' If the Court viewed the Review Board's power
as the equivalent of a legislative veto, then the case would directly re-
semble Chadha.' Under Chadha, a one- or two-house legislative veto
is unconstitutional." On the other hand, if the Court viewed the Re-
view Board's power as an exercise of an executive veto, then the case
would resemble Bowsher.'" In both Bowsher and Metropolitan, an
agent of the legislative branch (the Comptroller General and the Review
Board, respectively), would be exercising executive power.' As stated
in Metropolitan, "he structure of the Constitution does not permit Con-
gress to execute the laws; it follows that Congress cannot grant to an
officer under its control what it does not possess.' " '
For this reason, the majority concluded that under either characteriza-
tion, the Review Board was unconstitutional.' The same conclusion
could have been reached under a formalist approach,'s a natural law
approach concerned with the clear textual implications of Chadha and
the overruling influence of legislative control over executive action in
Bowsher,8 ' or an instrumental approach concerned with congressional
453. Id. at 2311.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. Id. (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986)).
459. Id. at 2312.
460. See id. at 2311. The Court stated:
To forestall the danger of encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the
Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on the Congress. It
may not "invest itself or its Members with either executive power or judicial
power." And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "sin-
gle, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified in Arti-
cle L
Id. (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1988); J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. Unit-
ed States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928)).
481. Id. at 2310-11. The Court state&
The abuses by the monarch recounted in the Declaration of Independence
provide dramatic evidence of the threat to liberty posed by a too powerful
executive. But, as James Madison recognized, the representatives of the ma-
jority in a democratic society, if unconstrained, may pose a similar
threat .... The first constraint is illustrated by the Court's holding in . . .
Bowsher v. Synar .... The second constraint is illustrated by our decision
in Chaoda.
Il (citations omitted) (exemplifying natural law rhetoric embracing the framers' separa-
tion of powers political philosophy).
delegation to a legislative Review Board.' All three approaches found
their way into Justice Stevens' opinion, in which a majority of the Court
joined.'
Justice White again dissented, as in Chadha and Bowsher.' Justice
White's dissent is a classic example of a functional, pragmatic approach,
and reveals his frustration with the majority's more analytical ap-
proach.'
Unlike Chadha and Boshwer, however, two Justices joined Justice
White's dissent: Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Marshall.' As long
as the constitutional text does not clearly indicate a contrary intent,
Justice White's functional approach would naturally attract a moderate
Holmesian, such as Chief Justice Rehnquist.'? In this case, the constitu-
tional text was not clear. As Justice White indicated, the majority's opin-
ion was particularly troubling because Metropolitan was not clearly a
separation of powers case.' The. case revolved around the relationship
between the federal government and the Metropolitan Washington Air-
ports Authority, a state commission.es Thus, the case was really a fed-
eralism case, and, under current doctrine, there is no Tenth Amendment
bar to the congressional action."n
462. Id. at 2312 ("Congress could, if this, Board of Review were valid, use similar
expedients to enable its Members or its agents to retain control, outside the ordinary
legislative process, of the activities of state grant recipients charged with executing
virtually every aspect of national policy."). This demonstrates an instrumentalist con-
cern with Congress delegating power to itself. -
463. See supra notes 460-62 and accompanying text.
464. Metropolitan, 111 S. Ct. at 2312 (White, J., dissenting). For Justice White's
dissent in Chadha, see supra text accompanying notes 312-22. For Justice White's
dissent in Bowsher, see supra text accompanying notes 358-62.
465. Metropolitan, 111 S. Ct. at 2312-13 (White, J., dissenting) ("Today the Court
strikes down yet another innovative and otherwise lawful governmental experiment in
the name of separation of powers.").
466. Id. at 2312 (White, J., dissenting).
467. For a summary discussion of Chief Justice Rehnquist's Holmesianism, see
supra note 266.
468. See Metropolitan, 111 S. Ct. at 2313 (White, J., dissenting).
469. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
470. Id. (White, J., dissenting). For an argument that the Tenth Amendment is not a
bar to Congress' power under the Commerce Clause, see Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985) ("In short, we have no li-
cense to employ freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty when measuring con-
gressional authority under the Commerce Clause."). The lack of a meaningful Tenth
Amendment challenge in Metropolitan would likely be the same even under National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 409 U.S. 528 (1985). Under the National League test,
the Court would ask whether the "[s]tates' compliance with the federal law would
directly impair their ability... [to perform) traditional governmental functions."
Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 684 (1982).
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The functional analysis in Justice White's opinion would also appeal to
an extremely functional, pragmatic instrumentalist like Justice Marshall.
Justice White noted that even if the case involved separation of powers
principles, this should not cause concern from a functional, pragmatic
perspective."7 ' Noting that neither Congress nor the Executive argued
that the arrangement was unconstitutional, Justice White stated:
[Niever before has the Court struck down a body on separation-of-powers
grounds that neither Congress nor the Executive oppose. It is absurd to suggest
that the Board's power represents the type of "legislative usurpatio[n] ... which,
by assembling all power in the same hands... must lead to the same tyranny,"
that concerned the Framers.'"
Justice White also provided an alternative characterization of the con-
gressional arrangement in order to rebut the majority's reasoning. With
respect to the specific analogy to Bowsher, Justice White noted that
unlike Bowsher, in this case Congress was not gianting executive power
to an officer "under its control."" In Bowsher, congressional power to
remove the Comptroller General established such control. However, no
such congressional removal power existed in Metropolitan."7 Nor was
Metropolitan a case where Congress exercised improper control over the
Review Board through the appointment process. Though directors of the
Review Board had to choose all of the Board's members from congres-
sional lists, Justice White noted that "[a] fair reading of the [appoint-
ment] requirement shows only that the Board may not be chosen from
outside the lists. It is perfectly plausible to infer that the Directors are
free to reject any and all candidates on the lists until acceptable names
are submitted." 7' Thus, Justice White concluded, "Congress has neither
expressly nor substantively vested appointment power in itself or appro-
priated appointment power properly lodged with the President."'"
Justice White distinguished Chadha by observing that the power exer-
cised in that case was legislative, whereas the Review Board's power was
471. Metropolitan, 111 S. Ct. at 2317 (White, J., dissenting).
472. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
473. Id. at 2317-18 (White, J., dissenting).
474. Id. at 2318 (White, J., dissenting).
475. Id. at 2319 (White, J., dissenting).
476. Id. (White, J., dissenting). The majority rebutted this assertion by noting that in
fact "membership on the Board of Review is limited to federal officials, specifically
members of congressional committees charged with authority over air transportation,"
Id. at 2307. Although members of Congress "nominally serve 'in their individual
capacities,' [the structure of the Board and its responsibilities] belie the ipse dixit
that the Board members will act 'in their individual capacities.'" Id. (citation omitted).
executive.'" As Justice White indicated:
Before their transfer to the Airports Authority, National and Dulles were managed
by the Federal Aviation Administration, which in turn succeeded the Civil Aero-
nautics Agency. There is no question that these two agencies exercised
paradigmatic executive power or that the transfer of the airports in no way al-
tered that power, which is now in the hands of the Authority.'
Returning to the basic Holmesian position that the Court ought to defer
to Congress absent clear constitutional text or purpose to the contrary,
Justice White closed his opinion as follows:
Since the "compelling constitutional reasons" on which we have relied in our past
separation-of-powers decisions are insufficient to strike down the Board, the
Court has had to inflate those reasons needlessly to defend today's decision. I
cannot follow along this course. The Board violates none of the principles set
forth in our cases. Still less does it provide a "blueprint for extensive expansion of
the legislative power beyond its constitutionally-confined role." This view utterly
ignores the Executive's ability to protect itself through, among other things, the
ample power of the veto. Should Congress ever undertake such improbable pro-
jects as transferring national parklands to the States on the condition that its
agents control their oversight, there is little doubt that the President would be
equal to the task of safeguarding his or her interests. Least of all, finally, can it be
said that the Board reflects "[tihe propensity of the legislative department to in-
trude upon the rights, and to absorb the powers, of the other departments," that
the Framers feared.'"
477. Id. at 2319-20 (White, J., dissenting).
478. Id. at 2320 (White, J., dissenting).
479. Id. at 2320-21 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). An in-depth discussion
of cases dealing with those aspects of separation of powers directly involving the ju-
diciary, such as Congress' ability to create non-Article HI courts or constitutional re-
quirements of standing, is beyond the scope of this Article. See supra note 6. Never-
theless, a few comments are in order, particularly because some commentators have
stated that the Court has been inconsistent on how these cases have been decided
versus the separation of powers cases discussed in the text. See, e.g., Krent, supra
note 110, at 1255 n.10.
With regard to Congress' ability to create non-Article ITI courts, one can predict
that instrumentalist judges would be hesitant to find that Congress has such power,
given the extra protection afforded individuals when a case is heard in an Article mI
court before judges with life tenure. Instrumentalist judges would thus want to keep
such power to a minimum and affirm it only where countervailing factors, like the
needs of military discipline, are strongest. In Commodity Futures Trading Commission
v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986), Justice Brennan stated that
(tlhe Court has. . . recognized three narrow exceptions to the otherwise
absolute mandate of Article Ill: territorial courts, courts-martial, and courts
that adjudicate certain disputes concerning public rights. Unlike the Court, I
would limit the judicial authority of non-Article I federal tribunals to these
few, long-established exceptions and would countenance no further erosion of
Article HI's mandate.
Id at 869 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Justice Marshall joined in Justice Brennan's dis-
senting opinion).
On the other hand, because there is no clear constitutional text prohibiting Con-
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gress from creating non-Article MI courts, judges approaching the problem from the
Holmesian perspective would counsel deference to Congress, and judges approaching
the problem from a natural law perspective would examine whether creation of a par-
ticular non-Article I1 court does violence to our sharing-of-powers, checks-and-balances
scheme. This is exactly the approach adopted by the Holmesian and natural law major-
ity in Schor. See id. at 854-57. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, stated:
In [these] circumstances, separation of powers concerns are diminished ....
IThe magnitude of any intrusion on the Judicial Branch can only be termed
de minimias .... [Wie have, consistent with Bowsher, looked to a number
of factors in evaluating the extent to which the congressional scheme endan-
gers separation of powers principles under the circumstances presented, but
have found no genuine threat to those principles to be present in this litiga-
tion. In so doing, we have also been faithful to our Article HI precedents,
which counsel that bright-line rules cannot effectively be employed to yield
broad principles applicable in all Article I inquires.
Id. at 856-57.
Because of the majority's rejection of "bright-line" rules in Schor, a formalist judge
might be hesitant to join the majority opinion. As commentators have noted, Justice
Brennan's instrumentally inspired dissent in the case adopts classic formalist rhetoric.
See Krent, supra note 110, at 1255 n.10. Unfortunately, Justice Scalia was not yet on
the Court at the time Schor was decided, so there is no recent formalist Supreme
Court opinion on this issue.
With respect to the issue of the constitutional requirements for standing, Luan v.
Defenders of'Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130. (1992), provides the most recent Supreme Court
decision on point. On matters of standing, one can predict that, because of their pref-
erence for three strictly separate branches of government and for clear bright-line
rules, formalists would push for a clearly delineated requirement of "injury in fact."
This requirement would protect executive independence by not allowing Congress much
leeway to expand the class of actions which qualify as constitutional cases or contro-
versies for -which the executive branch could be sued. Holmesians, while concerned
about certainty and predictability in the law, see supra text accompanying notes 27-28,
would be more willing than formalists to defer to Congress in the creation of rights
vindicable in federal courts in cases in which constitutional text does not clearly pro-
hibit It. Each of these formalist and Holmesian arguments found their way into Justice
Scalia's opinion in Defenders of Wildlife, which was joined unreservedly only by the
two most Holmeslan Justices on the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White,
and by the more formalist Justice Thomas. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, stated:
If the concrete injury requirement has the separation-of-powers significance
we have always said, the answer must be obvious: To permit Congress to
convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers' compliance
with the law into an "individual right" vindicable in the courts is to permit
Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive's
most important constitutional duty, to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed." . . . Notling in this contradicts the principle that "[t]he ...injury
required by Art. HI may exist solely by virtue of 'statutes creating legal
rights, -the invasion of which creates standing."
Id. at 2145 (citations omitted).
For their part, natural law judges would be sensitive to the natural law principle
that "where there is a wrong, there must be a remedy." As phrased by Chief Justice
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803), and cited by Jus-
tices Blackmun and O'Connor in their dissent in Defenders qf Wildlife, "The very es-
sence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the pro-
tection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. CL
at 2160 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Justice O'Connor joined in Justice Blackmun's dis-
senting opinion). On the other hand, natural law judges would also be sensitive to the
fact that not every natural law principle was incorporated into the Constitution, see
supra text accompanying notes 51-52, that Article Hr's "case or controversy" require-
ment and congressional control over Supreme Court jurisdiction represent textual limi-
tations on this principle, and that, where possible, it is better to have clearly defined
tests and consistency in legal categories. See supra text accompanying note 205. Re-
solving these competing tendencies, a natural law approach would thus likely be. recep-
tive to arguments concerning Congress' ability to provide for judicial remedies and for
finding that "Irjuries in fact" exist sufficient to meet the "case or controversy" require-
ment, as long as the definition of "ijury in fact" remains clearly defined and the con-
stitutional minimum of "case or controversy" is met.
All of these concerns were present in Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Defenders
of Wildlife. As Justice Kennedy stated:
The component of the standing inquiry is not satisfied unless "[p]lantiffs ...
demonstrate a 'personal stake in the outcome.'" . . . While it may seem triv-
al to require that Mss. Kelly and Skilbred acquire airline tickets to the pro-
ject sites or announce a date certain upon which they will return, this is not
a case where it is reasonable to assume that the affiants will be using the
sites on a regular basis .... [I]n different circumstances a nexus theory
similar to those proffered here might support such a claim .... As govern-
ment programs and policies become more complex and far-reaching, we must
be sensitive to the articulation of new rights of action that do not have clear
analogs in our common-law tradition .... In my view, Congress has the
power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise
to a case or controversy where none existed before, and I do not read the
Court's opinion to suggest a contrary view. In exercising this power, howev-
er, Congress must at the very least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate
and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit.
Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. CL at 2146-47 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment) (Justice Souter joined in Justice Kennedy's opinion).
Of course, an instrumentalist approach would be much more willing to find stand-
ing than any other approach in order to permit individuals to vindicate their rights in
court. In his concurrence in Defenders of Wildlife, Justice Stevens wrote: "In my
opinion a person who has visited the critical habitat of an endangered species, has a
professional interest in preserving the species and Its habitat, and intends to revisit
them in the future has standing to challenge agency action that threatens their destruc-
tion." Id. at 2147 (Stevens, J., concurring). Indeed, an extreme instrumentalist approach
might support standing without regard to a particularized finding of injury, as long as
the litigant was able to be a vigorous advocate and thus ensure sufficient "concrete
adversariness" to sharpen the issue for court resolution. See Mark Tushnet, The New
Law of Standing. A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L REv. 663, 688-90 (1977).
The separation of powers cases dealing with legislative or executive immunity
from judicial processes can be analyzed similarly. For example, in Gravel v. United
States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972), an instrumentalist dissent was willing to read the Speech
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V. CONCLUSION
This Article has suggested that four main approaches to judicial deci-
sion-making have existed in American legal history. These four approach-
or Debate Clause more broadly than would a formalist or a Holmesian, who would
pragmatically apply the Clause not only to House and Senate members, but also to
their staffs. The instrumentalist dissent would also have extended Speech or Debate
protection to statements made by members of Congress in public to advance the
sound, social policy of "informing the public." Id. at 652 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Jus-
tices Douglas and Marshall joined in Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion).
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), a formalist dissent by Chief Justice
Burger called for the clear, bright-line rule of absolute immunity for senior executive
officials. Id. at 822 (Burger, C. J., dissenting). The rest of the Court acknowledged a
need, in the absence of clear constitutional text, to apply a balancing approach, which
had both a Holmesian or instrumental "functional" branch, and an "analytical" "special
functions" branch. Id. at 810-12. This analytic branch focused most strongly on the
fundamental separation of powers concern that one branch does not intrude too greatly
on the prerogatives of another branch. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753-57
(1982) (recognizing that "the Presidential privilege is 'rooted in the separation of
powers'"). It was this analytic "special functions" branch which most strongly supported
absolute immunity for the President in Nixon. There, the Court stated: "In view of the
special nature of the President's constitutional office and functions, we think it appro-
priate to recognize absolute Presidential immunity from damages liablity for acts within
the 'outer perimeter' of his official responsibility." Id. at 756. However, this analytic
"special functions" branch did not support absolute immunity for other executive offi-
cials. See Harilow, 457 U.S. at 812 ("[A] 'special functions' rationale does not warrant a
blanket recognition of absolute immunity for all Presidential aides in the performance
of their duties."). This "analytic" branch may in part explain why Justice Powell
authored the majority opinions in both Hariow and Nixon, while more functional
Holmesian and instrumentalist Justices dissented, refusing to give the President absolute
immunity in Nixon. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 770 (White, J., dissenting) (Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun joined in Justice White's dissenting opinion) ("The Court casu-
ally, but candidly, abandons the functional approach to immunity that has run through
all of our decisions.").
Of course, it must be noted that in Hariow and Nixon the Justices used the term
"functional" to describe an inquiry into immunity based upon the functions which the
officer performs. This inquiry, however, is also functional in the jurisprudential sense
because It is based upon a pragmatic inquiry into the needs of the officer for immu-
nity. Similarly, the analytic "special functions" branch of immunity law is analytic in
the sense that term is used in this Article because it focuses on creating a clearly deL
fined, logical category of absolute immunity, not a functional or pragmatic case-by-case
inquiry. Addressing the problem consistent with a natural law perspective, Justice
Powell noted in Nixon that under this analytic branch of immunity doctrine, the Court
"has refused to draw functional lines finer than history or reason would support." Id.
at 755.
es can be called natural law, formalism, Holmesianism, and
instrumentalism. Two of these approaches, formalism and Holmesianism,
follow the dictates of positivism. The other two approaches, natural law
and instrumentalism, reject it. Two of the approaches, formalism and
natural law, emphasize an analytic, or logical, development of the law.
The other two approaches, Holmesianism and instrumentalism, focus on
functional, or pragmatic, concerns.'
On the present Supreme Court, one can find Justices who seem to
follow each of these four decision-making styles. Currently, there ap-
pears to be one formalist (Justice Scalia); two Holmesians (Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice White); two moderate instnnentalists (Justices
Blackmun and Stevens); and four Justices who, to varying extents, ap-
pear to follow most closely the framers and ratifiers' original natural law
approach (Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas).
This situation is somewhat muddled, however, because Justice Thomas
has indicated a predisposition to read the natural law philosophy of our
constitutional tradition differently than Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, or
Souter. For example, in the separation of powers area, instead of adopt-
ing the traditional view that the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution
believed in a sharing of powers, checks-and-balances approach, Justice
Thomas has suggested a belief that the framers were more attuned to a
strict separation of powers approach, which reflects a more formalist
approach towards separation of powers. Thus, Justice Thomas has indi-
cated a predisposition to vote with the one clear formalist on the Court,
Justice Scalia, in separation of powers cases.'
Therefore, with regard to separation of powers cases, there are per-
haps three groups of two Justices on the Court: Justices Scalia and
Thomas are likely to follow a formalist approach; Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice White are likely to follow a Holmesian approach; and Justic-
es Blackmun and Stevens are likely to follow an instrumentalist ap-
proach. Then, there is a final group of three Justices who appear to ap-
proach judicial decision-making more from the perspective of the framers
and ratifiers' original natural law approach: Justices Kennedy, O'Connor,
and Souter.
Given this categorization, for separation of powers purposes, the
Holmesian and instrumental pragmatists make up only four Justices on
the Court, while the Holmesian and formalist positivists also make up
only four Justices on the Court. To command a majority of five, one of
the three more natural law Justices needs to be persuaded. Perhaps for
480. See supra text accompanying notes 12-96.
481. See supra text accompanying notes 182-291.
482. See supra text accompanying notes 127-31, 248-62.
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this reason, the only approach unreservedly in the majority in each of the
six main separation of powers cases of the last decade was that of natu-
ral law.' With some theoretical support for a natural law position from
Justice Thomas8 " and some practical support from Justice
Blackmun,s' that is where the majority of the Court may be headed in
the future. Given a closer look at history,. this approach may be the'most
faithful to the original intent of the framers and ratifiers of our Constitu-
tion.'
483. See supra text accompanying notes 432-43, 459-63.
484. See supra notes 248 and accompanying text.
485. See supra note 266 (discussing Justice Blackmun's decision-making style as
poised between instrumentalism and natural law). See also supra text accompanying
notes 369-70.
486. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (citing to articles on the original
intent of the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution); supra notes 102-31 (discussing
the framers' and ratifiers' original views on the separation of powers).

